Downregulation of TFPI in breast cancer cells induces tyrosine phosphorylation signaling and increases metastatic growth by stimulating cell motility

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Increased hemostatic activity is common in many cancer types and often causes additional complications and even death. Circumstantial evidence suggests that tissue factor pathway inhibitor-1 (TFPI) plays a role in cancer development. We recently reported that downregulation of TFPI inhibited apoptosis in a breast cancer cell line. In this study, we investigated the effects of TFPI on self-sustained growth and motility of these cells, and of another invasive breast cancer cell type (MDA-MB-231).</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Stable cell lines with TFPI (both α and β) and only TFPIβ downregulated were created using RNA interference technology. We investigated the ability of the transduced cells to grow, when seeded at low densities, and to form colonies, along with metastatic characteristics such as adhesion, migration and invasion.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Downregulation of TFPI was associated with increased self-sustained cell growth. An increase in cell attachment and spreading was observed to collagen type I, together with elevated levels of integrin α2. Downregulation of TFPI also stimulated migration and invasion of cells, and elevated MMP activity was involved in the increased invasion observed. Surprisingly, equivalent results were observed when TFPIβ was downregulated, revealing a novel function of this isoform in cancer metastasis.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Our results suggest an anti-metastatic effect of TFPI and may provide a novel therapeutic approach in cancer.</p

Integrating institutional and behavioural measures of bribery

Bribery involves individuals exchanging material benefits for a service of a public institution. To understand the process of bribery we need to integrate measures of individual behaviour and institutional attributes rather than rely exclusively on surveys of individual perceptions and experience or macro-level corruption indexes national institutions. This paper integrates institutional and behavioural measures to show that where you live and who you are have independent influence on whether a person pays a bribe. The analysis of 76 nationwide Global Corruption Barometer surveys from six continents provides a date set in which both institutional and individual differences vary greatly. Multi-level multivariate logit analysis is used to test hypotheses about the influence of institutional context and individual contact with public services, socio-economic inequalities and roles, and conflicting behavioural and ethical norms. It finds that path-determined histories of early bureaucratization or colonialism have a major impact after controlling for individual differences. At the individual level, people who frequently make use of public services and perceive government as corrupt are more likely to pay bribes, while socio-economic inequality has no significant influence. While institutional history cannot be changed, changing the design of public services offers is something that contemporary governors could do to reduce the vulnerability of their citizens to bribery

Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry

This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might ‘grease the wheels’ of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003–2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the ‘greasing’ effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis