Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities

This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to charge low access prices. This result moderates the risk of tacit collusion when competitors can freely negotiate their access charges. We also analyze the case of a merger between the two networks and give conditions under which the merger can be welfare improving.

Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences

We try in this paper to characterize the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia. Our study is based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and a comparison of the critical threshold of collusion between operators in developing countries like Tunisia. The market power is estimated based on the work of Parker Roller (1997) and the assumption of "Balanced Calling Pattern". We use then the model of Friedman (1971) to compare the critical threshold of collusion. We show that the "conduct parameter" measuring the intensity of competition is not null during the period 1993-2011. Results show also that collusion is easier on the Tunisian market that on the Algerian, Jordanian, or Moroccan one

Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities

This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to charge low access prices. This result moderates the risk of tacit collusion when competitors can freely negotiate their access charges. We also analyze the case of a merger between the two networks and give conditions under which the merger can be welfare improving.

Interconnexion de reseaux et qualite de l'infrastructure comme barriere a l'entree: quels instruments de regulation?

Nous situons notre analyse dans le contexte de l'ouverture a la concurrence d'un bien reseau dans lequel l'operateur historique, integre verticalement, gere en monopole l'infrastructure et est concurrence sur les sectuers des services. La qualite du bien reseau est le minimum des qualite de chaque composante. Nous montrons que l'operatuer historique peut utiliser la qualite de son infrastructure comme instrument de barriere a l'entree.CONCURRENCE

Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition

While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005tax, federalism, harmonization, rent-seeking, commons, H20, H77,

Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries

Tax competition, Mobility of factors of production, Fiscal federalism, H23, H77, H87,