The Supreme Court, CAFA, and \u3cem\u3eParens Patriae\u3c/em\u3e Actions: Will it be Principles or Biases?

The Supreme Court will hear a case during its 2013-2014 term that will test the principles of both its conservative and liberal wings. In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., Justices from each wing of the Court will be forced to choose between the modes of statutory interpretation they usually have favored in the past and their previously displayed pro-business or anti-business predispositions. The issue is whether the defendant-manufacturers can remove an action brought by a state attorney general suing as parens patriae to federal court. Beginning with their actions against tobacco manufacturers in the mid-1990s, state attorneys general often sued as parens patriae in litigation of nationwide significance. In Hood, the Supreme Court considers whether mass plaintiffs’ attorneys, by partnering with state attorneys general in parens patriae actions, will be able to circumvent the requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act that allow defendants to remove class actions and other forms of mass actions to the typically more defendant-friendly confines of federal courts. Resolution will turn on the Court’s interpretation of the statutory term “mass action.” A textualist interpretation, usually favored by Justice Scalia and his conservative colleagues, would not allow such removal—a decidedly anti-business result. At the same time, a purposive approach to interpreting the statutory provision, promoted by Justice Breyer, possibly would allow such removal. For each group of Justices, the conflict is clear: Will they follow their previously articulated principles of statutory interpretation or their ideological biases

A Case Study in the Superiority of the Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation: \u3cem\u3e Bruesewitz v. Wyeth \u3c/em\u3e

This Article uses the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth to examine the textualist or “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation. For more than a quarter-century, Justice Scalia has successfully promoted textualism, usually associated with conservatism, among his colleagues. In Bruesewitz, Scalia, writing for the majority, and his liberal colleague Justice Sotomayer, in dissent, both employed textualism to determine if the plaintiffs, whose child was allegedly harmed by a vaccine, could pursue common-law tort claims or whether their remedies were limited to those available under the no-fault compensation system established by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Despite these Justices’ common approach to statutory interpretation, they reached diametrically opposite conclusions in opinions that dissected the statutory language and quarreled over the meaning of “even though” and “if” clauses. In contrast, Justice Breyer employed a purposive or “purposes and objectives” approach to statutory interpretation. Rather than obsessing over the meaning of each and every phrase, Breyer looked at Congress’s goals in passing the Act. He recognized that Scalia’s conclusion was correct, not because of the supposedly “plain” meaning of specific language, but because this interpretation was the only one that enabled the alternative compensation system to function as Congress envisioned. Other scholars have analyzed Bruesewitz as a preemption case, but despite statutory interpretation’s inherently decisive role in express preemption cases, this is the first Article to highlight Bruesewitz as an illustration of the emptiness of textualism

Coyote (Canis latrans) use of marine resources in coastal California: A new behavior relative to their recent ancestors

Coyotes ( Canis latrans) are known to consume marine foods, but the importance and persistence of marine subsidies to coyotes is unknown. Recent access to a marine subsidy, especially if gained following apex predator loss, may facilitate coyote expansion along coastal routes and amplify the effects of mesopredator release. Our goal was to quantify and contextualize past and present marine resource use by coyotes on the central coast of California via stable isotope analysis. We measured δ13C and δ15N values in coyotes, their competitors, and their food resources at two modern sites, seven archaeological sites spanning in age from ~3000 to 750 BP, and from historical (AD 1893–1992) coyote and grizzly bear hair and bone sourced from coastal counties. We found evidence for marine resource use by modern coastal California coyotes at one site, Año Nuevo, which hosts a mainland northern elephant seal ( Mirounga angustirostris) breeding colony. Seals and sea lions account for ~20% of Año Nuevo coyote diet throughout the year and this marine subsidy likely positively impacts coyote population size. Isotopic data suggest that neither historic nor prehistoric coyotes consumed marine-derived foods, even at sites near ancient mainland seal rookeries. Marine resource use by some contemporary California coyotes is a novel behavior relative to their recent ancestors. We hypothesize that human alteration of the environment through extirpation of the California grizzly bear and the more recent protection of marine mammals likely enabled this behavioral shift

Symbiotic outcome modified by the diversification from 7 to over 700 nodule specific cysteine rich peptides

Legume-rhizobium symbiosis represents one of the most successfully co-evolved mutualisms. Within nodules, the bacterial cells undergo distinct metabolic and morphological changes and differentiate into nitrogen-fixing bacteroids. Legumes in the inverted repeat lacking clade (IRLC) employ an array of defensin-like small secreted peptides (SSPs), known as nodule-specific cysteine-rich (NCR) peptides, to regulate bacteroid differentiation and activity. While most NCRs exhibit bactericidal effects in vitro, studies confirm that inside nodules they target the bacterial cell cycle and other cellular pathways to control and extend rhizobial differentiation into an irreversible (or terminal) state where the host gains control over bacteroids. While NCRs are well established as positive regulators of effective symbiosis, more recent findings also suggest that NCRs affect partner compatibility. The extent of bacterial differentiation has been linked to species-specific size and complexity of the NCR gene family that varies even among closely related species, suggesting a more recent origin of NCRs followed by rapid expansion in certain species. NCRs have diversified functionally, as well as in their expression patterns and responsiveness, likely driving further functional specialisation. In this review, we evaluate the functions of NCR peptides and their role as a driving force underlying the outcome of rhizobial symbiosis, where the plant is able to determine the outcome of rhizobial interaction in a temporal and spatial manner

What\u27s on First?: Organizing the Casebook and Molding the Mind

This study empirically tests the proposition that law students adopt different conceptions of the judge’s role in adjudication based on whether they first study intentional torts, negligence, or strict liability. The authors conducted an anonymous survey of more than 450 students enrolled in eight law schools at the beginning, mid-point, and end of the first semester of law school. The students were prompted to indicate to what extent they believed the judge’s role to be one of rule application and, conversely, to what extent it was one of considering social, economic, and ideological factors. The survey found that while all three groups of students shifted toward a belief that judges consider social, economic, and ideological factors, the degree of the shift differed in a statistically significant way depending on which torts their professors taught first. These differences persisted throughout the semester, even after they studied other torts. Further, these differences were observed even when the analysis controlled for law school ranking and were more pronounced among students attending the highest ranked schools. In interpreting the survey results, the authors employ sociologist Erving Goffman’s theory of “frame analysis” and the work of cognitive psychologists including Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman on “anchoring.” The Article concludes that the category of tort liability to which students are first exposed affects the “frame” or “lens” through which they view the judicial process. This frame becomes anchored and persists throughout the study of other tort categories. The lessons about the nature of the judging process learned implicitly through the professor’s choice of topic sequence may be even more important than the substantive topics themselves