Euler diagrams through the looking glass: From extent to intent

Extension and intension are two ways of indicating the fundamental meaning of a concept. The extent of a concept, C, is the set of objects which correspond to C whereas the intent of C is the collection of attributes that characterise it. Thus, intension denotes the set of objects corresponding to C without naming them individually. Mathematicians switch comfortably between these perspectives but the majority of logical diagrams deal exclusively in extension. Euler diagrams indicate sets using curves to depict their extent in a way that intuitively matches the relations between the sets. What happens when we use spatial diagrams to depict intension? What can we infer about the intension of a concept given its extension, and vice versa? We present the first steps towards addressing these questions by defining extensional and intensional Euler diagrams and translations between the two perspectives. We show that translation in either direction leads to a loss of information, yet preserves important semantic properties. To conclude, we explain how we expect further exploration of the relationship between the two perspectives could shed light on connections between diagrams, extension, intension, and well-matchedness

A formal concept view of argumentation

International audienceThe paper presents a parallel between two important theories for the treatment of information which address questions that are apparently unrelated and that are studied by different research communities: an enriched view of formal concept analysis and abstract argumentation. Both theories exploit a binary relation (expressing object-property links, attacks between arguments). We show that when an argumentation framework rather considers the complementary relation does not attack, then its stable extensions can be seen as the exact counterparts of formal concepts. This leads to a cube of oppositions, a generalization of the well-known square of oppositions, between eight remarkable sets of arguments. This provides a richer view for argumentation in cases of bi-valued attack relations and fuzzy ones

Significance testing as perverse probabilistic reasoning

Truth claims in the medical literature rely heavily on statistical significance testing. Unfortunately, most physicians misunderstand the underlying probabilistic logic of significance tests and consequently often misinterpret their results. This near-universal misunderstanding is highlighted by means of a simple quiz which we administered to 246 physicians at two major academic hospitals, on which the proportion of incorrect responses exceeded 90%. A solid understanding of the fundamental concepts of probability theory is becoming essential to the rational interpretation of medical information. This essay provides a technically sound review of these concepts that is accessible to a medical audience. We also briefly review the debate in the cognitive sciences regarding physicians' aptitude for probabilistic inference

Leibniz on Intellectual Pleasure, Perception of Perfection, and Power

Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power