Zur Gründung des Instituts für Meereskunde der Universität Kiel 1933 bis 1945

Up to 1937 there was no marine science institute at Kiel, but marine research was done within the university institutes of zoology, botany, geology and geography, and since 1870 was supported by the Prussian Commission for Scientific Investigations of the German Seas, since 1900 also by the German Scientific Commission for Marine Research. In 1933, the first year of the national socialistic regime, the Philosophical Faculty developed plans for an Institute of Marine Research of Kiel University. In 1934 Kiel University sent a memorandum regarding the institute to the Minister of Education in Berlin. In 1936 Adolf Remane was appointed Director of the Zoological Institute of Kiel University and at the same time got order to found a marine science institute with departments of biology, hydrography/chemistry and hydrogeology at Kitzeberg on the eastern banks of Kiel Fjord. In 1937 the Institute of Marine Research was inaugurated and Remane was appointed provisional director. In 1944 the chemist Hermann Wattenberg became director, but he was killed on 24 July 1944 when the institute building was destroyed by bombs. After the war the institute was re-installed in Kie

Optimal Unilateral Carbon Policy

We derive the optimal unilateral policy in a general equilibrium model of trade and climate change where one region of the world imposes a climate policy and the rest of the world does not. A climate policy in one region shifts activities—extraction, production, and consumption—in the other region. The optimal policy trades off the costs of these distortions. The optimal policy can be implemented through: (i) a nominal tax on extraction at a rate equal to the global marginal harm from emissions, (ii) a tax on imports of energy and goods, and a rebate of taxes on exports of energy but not goods, both at a lower rate than the extraction tax rate, and (iii) a goods-specific export subsidy. The policy controls leakage by combining supply-side and demand-side taxes to control the price of energy in the non-taxing region. It exploits international trade to expand the reach of the climate policy. We calibrate and simulate the model to illustrate how the optimal policy compares to more traditional policies such as extraction, production, and consumption taxes and combinations of those taxes. The simulations show that combinations of supply-side and demand-side taxes are much better than simpler policies and can perform nearly as well as the optimal policy

Climate Change Policy in the International Context: Solving the Carbon Leakage Problem

Under the Paris Agreement, nations set their own emissions goals and policies. As a result, climate policies vary widely across countries, with some countries imposing stringent emissions policies and others doing very little. A key problem when carbon policies vary across countries is that energy-intensive industries can relocate to places with few or no emissions restriction. Relocated industries would continue to pollute but would be operating in a less desirable location. Moreover, the countries that imposed strict emissions reductions lose the benefit of having those industries located domestically. This problem, known as leakage, is one of the key reasons the United States has failed to enact substantial climate change policies. Without a solution to leakage, it may be much more difficult to prevent catastrophic climate change. The most commonly proposed response to leakage is to impose border adjustments—tariffs on imports based on the emissions from the production of the imported good, and rebates for exports of prior taxes or other prices imposed on emissions. Border adjustments ensure that the same price is paid regardless of the location of production. Border adjustments, however, are complex to impose and potentially incompatible with the WTO. Moreover, numerous studies show that border adjustments do not significantly improve the effectiveness of regional carbon policies. We propose a better solution to the leakage problem. Our solution, the extraction/production tax or the EPT, combines a tax on domestic extraction with a conventional tax on emissions from domestic production. The core intuition behind this hybrid tax is that shifts in location due to carbon prices arise because of their effects on the price of energy seen by foreign actors. By reducing demand for fossil fuels, taxes on emissions from domestic production lower the global price of energy. In response, foreign actors increase their energy use, generating leakage. Border adjustments do not change this effect: carbon taxes on production with border adjustments also reduce the price of energy and increase energy use abroad. A tax on domestic extraction, however, raises the global price of energy because it reduces supply. A higher price of energy causes foreign users of energy to reduce their energy use, reducing leakage. Foreign extractors of energy, however, increase their supply. By combining a tax on the supply of energy and a tax on the demand for energy, the EPT sets these two forces against each other. A tax on the supply side of the market allows a lower tax on the demand side, with the two taxes set to minimize distortions in non-taxing regions. The EPT not only better solves the economic problem of leakage than conventional approaches; it is also much simpler to implement. The EPT can be implemented by imposing a nominal tax on domestic extraction and border adjustments only on energy (but not goods in general) at a lower rate than the nominal extraction tax. Both an extraction tax and border adjustments on energy are easy to impose, which means that the EPT can greatly simplify the administration of carbon taxes. Finally, the EPT reduces concerns with WTO legality raised by traditional approaches. The EPT is a practical solution to the leakage problem and, therefore, can be a key piece to solving the global climate change problem

Climate Change Policy in the International Context: Solving the Carbon Leakage Problem

Under the Paris Agreement, nations set their own emissions goals and policies. As a result, climate policies vary widely across countries, with some countries imposing stringent emissions policies and others doing very little. A key problem when carbon policies vary across countries is that energy intensive industries can relocate to places with few or no emissions restriction. Relocated industries would continue to pollute but would be operating in a less desirable location. Moreover, the countries that imposed strict emissions reductions lose the benefit of having those industries located domestically. This problem, known as leakage, is one of the key reasons the United States has failed to enact substantial climate change policies. Without a solution to leakage, it may be much more difficult to prevent catastrophic climate change. The most commonly proposed response to leakage is to impose border adjustments—tariffs on imports based on the emissions from the production of the imported good, and rebates for exports of prior taxes or other prices imposed on emissions. Border adjustments ensure that the same price is paid regardless of the location of production. Border adjustments, however, are complex to impose and potentially incompatible with the WTO. Moreover, numerous studies show that border adjustments do not significantly improve the effectiveness of regional carbon policies. We propose a better solution to the leakage problem. Our solution, the extraction/production tax or the EPT, combines a tax on domestic extraction with a conventional tax on emissions from domestic production. The core intuition behind this hybrid tax is that shifts in location due to carbon prices arise because of their effects on the price of energy seen by foreign actors. By reducing demand for fossil fuels, taxes on emissions from domestic production lower the global price of energy. In response, foreign actors increase their energy use, generating leakage. Border adjustments do not change this effect: carbon taxes on production with border adjustments also reduce the price of energy and increase energy use abroad. A tax on domestic extraction, however, raises the global price of energy because it reduces supply. A higher price of energy causes foreign users of energy to reduce their energy use, reducing leakage. Foreign extractors of energy, however, increase their supply. By combining a tax on the supply of energy and a tax on the demand for energy, the EPT sets these two forces against each other. A tax on the supply side of the market allows a lower tax on the demand side, with the two taxes set to minimize distortions in non-taxing regions. The EPT not only better solves the economic problem of leakage than conventional approaches; it is also much simpler to implement. The EPT can be implemented by imposing a nominal tax on domestic extraction and border adjustments only on energy (but not goods in general) at a lower rate than the nominal extraction tax. Both an extraction tax and border adjustments on energy are easy to impose, which means that the EPT can greatly simplify the administration of carbon taxes. Finally, the EPT reduces concerns with WTO legality raised by traditional approaches. The EPT is a practical solution to the leakage problem and, therefore, can be a key piece to solving the global climate change problem

Trade, Leakage, and the Design of a Carbon Tax

Climate policies vary widely across countries, with some countries imposing stringent emissions policies and others doing very little. When climate policies vary across countries, energy-intensive industries have an incentive to relocate to places with few or no emissions restrictions, an effect known as leakage. Relocated industries would continue to pollute but would be operating in a less desirable location. We consider solutions to the leakage problem in a simple setting where one region of the world imposes a climate policy and the rest of the world is passive. We solve the model analytically and also calibrate and simulate the model. Our model and analysis imply: (1) optimal climate policies tax both the supply of fossil fuels and the demand for fossil fuels; (2) on the demand side, absent administrative costs, optimal policies would tax both the use of fossil fuels in domestic production and the domestic consumption of goods created with fossil fuels, but with the tax rate on production lower due to leakage; (3) taxing only production (on the demand side), however, would be substantially simpler, and almost as effective as taxing both production and consumption, because it would avoid the need for border adjustments on imports of goods; (4) the effectiveness of the latter strategy depends on a low foreign elasticity of energy supply, which means that forming a taxing coalition to ensure a low foreign elasticity of energy supply can act as a substitute for border adjustments on goods

Trade, Leakage, and the Design of a Carbon Tax

Climate policies vary widely across countries, with some countries imposing stringent emissions policies and others doing very little. When climate policies vary across countries, energy-intensive industries have an incentive to relocate to places with few or no emissions restrictions, an effect known as leakage. Relocated industries would continue to pollute but would be operating in a less desirable location. We consider solutions to the leakage problem in a simple setting where one region of the world imposes a climate policy and the rest of the world is passive. We solve the model analytically and also calibrate and simulate the model. Our model and analysis imply: (1) optimal climate policies tax both the supply of fossil fuels and the demand for fossil fuels; (2) on the demand side, absent administrative costs, optimal policies would tax both the use of fossil fuels in domestic production and the domestic consumption of goods created with fossil fuels, but with the tax rate on production lower due to leakage; (3) taxing only production (on the demand side), however, would be substantially simpler, and almost as effective as taxing both production and consumption, because it would avoid the need for border adjustments on imports of goods; (4) the effectiveness of the latter strategy depends on a low foreign elasticity of energy supply, which means that forming a taxing coalition to ensure a low foreign elasticity of energy supply can act as a substitute for border adjustments on goods

A Lateral Flow Assay for Quantitative Detection of Amplified HIV-1 RNA

Although the accessibility of HIV treatment in developing nations has increased dramatically over the past decade, viral load testing to monitor the response of patients receiving therapy is often unavailable. Existing viral load technologies are often too expensive or resource-intensive for poor settings, and there is no appropriate HIV viral load test currently available at the point-of-care in low resource settings. Here, we present a lateral flow assay that employs gold nanoparticle probes and gold enhancement solution to detect amplified HIV RNA quantitatively. Preliminary results show that, when coupled with nucleic acid sequence based amplification (NASBA), this assay can detect concentrations of HIV RNA that match the clinically relevant range of viral loads found in HIV patients. The lateral flow test is inexpensive, simple and rapid to perform, and requires few resources. Our results suggest that the lateral flow assay may be integrated with amplification and sample preparation technologies to serve as an HIV viral load test for low-resource settings