90 research outputs found

    Commonwealth of Independent States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

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    Throughout the region, anti-corruption initiatives begin, characteristically, from the top and, despite the increasing role of democratic institutions, independent media and NGOs, the speed of implementation is determined and controlled by political heads of states. Pressure from international lending agencies and donors is undoubtedly significant: the governments of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Turkmenistan all adopted anti-corruption rhetoric in 2002. What are absent are more effective ways of translating the rhetoric into consistent and effective programmes that address corruption

    A Critique of the global corruption “paradigm”

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    While the decline of communism in the late twentieth century brought democracy, political freedom, and better economic prospects for many people, it also produced massive social dislocation and engendered social problems that were far less pronounced under the old regimes. The fall of state socialism led to enormously complex political, economic, social, and cultural transformations, and while political liberalization was a lofty goal, it was neither uniform in its effects nor unqualified in its benefits. Postcommunism from Within foregrounds the diversity of the historical experiences and current realities of people in the postcommunist region in examining how they are responding to these monumental changes at home. The original essays in this volume lay out a bold new approach to research on the postcommunist region, and to democratization studies more broadly, that focuses on the social and cultural microprocesses behind political and economic transformation. Thematic essays by eminent scholars of postcommunism from across the social sciences are supported by case studies to demonstrate the limitations of current democratization paradigms and suggest ways of building categories of research that more closely capture the role of vernacular knowledge in demanding, creating, and adapting to institutional change. A novel approach to understanding one of the greatest political and social transformations in recent history, Postcommunism from Within explores not just how citizens respond to political and economic restructuring engineered at the top but also how people enact their own visions of life, politics, and justice by responding to daily challenges

    Interview with Prof. Alena Ledeneva: Thriving on the Fringe

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    INTERNATIONALLY RENOWNED EXPERT ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA, PROFESSOR ALENA LEDENEVA, IN CONVERSATION WITH SLOVO’S EXECUTIVE EDITOR BORIMIR TOTEV. Alena Ledeneva is a Professor of Politics and Society at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London. Her research interests include corruption, informal economy, economic crime, informal practices in corporate governance, and role of networks and patron-client relationships in Russia and around the globe. Her books ‘Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange’ (Cambridge University Press, 1998), ‘How Russia Really Works: Informal Practices in the 1990s’ (Cornell University Press, 2006), and ‘Can Russia Modernize? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance’ (Cambridge University Press, 2013) have become must-read sources in Russian studies and social sciences. She received her PhD in Social and Political Theory from Cambridge University. Currently, she is the pillar leader of the multi-partner ANTICORRP.eu research project and also works on the Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, The Global Informality Project, and the FRINGE CENTRE: Centre for the Study of Social and Cultural Complexity

    Corruption studies for the twenty-first century: paradigm shifts and innovative approaches

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    The key question currently driving innovations in corruption studies is why anti-corruption reforms do not work. The explanatory factors for the disappointing outcomes of anti-corruption interventions over the last twenty-five years include those associated with: 1) understanding and modelling of corrupt practices; 2) measurement and monitoring; and 3) policy design and implementation

    Managing Business Corruption: Targeting Non-Compliant Practices in Systemically Corrupt Environments

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    This article focuses on strategies of ‘managing business corruption’ at the firm level and offers insights for practitioners in systemically corrupt environments. Our study of 110 CEOs and owners of companies operating in Russia tested a new, ethnographic approach to managing corruption at a firm level. We conceptualize ‘managing business corruption’ as devising and implementing strategies that mitigate corruption-related risks in an effective way. We argue that such strategies have to target specific non-compliant practices, identified bottom-up, yet also amount to a pragmatic, problem-solving framework at the firm level, implemented top-down. Leadership is a key factor which defines effectiveness of corruption management in systemically corrupt environments. While the latter are generally conducive to tolerance and passive attitudes to corruption among business leaders, we identify proactive modes (preventive and controlling) and possible channels (formal hierarchy and informal networks) for leadership action. The proposed approach can also be used for leadership training

    VenÀjÀn talouden muuttaminen lÀpinÀkyvÀksi

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    VenÀjÀn epÀvirallinen hallinto

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    Nyky-VenĂ€jĂ€llĂ€ korruptio voidaan jĂ€ljittÀÀ traditionaalisiin kĂ€ytĂ€nteisiin, patrimoniaalisen vallan malliin ja neuvostoaikaisiin hallinnon vĂ€lineisiin – jotka kaikki laiminlyövĂ€t ja rutiininomaisesti ylittĂ€vĂ€t julkisen ja yksityisen vĂ€listĂ€ rajaa. HĂ€mĂ€rtynyt julkisen ja yksityisen vĂ€linen raja muodostaa tilan henkilökohtaisiin verkostoihin perustuvalle hallinnolle, johon nykyisin usein viitataan nimellĂ€ ”Putinin sistema”. ”Kestityksen”, ”jaetun vastuullisuuden” ja ”Potjomkinin kulissien” mallit ovat tunnistettavissa tavassa, jossa johtajuus on riippuvaista instrumenteista kuten ilmoittamattomat palkkiot, epĂ€viralliset kytkökset, piilotetut agendat ja varoitusviestit, jotka voidaan nĂ€hdĂ€ tehokkaina hallinnon mekanismeina. Tiettyjen toimijoiden henkilökohtaisen vaikutuksen avulla Putinin sistema antaa voimaa hallituksen taloudellisille ja poliittisille projekteille ja pitÀÀ jĂ€rjestelmĂ€n alamaiset varpaillaan. Samaan aikaan jĂ€rjestelmĂ€n avoimuuden ja vastuullisuuden vastainen luonne tarjoaa hedelmĂ€llisen maaperĂ€n korruptiolle ja tekee sen torjumisesta vaikeaa. En suoraan samaista epĂ€virallista hallintoa korruptioon, mutta vĂ€itĂ€n, ettei korruptiota kyetĂ€ VenĂ€jĂ€llĂ€ kunnolla torjumaan, elleivĂ€t maan johtajat sitoudu ”reflektiiviseen modernisointiin” ja tunnusta yllĂ€pitĂ€mĂ€nsĂ€ epĂ€virallisen hallinnon seuraamuksia, joista yleinen korruptio on yksi vahingollisimmista maan toiminnan kannalta

    Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? Informal Governance and the Public/Private Crossover in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania

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    Despite significant investment and anti-corruption capacity building in the past decades, 'most systematically corrupt countries are considered to be just as corrupt now as they were before the anti-corruption interventions'. Statements like this are indicative of the frustration shared by practitioners and scholars alike at the apparent lack of success in controlling corruption worldwide and point to the need to rethink our understanding of the factors that fuel corruption and make it so hard to abate. In this article we propose a novel analytical lens through which to understand the root causes of corruption. Our arguments emerge out of the study of commonplace practices shaping political, economic and social outcomes in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania. The comparative analysis of these three seemingly dissimilar cases revealed striking similarities in rudimentary patterns of informal governance, which in turn can be linked to specific incentives to engage in corrupt behaviours
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