Scheimpflug-based analysis of the reflectivity of the cornea in Marfan Syndrome

Purpose:We sought to investigate corneal reflectivity inMarfan syndrome (MFS) on the basis of Scheimpflug light intensity distribution. Methods: In a retrospective case-control analysis, the left eyes of 40 MFS patients and 40 age- and refraction-matched healthy controls were investigated. Patients with MFS meeting the Ghent II diagnostic criteria and with genetic confirmation of disease were included. Exclusion criteria were the following: Coexisting corneal, conjunctival, or scleral pathology, use of medication known to affect corneal transparency, history of ocular surgery, and insufficient data. Scheimpflug tomography images were exported to analyze corneal transparency in different corneal layers and regions. Each corneal image was automatically segmented, after which the corresponding pixel intensities in the defined regions of interest were statistically modeled using a Weibull probability density function from which parameters a (transparency) and ß (homogeneity) were derived. Results: The cornea in MFS showed significantly higher light reflectivity (overall cornea, a = 71 ± 17 arbitrary units (a.u.)) than in the control group (overall cornea, a = 59 ± 15 a.u.) (t test, P = 0.003). The a parameter was significantly higher in MFS eyes in all examined layers and regions (P 0.05). The difference in a did not correlate with ocular biometric properties (corneal thickness and curvature) or ectopia lentis (P> 0.05). Conclusions: The cornea in MFS shows significantly higher reflectivity than healthy controls with similar levels of homogeneity. Translational Relevance: The proposed methodology detects corneal reflectivity changes in MFS not available from regular slit-lamp examination

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Pay What You Want (PWYW) can be an attractive marketing strategy to price discriminate between fair-minded and selfish customers, to fully penetrate a market without giving away the product for free, and to undercut competitors that use posted prices. We report on laboratory experiments that identify causal factors determining the willingness of buyers to pay voluntarily under PWYW. Furthermore, to see how competition affects the viability of PWYW, we implement markets in which a PWYW seller competes with a traditional seller. Finally, we endogenize the market structure and let sellers choose their pricing strategy. The experimental results show that outcome-based social preferences and strategic considerations to keep the seller in the market can explain why and how much buyers pay voluntarily to a PWYW seller. We find that PWYW can be viable in isolation, but it is less successful as a competitive strategy because it does not drive traditional posted-price sellers out of the market. Instead, the existence of a posted-price competitor reduces buyers’ payments and prevents the PWYW seller from fully penetrating the market. If given the choice, the majority of sellers opt for setting a posted price rather than a PWYW pricing. We discuss the implications of these results for the use of PWYW as a marketing strategy

Game theory of mind

This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution