A sobrevivência de empresas nascentes no estado de São Paulo: um estudo sobre capital humano, capital social e práticas gerenciais

ABSTRACTThe survival of new companies in São Paulo state: a study about human capital, social capital and management practicesThe literature indicates that small young firms face a greater risk of closing than bigger, established enterprises in their respective sectors. The objective of our research is to examine empirically the impact of three factors that may contribute to the survival of rising companies: the human capital of the entrepreneurs, their social capital and the use of management practices after the startup of the new firm. Based on a sample of 1,961 companies opened and registered at State of São Paulo Registry of Commerce (Jucesp) from 1999 to 2003, we conducted a quantitative study to examine the probability of survival of these enterprises. Certain variables were shown to be statistically significant in terms of explaining the likelihood of survival of new companies, such as the entrepreneurs’ degree of education and their previous preparation before opening the business (related to their human capital), the existence of family members in similar businesses (related to their social capital) and, mainly, the adoption of management practices such as attempting to foresee facts and the search for relevant information. These results highlight the need to consider elements of different theoretical approaches in order to explain the likelihood of new enterprises surviving

Competição entre bolsas de futuros: o caso da BM&F e da CSCE no mercado de café

This study discusses the competition between futures exchanges as evaluated by their users, in particular hedgers, choosing alternative contracts based on costs and benefits of hedging. Focusing on Brazilian hedgers, two alternative exchanges supplying coffee futures contracts are evaluated: the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE), and the Brazilian Commodities and Futures Exchange (BM&F), the latter with contracts more specifically designed to the physical, temporal and locational characteristics of the Brazilian coffee. Results suggest that liquidity is the most important factor influencing the negotiation of contracts on the CSCE market by Brazilian traders, even though there is evidence that hedging effectiveness tends to be higher for the BM&Fcontract. An analysis ofthe future price bias ("risk premium") embodied in the contracts did not allow us to reject the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the exchanges with regard to this aspect. Institutional and dynamic issues are also briefly discussed

Opportunistic behavior involving specific investments in negotiations: a study with experimental methodology

O comportamento oportunista nas relações contratuais que demandam investimentos específicos, denominado hold-up, é tido na literatura como uma das explicações para a existência de firmas integradas verticalmente. Apesar disso, muitos autores acreditam que esse comportamento pode ser evitado por meio de termos contratuais, desejo de construir reputação ou intenção de premiar uma atitude anterior. Existem controvérsias quanto à ocorrência de oportunismo mesmo na famosa relação contratual entre a General Motors e a Fisher Body, tida como um exemplo clássico de hold-up por muitos autores. Essa questão é crucial, pois se o hold-up pode ser evitado, a literatura precisa encontrar teorias alternativas para a existência de firmas verticalmente integradas. Visando aprofundar essa questão, foi realizado um experimento em que os participantes, agrupados em pares, negociaram com sua contraparte. Os papéis atribuídos aos participantes permitiam que um dos agentes empregasse o hold-up no outro. Essa ação oportunista ainda poderia ser acobertada pela assimetria de informação. Os resultados foram heterogêneos, não permitindo uma resposta única em relação ao emprego do hold-up. A maioria agiu oportunisticamente, mas não de forma a expropriar por completo as quase-rendas da contraparte. De maneira inesperada, o hold-up foi mais freqüente nos pares em que as pessoas já se conheciam.El comportamiento oportunista en relaciones contractuales que demandan inversiones específicas, denominado hold-up, está considerado en la literatura como una de las explicaciones para la existencia de empresas integradas verticalmente. Sin embargo, muchos autores creen que se puede evitar ese comportamiento por medio de cláusulas contractuales, deseo de construir reputación o intención de recompensar una actitud anterior. Hay controversias sobre la ocurrencia de oportunismo incluso en la famosa relación contractual entre General Motors y Fisher Body, considerada por muchos autores como un ejemplo clásico de hold-up. Si se puede evitar el hold-up, la literatura debe encontrar teorías alternativas que expliquen la existencia de empresas verticalmente integradas. Intentando profundizar la discusión, se realizó un experimento en que los participantes, agrupados en parejas, negociaron entre sí. Los papeles atribuidos a los participantes permitían que uno de los agentes empleara el hold-up en el otro. Asimismo, esa acción oportunista podría ser encubierta por la asimetría de información. Los resultados fueron heterogéneos, lo que no permite una respuesta única con relación al empleo del hold-up. La mayoría actuó de forma oportunista, pero no de forma a expropiar completamente las cuasirrentas de su pareja. De modo inesperado, el hold-up fue más frecuente cuando las parejas se conocían previamente.In the related literature, opportunistic behavior in contractual relations that require specific investments, commonly referred to as 'hold-up', partly accounts for the existence of vertically integrated firms. However, many authors posit that this behavior can be deterred through contractual terms, desire to build a reputation or intention to reward previous attitudes. The occurrence of opportunism is controversial, even in the famous contractual relation between General Motors and Fisher Body, considered by some as a canonical example of hold-up. This is a paramount issue because, if hold-up can indeed be avoided, literature must find new, alternative theories for the existence of vertically-integrated firms. Aimed at a deeper understanding of this issue, an experiment was carried out in which pairs of purchasers and sellers meet in negotiations. The roles ascribed to the participants allowed them to engage in hold-up with each other, and opportunistic behavior could also be concealed by informational asymmetries. Results were heterogeneous, not allowing a single clear answer regarding the occurrence of hold-up. Most participants acted opportunistically, but not so as to totally expropriate the quasi rents of their counterparts. Unexpectedly, the hold-up problem was proven more frequent in the pairs where people already knew each other

Pesquisa em Administração: Em busca de impacto social e outros impactos

Reflexão sobre o desafio da pesquisa no campo da Administração obter impacto social.Reflexión sobre el desafío de la investigación, en el campo de la Administración, de obtener impacto social.A reflection on the challenge of achieving a social impact in the field of management.