NRC support for the Kalinin (VVER) probabilistic risk assessment

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority of the Russian Federation have been working together since 1994 to carry out a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of a VVER-1000 in the Russian Federation. This was a recognition by both parties that this technology has had a profound effect on the discipline of nuclear reactor safety in the West and that the technology should be transferred to others so that it can be applied to Soviet-designed plants. The NRC provided funds from the Agency for International Development and technical support primarily through Brookhaven National Laboratory and its subcontractors. The latter support was carried out through workshops, by documenting the methodology to be used in a set of guides, and through periodic review of the technical activity. The result of this effort to date includes a set of procedure guides, a draft final report on the Level 1 PRA for internal events (excluding internal fires and floods), and progress reports on the fire, flood, and seismic analysis. It is the authors belief that the type of assistance provided by the NRC has been instrumental in assuring a quality product and transferring important technology for use by regulators and operators of Soviet-designed reactors. After a thorough review, the report will be finalized, lessons learned will be applied in the regulatory and operational regimes in the Russian Federation, and consideration will be given to supporting a containment analysis in order to complete a simplified Level 2 PRA

NRC Support for the Kalinin (Vver) Probabilistic Risk Assessment

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority of the Russian Federation have been working together since 1994 to carry out a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of a VVER-1000 in the Russian Federation. This was a recognition by both parties that this technology has had a profound effect on the discipline of nuclear reactor safety in the West and that the technology should be transferred to others so that it can be applied to Soviet-designed plants. The NRC provided funds from the Agency for International Development and technical support primarily through Brookhaven National Laboratory and its subcontractors. The latter support was carried out through workshops, by documenting the methodology to be used in a set of guides, and through periodic review of the technical activity. The result of this effort to date includes a set of procedure guides, a draft final report on the Level 1 PRA for internal events (excluding internal fires and floods), and progress reports on the fire, flood, and seismic analysis. It is the authors belief that the type of assistance provided by the NRC has been instrumental in assuring a quality product and transferring important technology for use by regulators and operators of Soviet-designed reactors. After a thorough review, the report will be finalized, lessons learned will be applied in the regulatory and operational regimes in the Russian Federation, and consideration will be given to supporting a containment analysis in order to complete a simplified Level 2 PRA

Cocirculation of Two Transmission Lineages of Echovirus 6 in Jinan, China, as Revealed by Environmental Surveillance and Sequence Analysis▿

Enterovirus environmental surveillance on sewage from the city of Jinan, Shandong Province, China, was initiated in 2008. Thirty echovirus 6 (E6) strains—1 in 2008 and 29 in 2010—were isolated and identified. Most E6 isolates (n = 21) came from the sewage collected on August 2010, revealing high local E6 activity at that time. Interestingly, the VP1 sequences of most isolates, even from the same sewage, were not identical. Phylogenetic analysis of VP1 sequences revealed two lineages for these isolates, with 78.0 to 80.0% nucleotide identities with one another, 94.8 to 100.0% identity within the major lineage, and 92.7 to 98.5% identity within the minor one. The VP1 sequences of environmental isolates, clinical isolates from 1998 to 2010, and global E6 were subjected to evolutionary analysis using Bayesian phylodynamic methods. The inferred E6 VP1 ancestral sequence dated back to 1901 (range, 1873 to 1928) and evolved with 7.047 × 10−3 substitutions per site per year. Shandong E6 segregated into three clusters, and the two environmental lineages belonged to clusters A and C, which originated in 2003 and 1992, respectively. The antigenicity analysis via neutralization assay confirmed great antigenic differences between Shandong isolates and a prototype strain. These findings underscore the value of continuous environmental surveillance and genetic analysis to monitor circulating enteroviruses in the population and give further insight into E6 evolution