Eino Kaila's Scientific Philosophy

This paper seeks to answer the question of what the Finnish philosopher Eino Kaila meant when he described his own philosophy as scientific. I argue that Kaila was a naturalist in a straightforward sense. Naturalism is not undermined by his logical empiricism: the core of scientific thought is its principled connection to experience, and Kaila adhered to logical empiricism only because he thought it could explain how the connection arose. Secondly, naturalism is not compromised by the logical empiricist conception of "formal sciences", either, for this was not part of Kaila’s deepest convictions about human knowledge. Thirdly, naturalism is even compatible with Kaila’s anti-reductionist monism. Finally, I argue that Kaila’s naturalism is anchored in his view that human knowledge is essentially a search for invariances.Non peer reviewe

Logiikan välttämättömyys : kantilaisen näkökulman tarkastelua

Peer reviewe

Russell's Discussion of Judgment in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism : Did Russell have a Theory of Judgment in 1918?

Russell’s discussion of belief in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism is brief, tentative and mostly negative. The standard view has been that in the Lectures, Russell no longer believed in the multiple relation theory of judgment but was not yet in a position to articulate an alternative conception of belief; that came only a little later, with the psychological account of belief that is found in such works as On Propositions (1919) and The Analysis of Mind (1921). In this paper, I challenge the standard view. First, I present evidence to support the claim that the views that Russell held in 1918 at least leave room for a version of the multiple relation theory, albeit one that would be rather different from the view he held before. Second, I consider some key developments in Russell’s thinking about judgment during 1913–1918. These developments indicate the direction in which he may have been moving. Third, I present some speculation – partly relying on a recent work by Fraser MacBride – regarding a positive account of judgment in Russell’s Lectures; an important connection that emerges from this speculation is one between the multiple relation theory of judgment and the distinction between positive and negative factsPeer reviewe

Aaron Preston (ed.) Analytic Philosophy : An Interpretive History

Book Review: Aaron Preston (ed.) New York and London: Routledge, 2017 ISBN: 978–1–138–80079–3 (pbk)Non peer reviewe

Russell on Negative Judgment

This paper concerns Bertrand Russell’s changing views on negative judgement. ‘Negative judgement’ is considered in the context of three theories of judgement that Russell put forth at different times: (i) a dual relation theory (judgement involves a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition, which is an objective truth or falsehood); (ii) a multiple relation theory (judging relates a subject to a multiplicity of objects); (iii) a psychological theory of judgement (judgment involves a mental content standing in a relation of objective reference to its truth- or false-maker). Four issues are singled out for a more detailed discussion: (i) quality dualism versus quality monism, that is, the question whether judgement comes in two kinds, acceptance and rejection, or whether there is only one judgement-quality (acceptance/assertion); (ii) the structure of negative judging; (iii) the problem of truth-making for negative facts; (iv) the different roles of ‘fact’ in Russell’s theories of truth. What emerges from the discussion is a rough chronology of Russell’s views on negative judgement during the period from 1903 to 1948.Peer reviewe

S. Albert Kivinen deskriptiivisenä metafyysikkona

S. Albert Kivinen deskriptiivisenä metafyysikkon

The association between physical activity during preschool hours and early numeracy

Previous findings suggest positive association between physical activity (PA) and children's cognitive outcomes. Early numeracy (EN) refers to young children’s mathematical proficiency, including relational and counting skills. EN has been shown to strongly predict later mathematical and academic achievements. Previous research has mainly focused on school-age children; however, research in early ages is scarce. No previous studies have used device-based measurement of PA with an individual test of EN to understand the associations between preschool PA and EN. The study investigated the relationship between PA during preschool hours and EN in 4-5-year-old children (N = 95, Mage = 4.6). PA was measured during 5 consecutive preschool days using hip-worn accelerometers, while EN was assessed using the Finnish Early Numeracy Test. Results revealed no significant correlation between preschool PA level and EN. Furthermore, latent profile analyses identified three profiles with high, medium, and low PA, whereas EN did not significantly differ among the profiles. While the results showed significantly different amounts of PA among children during preschool, the current study suggests no direct relation between preschool PA and EN

Kant and formal logic

Non peer reviewe