The Domestic Impact of International Shaming: Evidence from Climate Change and Human Rights

Do international shaming efforts affect citizens’ support for government policies? While it is a frequent claim in the literature that shaming works through domestic politics, we know little about how and when international criticism affects domestic public opinion. We address this question through an originally designed survey experiment in Sweden, which (i) compares the effects of international shaming in two issue areas—human rights and climate change, and (ii) tests whether government responses to criticism moderate the impact of shaming. Our main findings are fourfold. First, we find substantial effects of international shaming on domestic public opinion. These effects hold across both issue areas and irrespective of whether citizens support government parties or not. Second, human rights shaming has a stronger impact on citizens’ support for government policies than climate shaming. Third, shaming is most effective among citizens who are more supportive of climate action, human rights, and international cooperation. Finally, our findings are mixed with respect to the effect of government responses. While government responses do not moderate the effects of human rights shaming, they seem to mitigate the effects of climate shaming

A Race to the Top? The Aid Transparency Index and the Social Power of Global Performance Indicators

Recent studies on Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) reveal the distinct power that non-state actors can accrue and exercise in world politics. How and when does this happen? Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine the impact of the Aid Transparency Index (ATI), an annual rating and rankings index produced by the small UK-based NGO Publish What You Fund. The ATI seeks to shape development aid donors’ behavior with respect to their transparency – the quality and kind of information they publicly disclose. To investigate the ATI’s effect, we construct an original panel dataset of donor transparency performance before and after ATI inclusion (2006–2013) to test whether, and which, donors alter their behavior in response to inclusion in the ATI. To further probe the causal mechanisms that explain variations in donor behavior we use qualitative research, including over 150 key informant interviews conducted between 2010 and 2017. Our analysis uncovers the conditions under which the ATI influences powerful aid donors. Moreover, our mixed methods evidence reveals how this happens. Consistent with Kelley and Simmons’ central argument that Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) exercise influence via social pressure, we find that the ATI shapes donor behavior primarily via direct effects on elites: the diffusion of professional norms, organizational learning, and peer pressure

Can Blacklisting Reduce Terrorist Attacks?

Within global security governance, a number of governments monitor and label certain organizations as “terrorist groups” with the aim of curtailing their capacity. The most prominent example of this is the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. Under what conditions is FTO listing an effective counterterrorism tool? We develop a theory of blacklisting in the context of FTOs, arguing that the impact of FTO designation depends on the types of support terrorist organizations rely on. We theorize that FTO blacklisting has capacity-curtailing effects on terrorist groups when funding sources are vulnerable to detection, sanctions, and stigmatization. Specifically, we hypothesize that groups with private funding (e.g. charities, diaspora networks) are more likely to reduce attacks after FTO designation, compared to groups with other funding sources such as criminal activities. Analysis of data on terrorist organizations between 1970 and 2014 takes into account the political processes of listing and provides support for the argument. The findings highlight the importance of understanding the nature of the target in evaluating the performance of global indicators

Features of heart remodeling in patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in combination with chronic heart failure

Goal. Clinical, structural and functional features of right and left heart remodeling in patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) were studied. Materials and methods. We examined 32 patients with COPD without exacerbation. Patients were divided into 2 groups: 1 - patients with COPD in combination with chronic heart failure (CHF); 2 - patients with COPD without CHF. 19 patients showed signs of CHF. Echocardiography (EchoCG) with additional parameters, spirometry, radiography, pulse oximetry was performed. The study also assessed level of highly sensitive C-reactive protein, acid-base blood composition, brain natriuretic peptide (NTproBNP). Results. In patients with combined pathology, there was a decrease in exercise tolerance, a greater body mass index and intensity of dyspnea. The left ventricular ejection fraction over 50% observed in the majority of patients (30) in both groups, therefore the signs of heart failure are explained precisely by diastolic dysfunction of the right and left ventricles. The conclusion. The use of tissue Doppler studies allows more accurate determination of the diastolic function of the right and left ventricles. Remodeling of the right and left ventricles are interdependent processes. The study of NTproBNP and additional EchoCG parameters - allow to reveal diastolic dysfunction of both ventricles of the heart at early stages.Цель. Исследовать клинические, структурно-функциональные особенности ремоделирования правых и левых отделов сердца у больных хронической обструктивной болезнью легких (ХОБЛ) в сочетании с хронической сердечной недостаточностью (ХСН). Материалы и методы. Обследовано 32 больных ХОБЛ вне обострения. Пациенты были распределены на 2 группы: 1 - пациенты с ХОБЛ в сочетании с ХСН (19); 2 - пациенты с ХОБЛ без ХСН (13). Проводили эхокардиографию, спирометрию, рентгенографию, пульсоксиметрию. Оценивали уровень высокочувствительного С-реактивного белка, кислотно-щелочного состава крови, мозгового натрийуретического пептида (NTproBNP). Результаты. У больных с сочетанной патологией отмечались снижение толерантности к физической нагрузке, больший индекс массы тела и интенсивность одышки. Сохраненная фракция выброса левого желудочка более 50% была отмечена у большинства больных (30) в обеих группах, поэтому признаки сердечной недостаточности объясняется именно диастолической дисфункцией правого и левого желудочков. Заключение. Использование тканевого допплеровского исследования позволяет более точно определить диастолическую функцию правого и левого желудочков. Ремоделирование правого и левого желудочков являются взаимозависимыми процессами. Исследование NTproBNP и дополнительных ЭхоКГ-параметров позволяют выявить диастолическую дисфункцию правого и левого желудочков сердца на ранних стадиях

Naming and Shaming : The politics and effectiveness of social pressure in the ILO

In the current international system, the use of centralized, hard enforcement mechanisms is often deemed either politically impossible or too costly. As a consequence, many international organizations (IOs) rely on so-called naming and shaming strategies as tools of political influence. Naming and shaming is the public exposure and condemnation of states that violate international rules and norms. It is not designed to simply renegade violators, but to produce compliance through reputational and status concerns. But how does naming and shaming work and what impact does it have on state behavior? In this dissertation, I adopt a comprehensive approach to the study of naming and shaming by examining its underlying politics and determinants as well as its impact on state behavior. In search for answers, I focus on the naming and shaming strategies employed in the International Labour Organization (ILO) during the period 1989-2011. Drawing on the theories of international politics, I develop a set of hypotheses that are tested by means of statistical as well as process tracing techniques. The overall conclusions of the dissertation are fourfold. First, the results indicate that ILO naming and shaming is used to punish violators of international labor standards. This implies that IOs, under the right conditions, can thwart the politicization of naming and shaming that has been observed in other IOs. Second, I find support for my argument that the decision to engage in naming and shaming primarily is determined by the democratic character of states. This enhances our understanding of when states participate in pressuring targets and the patterns of inter-state shaming. Third, the dissertation finds that ILO naming and shaming can improve international labor standards. The impact of ILO naming and shaming is stronger when target states are democratic and resourceful. This implies that IOs can overcome international collective problems without hard enforcement mechanisms and that IO naming and shaming, under certain propitious conditions, can produce compliance. Fourth, while democracies are more likely to respond to international criticism, not all democracies do. This dissertation demonstrates that ILO naming and shaming is a powerful tool among democracies that have strong and united labor unions. This implies that IO naming and shaming of democratic states is likely to work through domestic pressure mechanisms.At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Submitted. Paper 3: Submitted. Paper 4: Manuscript.</p

Naming and Shaming : The politics and effectiveness of social pressure in the ILO

In the current international system, the use of centralized, hard enforcement mechanisms is often deemed either politically impossible or too costly. As a consequence, many international organizations (IOs) rely on so-called naming and shaming strategies as tools of political influence. Naming and shaming is the public exposure and condemnation of states that violate international rules and norms. It is not designed to simply renegade violators, but to produce compliance through reputational and status concerns. But how does naming and shaming work and what impact does it have on state behavior? In this dissertation, I adopt a comprehensive approach to the study of naming and shaming by examining its underlying politics and determinants as well as its impact on state behavior. In search for answers, I focus on the naming and shaming strategies employed in the International Labour Organization (ILO) during the period 1989-2011. Drawing on the theories of international politics, I develop a set of hypotheses that are tested by means of statistical as well as process tracing techniques. The overall conclusions of the dissertation are fourfold. First, the results indicate that ILO naming and shaming is used to punish violators of international labor standards. This implies that IOs, under the right conditions, can thwart the politicization of naming and shaming that has been observed in other IOs. Second, I find support for my argument that the decision to engage in naming and shaming primarily is determined by the democratic character of states. This enhances our understanding of when states participate in pressuring targets and the patterns of inter-state shaming. Third, the dissertation finds that ILO naming and shaming can improve international labor standards. The impact of ILO naming and shaming is stronger when target states are democratic and resourceful. This implies that IOs can overcome international collective problems without hard enforcement mechanisms and that IO naming and shaming, under certain propitious conditions, can produce compliance. Fourth, while democracies are more likely to respond to international criticism, not all democracies do. This dissertation demonstrates that ILO naming and shaming is a powerful tool among democracies that have strong and united labor unions. This implies that IO naming and shaming of democratic states is likely to work through domestic pressure mechanisms.At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Submitted. Paper 3: Submitted. Paper 4: Manuscript.</p

Selecting for Shame: The Monitoring of Workers’ Rights by the International Labour Organization, 1989 to 2011

Why do intergovernmental organizations target some countries, but not others, for naming and shaming? We seek answers by examining these processes within the International Labour Organization (ILO), which through two principal bodies, monitors compliance with international conventions governing the rights of workers. We examine whether political interests and calculations or norms inducing adherence to international conventions best explain which countries the ILO calls out for their misconduct, what punishment countries receive, and whether naming and shaming in the ILO amount to distinctive activities. Based on an analysis of the 1989–2011 period, we find considerable evidence that norms matter to members of both ILO bodies. That is, we find evidence that the ILO “does its job” by acting in accordance with the organization's formal mandate. We also find evidence that the process of naming, which leads to the initial identification of culprits, stands apart from the process by which the ILO prioritizes, or chooses, from among countries for shaming. While our findings are specific to the ILO, they back claims that IOs can override states interests, if crafted in ways that limit political influence