When Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia and the Elektron Incident

In October 2005, the Russian trawler Elektron refused to be subjected to arrest when caught by the Norwegian coast guard fishing illegally in the Fisheries Protection Zone off the Svalbard archipelago. With two Norwegian coast guard inspectors still on board, the trawler took off from its pursuers, heading for Russian territorial waters. Observers in Russia were outraged by the attempted arrest and called for Russia's Northern Fleet to flex its muscles as the hot pursuit in the Barents Sea unfolded. The purpose of this article is to explore underlying factors that may explain Russia's non-escalatory behavior during the incident and why the issue was not 'securitized' by Russia's political establishment. The article is to be read as a case study exploring the phenomenon of 'failed securitization'. On a more policy-oriented level, it also aims to shed light on Russian policies and perceptions with regard to the role, relevance, and usefulness of military power in the European Arctic, as well as the interplay between intra- and interstate security dynamics.acceptedVersio

Russlands Nato-politikk

Denne utgaven av IFS Insights utgis som en del av forskningsprogrammet SNE (Security and Defence in Northern Europe), finansiert av Forsvarsdepartementet som går fra april 2013 til april 2017.Hovedpunkter: Russland og Nato har i dag ingen felles forståelse av hva et stabilt og sikkert Europa innebærer: dette forhindrer konstruktivt samarbeid. Russland vil bruke militære og ikkemilitære virkemidler for å avskrekke Nato i årene fremover, for å påvirke Natos oppfatning av kostnadene knyttet til å utfordre Russland. Sannsynligheten for konfrontasjon mellom Russland og Nato avhenger av partenes evne til å unngå misforståelser, men også av Russlands ambisjoner ovenfor Nato

Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority

Contemporary debates on Russian nuclear strategy focus on making sense of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, signalling and nuclear declarations. This paper argues that understanding how nuclear capabilities and strategy interact with conventional capabilities is fundamental to understanding nuclear strategy. It offers the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis for explaining change in Russia’s nuclear strategy after the Cold War. It shows how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been affected by perceived conventional vulnerabilities, and how the orthodox Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of ‘escalating to de-escalate’ comes short of explaining when Russia would go nuclear in conflict, and why