Adam Smith and the theory of punishment

A distinctive theory of punishment plays a central role in Smith's moral and legal theory. According to this theory, we regard the punishment of a crime as deserved only to the extent that an impartial spectator would go along with the actual or supposed resentment of the victim. The first part of this paper argues that Smith's theory deserves serious consideration and relates it to other theories such as utilitarianism and more orthodox forms of retributivism. The second part considers the objection that, because Smith's theory implies that punishment is justified only when there is some person or persons who is the victim of the crime, it cannot explain the many cases where punishment is imposed purely for the public good. It is argued that Smith's theory could be extended to cover such cases. The third part defends Smith's theory against the objection that, because it relies on our natural feelings, it cannot provide an adequate moral justification of punishment

Sequential Extensions of Causal and Evidential Decision Theory

Moving beyond the dualistic view in AI where agent and environment are separated incurs new challenges for decision making, as calculation of expected utility is no longer straightforward. The non-dualistic decision theory literature is split between causal decision theory and evidential decision theory. We extend these decision algorithms to the sequential setting where the agent alternates between taking actions and observing their consequences. We find that evidential decision theory has two natural extensions while causal decision theory only has one.Comment: ADT 201

Robert Nozick on nonhuman animals : rights, value and the meaning of life

In his chapter, Josh Milburn argues that Robert Nozick considers nonhuman animals in his philosophical writings, but that these discussions are downplayed in animal ethics and Nozick scholarship. This is regrettable, Milburn proposes, as Nozick is far more sympathetic to animal rights than many other libertarians. Milburn thus offers an analysis of Nozick’s animal ethics. Nozick’s arguments concerning vegetarianism and speciesism are considered, and Milburn argues that tensions in Nozick’s political philosophy potentially open the door to animal rights. Whatever their place in his political philosophy, Milburn contends, nonhuman animals find a comfortable home in Nozick’s axiology and ethics, with their value and the significance of our duties towards them affirmed. Milburn concludes that animal ethicists could learn from Nozick’s distinctive arguments and approaches and find an unexpected ally

Fairness, envy, guilt and greed: building equity considerations into agency theory

In this article we examine the extent to which fairness considerations are salient to senior executives, and consider the implications for agency theory, tournament theory and the design of top-management incentives. We look for patterns in a unique data set of senior executive preferences and seek explanations for these patterns using a model of fairness first advanced by Fehr and Schmidt in 1999. We propose a number of amendments to Fehr and Schmidt’s model. We challenge some of the standard tenets of agency theory and tournament theory, demonstrating why equity considerations should be taken into account. We add to the growing literature on behavioural agency theory

Denying reciprocity

When individuals receive benefits as a result of the burdens assumed by other people, they are expected to make a return in similar form. To do otherwise is considered as a failure to treat those other people with appropriate respect. It is this which justifies the expectation that individuals share in the labour that is necessary to preserve just institutions and productive practices that characterise complex schemes of social cooperation. In this paper, I argue that where benefits do not meet thresholds specifying the expected function and efficacy of those benefits, this does not simply issue in a ‘downward adjustment’ in the work expectations and reciprocal demands that are made of people. Rather, it legitimates refusal to engage in productive labour even where limited benefits are still being received. Other costs and obligations emerge that contribute to the creation of disruptive political, economic and social associations. These not only replace the demands of reciprocity but actively target and disrupt the practices and exchanges that give form to reciprocity

Just urban transitions: Toward a research agenda

While there are excellent policy and academic foundations for thinking about and making sense of urban climate action and questions of justice and climate change independently, there is less work that considers their intersection. The nature and dynamics of, and requirements for, a just urban transition (JUT)—the fusion of climate action and justice concerns at the urban scale—are not well understood. In this review article we seek to rectify this by first examining the different strains of justice scholarship (environmental, energy, climate, urban) that are informing and should inform JUT. We then turn to a discussion of just transitions in general, tracing the history of the term and current understandings in the literature. These two explorations provide a foundation for considering both scholarly and policy‐relevant JUT agendas. We identify what is still needed to know in order to recognize, study, and foster JUT.This article is categorized under:The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Benefits of MitigationClimate, Nature, and Ethics > Climate Change and Global JusticeJust urban transitions research and policy agendas center alternative urban futures: cities where the distribution of environmental risks and benefits do not disproportionately burden marginalized groups; where decision‐making is transparent, engaged, and democratic; and where policies seek to remedy structural inequalities and prior injustices.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154981/1/wcc640_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154981/2/wcc640.pd

Free Will in a Quantum World?

In this paper, I argue that Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem (1,2) to the conclusion that quantum mechanics and relativity entail freedom for the particles, does not change the situation in favor of a libertarian position as they would like. In fact, the theorem more or less implicitly assumes that people are free, and thus it begs the question. Moreover, it does not prove neither that if people are free, so are particles, nor that the property people possess when they are said to be free is the same as the one particles possess when they are claimed to be free. I then analyze the Free State Theorem (2), which generalizes the Free Will Theorem without the assumption that people are free, and I show that it does not prove anything about free will, since the notion of freedom for particles is either inconsistent, or it does not concern our common understanding of freedom. In both cases, the Free Will Theorem and the Free State Theorem do not provide any enlightenment on the constraints physics can pose on free will

Big data: Finders keepers, losers weepers?

This article argues that big data’s entrepreneurial potential is based not only on new technological developments that allow for the extraction of non-trivial, new insights out of existing data, but also on an ethical judgment that often remains implicit: namely the ethical judgment that those companies that generate these new insights can legitimately appropriate (the fruits of) these insights. As a result, the business model of big data companies is essentially founded on a libertarian-inspired ‘finders, keepers’ ethic. The article argues, next, that this presupposed ‘finder, keepers’ ethic is far from unproblematic and relies itself on multiple unconvincing assumptions. This leads to the conclusion that the conduct of companies working with big data might lack ethical justification

Contingency contractor optimization. Phase 2, requirements document.

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