76 research outputs found
How norms in technology ought to be interpreted
This paper defends the claim that there are — at least — two kinds of normativity in technological practice. The first concerns what engineers ought to do and the second concerns normative statements about artifacts. The claim is controversial, since the standard approach to normativity, namely normative realism, actually denies artifacts any kind of normativity; according to the normative realist, normativity applies exclusively to human agents. In other words, normative realists hold that only “human agent normativity” is a genuine form of normativity.I will argue that normative realism is mistaken on this point. I will mainly draw on material of Daniel Dennett and Philip Pettit to show that it makes sense to talk about artifactual normativity. We claim that this approach can also make sense of human agent normativity — or more specifically “engineer normativity”. Moreover, it avoids some of the problems formulated by opponents of normative realism. Thus I will develop a strategy which: (i) makes sense of artifactual normativity; and (ii) makes sense of “human agent normativity”, specifically “engineer normativity
Robust! -- Handle with care
Michael Weisberg has argued that robustness analysis is useful in evaluating both scientific models and their implications and that robustness analysis comes in three types that share their form and aim. We argue for three cautionary claims regarding Weisberg's reconstruction: robustness analysis may be of limited or no value in evaluating models and their implications; the unificatory reconstruction conceals that the three types of robustness differ in form and role; there is no confluence of types of robustness. We illustrate our central first claim with a case study: the application of Lotka-Volterra models to technology diffusion
The functional bias of the dual nature of technical artefacts program
In 2006, in a special issue of this journal, several authors explored what they called the dual nature of artefacts. The core idea is simple, but attractive: to make sense of an artefact, one needs to consider both its physical nature—its being a material object—and its intentional nature—its being an entity designed to further human ends and needs. The authors construe the intentional component quite narrowly, though: it just refers to the artefact’s function, its being a means to realize a certain practical end. Although such strong focus on functions is quite natural (and quite common in the analytic literature on artefacts), I argue in this paper that an artefact’s intentional nature is not exhausted by functional considerations. Many non-functional properties of artefacts—such as their marketability and ease of manufacture—testify to the intentions of their users/designers; and I show that if these sorts of considerations are included, one gets much more satisfactory explanations of artefacts, their design, and normativity
The rise of logical empiricist philosophy of science and the fate of speculative philosophy of science
This paper contributes to explaining the rise of logical empiricism in mid-twentieth century (North) America and to a better understanding of American philosophy of science before the dominance of logical empiricism. We show that, contrary to a number of existing histories, philosophy of science was already a distinct subfield of philosophy, one with its own approaches and issues, even before logical empiricists arrived in America. It was a form of speculative philosophy with a concern for speculative metaphysics, normative issues relating to science and society and issues which later were associated with logical empiricist philosophy of science, issues such as confirmation, scientific explanation, reductionism and laws of nature. Further, philosophy of science was not primarily pragmatist in orientation. We also show, with the help of our historical characterization, that a recent account of the emergence of analytic philosophy applies to the rise of logical empiricism. It has been argued that the emergence of American analytic philosophy is partly explained by analytic philosophers’ use of key institutions, including of journals, to marginalize speculative philosophy and promote analytic philosophy. We argue that this use of institutions included the marginalization of speculative and value-laden philosophy of science and the promotion of logical empiricism
On the emergence of American analytic philosophy
This paper is concerned with the reasons for the emergence and dominance of analytic philosophy in America. It closely examines the contents of, and changing editors at, The Philosophical Review, and provides a perspective on the contents of other leading philosophy journals. It suggests that analytic philosophy emerged prior to the 1950s in an environment characterized by a rich diversity of approaches to philosophy and that it came to dominate American philosophy at least in part due to its effective promotion by The Philosophical Review’s editors. Our picture of mid-twentieth-century American philosophy is different from existing ones, including those according to which the prominence of analytic philosophy in America was basically a matter of the natural affinity between American philosophy and analytic philosophy and those according to which the political climate at the time was hostile towards non-analytic approaches. Furthermore, our reconstruction suggests a new perspective on the nature of 1950s analytic philosophy
Population size does not explain past changes in cultural complexity
Acknowledgments We thank three anonymous reviewers and our PNAS editor, James O'Connell, for their generous feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript. K.V. acknowledges support from The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (VIDI Grant 016.144312). M.C. is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research of Canada, the Canada Research Chairs Program, the Canada Foundation for Innovation, the British Columbia Knowledge Development Fund, and Simon Fraser University. R.C. and W.R. acknowledge support from the Australian Research Council (Discovery Grant DP120100580).Peer reviewedPublisher PD
Robustness analysis
Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Scientific Modeling, ed. by Natalia Carrillo, Tarja Knuuttila and Rami Koskinen
This chapter is devoted to robustness analysis, a common practice in modelling, where researchers vary features of a model and study the impact of changes on its behavior. After
presenting the three most prominent types discussed in the philosophical literature, the chapter reviews the debate surrounding the epistemic role of this practice, focusing on the contested issue of its evidential import. The discussion highlights the multiple roles of robustness analysis, including the value of not establishing the robustness of a particular modeling result
Ethics and Metaphysics
In this chapter, Dorothy Walsh argues that any ethical theory requires an underlying speculative metaphysics
American women philosophers: institutions, background and thought
This chapter provides the background to the American women philosophers’ works that are introduced and collected in Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. We describe the institutional context which made these works possible and their methodological and theoretical background. We also provide biographies for their authors
Academic Research Values: Conceptualization and Initial Steps of Measure Development
In this paper we draw on value theory in social psychology to conceptualize the range of motives that may influence research-related attitudes, decisions, and actions of researchers. To conceptualize academic research values, we integrate theoretical insights from the personal, work, and scientific work values literature, as well as the responses of 6 interviewees and 255 survey participants about values relevant to academic research. Finally, we propose a total of 246 academic research value items spread over 11 dimensions and 36 sub-themes. We relate our conceptualization and item proposals to existing work and provide recommendations for future measurement development. Gaining a better understanding of the different values researchers have, is useful to improve scientific careers, make science attractive to a more diverse group of individuals, and elucidate some of the mechanisms leading to exemplary and questionable science
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