597 research outputs found
Objective rationality foundations for (dynamic) Alpha-MEU
We show how incorporating Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler’s (2010) notion of objective rationality into the α-MEU model of choice under ambiguity can overcome several challenges faced by the baseline model without objective rationality. The decision-maker (DM) has a subjectively rational preference ≿^, which captures the complete ranking overacts the DM expresses when forced to make a choice; in addition, we endow the DM with a (possibly incomplete) objectively rational preference ≿*, which captures the rankings the DM deems uncontroversial. Under the objectively founded α-MEU model, ≿^ has an α-MEU representation and ≿*has a unanimity representation à la Bewley (2002), where both representations feature the same utility index and set of beliefs. While the axiomatic foundations of the baseline α-MEU model are still not fully understood, we provide a simple characterization of its objectively founded counterpart. Moreover, in contrast with the baseline model, the model parameters are uniquely identified. Finally, we provide axiomatic foundations for prior-by-prior Bayesian updating of the objectively founded α-MEU model, while we show that, for the baseline model, standard updating rules can be ill-defined
Objective Rationality Foundations for (Dynamic) α-MEU
We show how incorporating Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler’s (2010) notion of objective rationality into the alpha-MEU model of choice under ambiguity (Hurwicz, 1951) can overcome several challenges faced by the baseline model without objective rationality. The decision-maker (DM) has a subjectively rational preference , which captures the complete ranking over acts the DM expresses when forced to make a choice; in addition, we endow the DM with a (possibly incomplete) objectively rational preference , which captures the rankings the DM deems uncontroversial. Under the objectively founded alpha-MEU model, has an alpha-MEU representation and has a unanimity representation à la Bewley (2002), where both representations feature the same utility index and set of beliefs. While the axiomatic foundations of the baseline alpha-MEU model are still not fully understood, we provide a simple characterization of its objectively founded counterpart. Moreover, in contrast with the baseline model, the model parameters are uniquely identified. Finally, we provide axiomatic foundations for prior-by-prior Bayesian updating of the objectively founded alpha-MEU model, while we show that, for the baseline model, standard updating rules can be ill-defined
Objective rationality foundations for (dynamic) α-MEU
We show how incorporating Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler’s (2010) notion of objective rationality into the alpha-MEU model of choice under ambiguity (Hurwicz, 1951) can overcome several challenges faced by the baseline model without objective rationality. The decision-maker (DM) has a subjectively rational preference , which captures the complete ranking over acts the DM expresses when forced to make a choice; in addition, we endow the DM with a (possibly incomplete) objectively rational preference , which captures the rankings the DM deems uncontroversial. Under the objectively founded alpha-MEU model, has an alpha-MEU representation and has a unanimity representation à la Bewley (2002), where both representations feature the same utility index and set of beliefs. While the axiomatic foundations of the baseline alpha-MEU model are still not fully understood, we provide a simple characterization of its objectively founded counterpart. Moreover, in contrast with the baseline model, the model parameters are uniquely identified. Finally, we provide axiomatic foundations for prior-by-prior Bayesian updating of the objectively founded alpha-MEU model, while we show that, for the baseline model, standard updating rules can be ill-defined
Boolean Expected Utility
We propose a multiple-prior model of preferences under ambiguity that provides a unified lens through which to understand different formalizations of ambiguity aversion, as well as context-dependent negative and positive ambiguity attitudes documented in experiments. This model, Boolean expected utility (BEU), represents the belief the decision-maker uses to evaluate any uncertain prospect as the outcome of a game between two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. We prove, first, that BEU provides a novel representation of the class of invariant biseparable preferences (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004). Second, BEU accommodates rich patterns of ambiguity attitudes, which we characterize in terms of the relative power allocated to each force in the game
Enhanced Wavelet Analysis of Solar Magnetic Activity with Comparison to Global Temperature and the Central England Temperature Record
The continuous wavelet transform may be enhanced by deconvolution with the
wavelet response function. After correcting for the cone-of-influence, the
power spectral density of the solar magnetic record as given by the derectified
yearly sunspot number is calculated, revealing a spectrum of odd harmonics of
the fundamental Hale cycle, and the integrated instant power is compared to a
reconstruction of global temperature in a normalized scatter plot displaying a
positive correlation after the turn of the twentieth century. Comparison of the
spectrum with that obtained from the Central England Temperature record
suggests that some features are shared while others are not, and the scatter
plot again indicates a possible correlation.Comment: 19 pages, 11 figure
Dual-self Representations of Ambiguity Preferences
We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity, where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM’s ambiguity attitude, and we show that it provides a unified framework through which to characterize different degrees of ambiguity aversion, and to represent the co-existence of negative and positive ambiguity attitudes within individuals as documented in experiments. We prove that our baseline representation, dual-self expected utility (DSEU), yields a novel representation of the class of invariant biseparable preferences (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004), which drops uncertainty aversion from maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). Extensions of DSEU allow for more general departures from independence
Dual-self Representations of Ambiguity Preferences
We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity, where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM’s ambiguity attitude, and we show that it provides a unified framework through which to characterize different degrees of ambiguity aversion, and to represent the co-existence of negative and positive ambiguity attitudes within individuals as documented in experiments. We prove that our baseline representation, dual-self expected utility (DSEU), yields a novel representation of the class of invariant biseparable preferences (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004), which drops uncertainty aversion from maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), while extensions of DSEU allow for more general departures from independence. We also provide foundations for a generalization of prior-by-prior belief updating to our model
Boolean Representations of Preferences under Ambiguity
We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM’s ambiguity attitude, and we show that it provides a unified framework through which to characterize different degrees of ambiguity aversion, as well as to represent context-dependent negative and positive ambiguity attitudes documented in experiments. We prove that our baseline representation, Boolean expected utility (BEU), yields a novel representation of the class of invariant biseparable preferences (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004), which drops uncertainty aversion from maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), while extensions of BEU allow for more general departures from independence
Multi-timescale Solar Cycles and the Possible Implications
Based on analysis of the annual averaged relative sunspot number (ASN) during
1700 -- 2009, 3 kinds of solar cycles are confirmed: the well-known 11-yr cycle
(Schwabe cycle), 103-yr secular cycle (numbered as G1, G2, G3, and G4,
respectively since 1700); and 51.5-yr Cycle. From similarities, an
extrapolation of forthcoming solar cycles is made, and found that the solar
cycle 24 will be a relative long and weak Schwabe cycle, which may reach to its
apex around 2012-2014 in the vale between G3 and G4. Additionally, most Schwabe
cycles are asymmetric with rapidly rising-phases and slowly decay-phases. The
comparisons between ASN and the annual flare numbers with different GOES
classes (C-class, M-class, X-class, and super-flare, here super-flare is
defined as X10.0) and the annal averaged radio flux at frequency of 2.84
GHz indicate that solar flares have a tendency: the more powerful of the flare,
the later it takes place after the onset of the Schwabe cycle, and most
powerful flares take place in the decay phase of Schwabe cycle. Some
discussions on the origin of solar cycles are presented.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figure
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