Surveillance powers of law enforcement and intelligence services in Poland

The article presents three cases from 2018. They show that in Poland there is a tendency to build strengthened surveillance powers without finding a balance between security and respect for human rights. In the first case, the Commissioner for Human Rights withdrew his application from the Constitutional Tribunal (March 2018), in which he questioned the reforms introduced in 2016. According to the Polish Ombudsman, in the Polish legal system there is still a shortage of the legal safeguards which would make sure that surveillance measures do not violate fundamental rights. In the second case, the Prosecutor General submitted one application to the Constitutional Tribunal concerning the constitutionality of obtaining of evidence of the committing of another offence different from the one covered by operational surveillance. The third case concerns two new institutions which emerged in 2018, which were granted considerable powers in terms of surveillance: the National Security Services and the Internal Supervision Bureau, which is subject to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The circumstances surrounding the emergence of these institutions will also be analyzed

Secret surveillance in Poland after Snowden : between secrecy and transparency

The chapter presents Poland's surveillance policy after 2013. The domination of secrecy in this area is a systemic and institutional challenge. Since 1990, there has been no comprehensive reform of transparency and the construction of modern intelligence services has not been completed in Poland. There is a lack of response to contemporary challenges, including the development of information technologies and international cooperation with other countries' services, as well as others related to Snowden's revelations. On the contrary, security services enjoy increasingly extensive surveillance powers. The chapter is structured as follows: the first part will present significant legislative changes in surveillance after 2013; the second part will describe institutional barriers that should ensure there is a balance between secrecy and transparency; the third part will show the Constitutional Tribunal's balancing role before 2016 and its limited role ever since

Constitutional status of Polish intelligence services since 1989 : intelligence vs. the police

The aim of the paper is to focus on two characteristic features which make it difficult to define precisely the constitutional position of Polish intelligence services. First of all, there is no concise concept referring to the place and role that Polish intelligence services should play after 1989. Secondly, intelligence services lack clear distinction from police services. Not only are these services organized in a similar way but also their tasks and powers are alike. Here the question arises: where is the border between intelligence services and police services which were created for different purposes and which have other methods of interfering in individual’s rights and freedom

Kontrola zewnątrzadministracyjna nad czynnościami operacyjno-rozpoznawczymi polskich służb specjalnych

W artykule omówiono uprawnienia służb specjalnych do stosowania czynności operacyjno- rozpoznawczych z perspektywy kontroli, jaka jest nad nimi roztoczona. Działania kontrole nad pracą operacyjną wpisują się w ogólne zasady weryfi kacji pracy administracji publicznej przez organy zewnętrzne. Poszczególne metody operacyjne objęte są różnym zakresem kontroli. Część z nich została poddana kontroli sądowej i prokuratorskiej. Wszystkie łączy ingerencja w prawa i wolności jednostki, co jest główną przesłanką do zapewnienia efektywnych rozwiązań w tej materii. Obecnie zewnętrzną kontrolę w ramach władzy ustawodawczej zapewnia głównie Sejmowa Komisja do Spraw Służb Specjalnych. Jednak większe znaczenie w tym względzie mają organy judykatywy, przede wszystkim sądy powszechne i wojskowe. Również prokuratura zajmuje tu niepoślednią rolę – jako organ kontroli i ochrony prawa.The paper reviews the operational investigation of the secret services in terms of control and oversight. Control and oversight of the operational investigation are a part of a general principle of control over public administration. Different methods of operational investigation are covered by a different scope of control. Some of them are controlled by the courts and prosecutors. They are all linked by the interference with the rights and freedoms of individuals, which is the main prerequisite for ensuring effective control and oversight in this matter. The external control is provided by the legislative authority, mainly The Special Services Committee of the Sejm. The judiciary, especially civil and military courts are more important in this regard. The prosecutor also has a role as a controlling tool and a protector of the rights.В статье обсуждено права спецслужб в сфере оперативно-розыскной деятель- ности с перспективы возможности контроля этих действий. Надзор за оперативной деятельностью является частью общих принципов проверки работы публичной администрации, осуществляемой внешними органами. Разные опе- ративные методы подвергнуты разным масштабам контроля. Некоторые дей- ствия попадают под судебный контроль и прокурорский надзор. Ввиду того, что вся описываемая деятельность характеризуется вмешательством в права и свободы граждан, необходимо обеспечить правовую базу её эффективного контроля. Сегодня внешний контроль этих действий от лица законодательных властей, главным образом, проводит Сеймовая комиссия по делам специаль- ных служб. Однако намного большее значение в этой сфере имеют действия таких юридических органов, как публичные и военные суды. Важное место занимает также прокуратура – осуществляющая надзор за соблюдением за- конодательства

Understanding contemporary security : a prolegomenon to the interplay between technology, innovation and policy responses

Contemporary security is shaped by a variety of factors which determine the changing dynamics of connections and interdependencies within and between social groups and political actors. The growing importance of technology and innovation for states and societies has been a critical factor in the infrastructural, organizational and decision-making dimensions. This article aims to integrate some aspects of contemporary security into current dynamics of technology and innovation as vehicles of rapid and substantial changes in security policies and actions. Designed as an essay based on qualitative method in social sciences, this paper raises theoretical and empirical questions concerning modernization and innovation as determinants of contemporary security structures and policies. The empirical dimension of technology, innovation and politics are presented in the microscale (local security), in the mesoscale (state security, national security, sectoral security) and in the macroscale (international security in regional and global dimensions), as well as from the cross-sectional (transversal) perspective

Rozwiązania instytucjonalno-prawne w zakresie cywilnej i demokratycznej kontroli i nadzoru nad Agencją Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego

The article presents the question of control and oversight over the largest Polish special force, Internal Security Agency (Polish acronym: ABW). The primacy of civilian authority over the military, and police and special forces is one of the standards of constitutional democracies. The principle of the division of power vests the legislative, executive, and judiciary with various control mechanisms towards the agency in question. Together, they provide a system whose assumption is to provide efficient civilian and democratic control over the ABW and other special forces. That is why the article presents a list of institutional and legal solutions pertaining to the control exercised by the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and discusses them together with selected so-called organs of law protection and control

Nadzór nad cywilnymi służbami specjalnymi

The article presents the issue of control over five intelligence and security agencies: the Internal Security Agency (ABW), Foreign Intelligence Agency, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), Military Counterintelligence Service, and Military Intelligence Service. After 1989 Poland experienced frequent and quite chaotic changes in the area, which is why there is currently no coherent model of controlling the special services. Some of the solutions applied in the past twenty years hinders effective control. Such control provides one the hand management in line with the priorities of foreign and security policies conducted by civilian politicians, while on the other is a prerequisite for effective external control over the activities of secret services. It is worth mentioning that changes recendy introduced in this area are also temporary. The article focuses on the period 1990 — 2013. The idea of civil supervision over the first secret service institution (Office for State Protection, UOP) emerged in 1990. The regulation became law on the power of the Act of 6th April 1990 on the Office for State Protection. The latest changes to it were introduced in 2013 in a Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 28th February 2013 on the detailed scope of authority of the Minister of Internal Affairs (currently Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz) in the coordination of special services. Besides the legal system, the article presents examples of political practice, and solutions adopted in other constitutional democracies

Poland's intelligence security after 24 February 2022

Celem rozdziału jest analiza aktualnego statusu polskiej wspólnoty wywiadowczej. Agresja Rosji na Ukrainę zapoczątkowała na całym świecie diametralną zmianę w tym obszarze funkcjonowania państwa. Niniejszy artykuł składa się z dwóch zasadniczych części. W pierwszej przedstawiono działalność polskich służb wywiadowczych w nowej sytuacji. W drugiej skupiono się na perspektywie reform polskich instytucji wywiadowczych.The aim of this chapter is to analyze the current state of Poland’s intelligence com-munity. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine marked the beginning of a sea change in this area of functioning intelligence worldwide. This article is composed of two main parts. The first part provides the activity of the Polish intelligence services in the new situation. The second section focusses on the perspective of reform in the Polish in-telligence community