License prices for financially constrained firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers’ point of view

Polyelectrolyte Multilayering on a Charged Planar Surface

The adsorption of highly \textit{oppositely} charged flexible polyelectrolytes (PEs) on a charged planar substrate is investigated by means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. We study in detail the equilibrium structure of the first few PE layers. The influence of the chain length and of a (extra) non-electrostatic short range attraction between the polycations and the negatively charged substrate is considered. We show that the stability as well as the microstructure of the PE layers are especially sensitive to the strength of this latter interaction. Qualitative agreement is reached with some recent experiments.Comment: 28 pages; 11 (main) Figs - Revtex4 - Higher resolution Figs can be obtained upon request. To appear in Macromolecule