An Access theory of self-control: Essays on self-control, ADHD, and stimulant medication

This dissertation consists of four articles and an introductory essay, the overarching aim of which is to investigate the nature of self-control and its implications. I defend a value-deflationist definition of self-control, according to which self-control is that which is enacted to align one’s behaviour with intention in the face of competing motivation. This radical revision of the concept of self-control, which under its received denotation is associated with motivational hierarchies under various guises, allows for a conception of self-control that is consistent even in the absence of clear value hierarchies. For my account, self-control is defined by its behavioural function, not by its reliance on any specific cognitive or neural process. As a result, self-control can be realized by a large range of functionally equivalent processes. Some such processes are intrapsychic, such as inhibition, rehearsal of reasons, and construal. Others are situational, such as environmental selection and modification as well as social processes of self-control. Not all self-control processes are equally available for all agents, however. Some processes that are heavily reliant on executive functioning, such as inhibition and rehearsal of reasons, are unavailable for agents with executive dysfunction. For other self-control processes, social and economic constraints delimit their availability. It then becomes of utmost importance that agents are aware of such means of self-control that are a good fit for the agent and her situation. In this dissertation I analyse individual differences in self-control in terms of differences in access to self-control behaviours, articulating criteria for access to self-control and demonstrating how epistemic and practical constraints contingently modulate access to self-control in a manner that results in aggravated individual differences in self-control. I also discuss various implications of the access theory of self-control. implications span assessments of responsibility for failures of self-control; accounting for individual differences in self-control, including when these differences are connected to diagnoses such as Attention Deficit /Hyperactivity Disorder; and the prospects of self-control neuroenhancement

Itsekontrollin saavutettavuusteoria ja sen implikaatioita

Lektio: Itsekontrollin saavutettavuusteoria ja sen implikaatioita

Demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits: Realist social ontology for mental disorders

Realists about mental disorder have been hasty about dismissing social explanations of how mental disorder is constituted. However, many social ontologies are realist ontologies. In order to create a meaningful distinction between realism and social metaphysics about mental disorder, I propose that realism about mental disorder is best understood as Individual Trait Realism (ITR) about them. For ITR, mental disorders exist in virtue of traits. I defend the view that ITR is compatible with social metaphysics, arguing that, in asking whether constituents in the social sphere figure the metaphysics of psychopathology, we are asking questions on three different strata of explanation: the strata of demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits. Distinguishing between these strata allows for nuanced realism that need not reject the social constitution of mental disorder

Accessing Self-Control

Self-control is that which is enacted to align our behaviour with intentions, motives, or better judgment in the face of conflicting impulses of motives. In this paper, I ask, what explains interpersonal differences in self-control? After defending a functionalist conception of self-control, I argue that differences in self-control are analogous to differences in mobility: they are modulated by inherent traits and environmental supports and constraints in interaction. This joint effect of individual (neuro)biology and environmental factors is best understood in terms of access to self-control behaviours. I sketch an account of access as including the three criteria of means, awareness, and non-excessive effort. I further demonstrate that people with disorders such as ADHD have limited access to self-control behaviours and stand therefore at a disadvantage with regard to self-control

Demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits: Realist social ontology for mental disorders

Realists about mental disorder have been hasty about dismissing social explanations of how mental disorder is constituted. However, many social ontologies are realist ontologies. In order to create a meaningful distinction between realism and social metaphysics about mental disorder, I propose that realism about mental disorder is best understood as Individual Trait Realism (ITR) about them. For ITR, mental disorders exist in virtue of traits. I defend the view that ITR is compatible with social metaphysics, arguing that, in asking whether constituents in the social sphere figure the metaphysics of psychopathology, we are asking questions on three different strata of explanation: the strata of demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits. Distinguishing between these strata allows for nuanced realism that need not reject the social constitution of mental disorder

Genetics on the neurodiversity spectrum: Genetic, phenotypic and endophenotypic continua in autism and ADHD

How we ought to diagnose, categorise and respond to spectrum disabilities such as autism and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a topic of lively debate. The heterogeneity associated with ADHD and autism is described as falling on various continua of behavioural, neural, and genetic difference. These continua are varyingly described either as extending into the general population, or as being continua within a given disorder demarcation. Moreover, the interrelationships of these continua are likewise often vague and subject to diverse interpretations. In this paper, I explore geneticists' and self-advocates’ perspectives concerning autism and ADHD as continua. These diagnoses are overwhelmingly analysed as falling on a continuum or continua of underlying traits, which supports the notion of “the neurodiversity spectrum”, i.e., a broader swath of human neural and behavioural diversity on which some concentrations of different functioning are diagnosed. I offer a taxonomy of conceptions of the genetic, phenotypic, and endophenotypic dimensionality within and beyond these diagnostic categories, and suggest that the spectrum of neurodiversity is characteristically endophenotypic

Born which Way? ADHD, Situational Self-Control, and Responsibility

Debates concerning whether Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) mitigates responsibility often involve recourse to its genetic and neurodevelopmental etiology. For such arguments, individuals with ADHD have diminished self-control, and hence do not fully satisfy the control condition for responsibility, when there is a genetic or neurodevelopmental etiology for this diminished capacity. In this article, I argue that the role of genetic and neurobiological explanations has been overstated in evaluations of responsibility. While ADHD has genetic and neurobiological causes, rather than embrace the essentialistic notion that it directly diminishes self-control and, therefore, responsibility, we ought to think of ADHD as constraining only some self-control practices. In particular, situational self-control strategies remain feasible for people with ADHD. However, not all individuals haveaccessto these strategies. I suggest a way to evaluate responsibility in terms of situational rather than agential pleas, which tracks whether the individual had access to self-control behaviors. While I restrict my discussion to ADHD, the access-based approach is also relevant for assessments of responsibility for other cases where self-control failures are at stake

Genetics on the neurodiversity spectrum: Genetic, phenotypic and endophenotypic continua in autism and ADHD

How we ought to diagnose, categorise and respond to spectrum disabilities such as autism and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a topic of lively debate. The heterogeneity associated with ADHD and autism is described as falling on various continua of behavioural, neural, and genetic difference. These continua are varyingly described either as extending into the general population, or as being continua within a given disorder demarcation. Moreover, the interrelationships of these continua are likewise often vague and subject to diverse interpretations.In this paper, I explore geneticists' and self-advocates’ perspectives concerning autism and ADHD as continua. These diagnoses are overwhelmingly analysed as falling on a continuum or continua of underlying traits, which supports the notion of “the neurodiversity spectrum”, i.e., a broader swath of human neural and behavioural diversity on which some concentrations of different functioning are diagnosed. I offer a taxonomy of conceptions of the genetic, phenotypic, and endophenotypic dimensionality within and beyond these diagnostic categories, and suggest that the spectrum of neurodiversity is characteristically endophenotypic.</p

Willpower as a metaphor

Willpower is a metaphor that is widespread in both common usage and expert literature across disciplines. This paper looks into willpower as a ‘metaphor we live by’, analyzing and exploring the consequences of the tacit information content of the willpower metaphor for agentive self-understanding and efficacy. In addition to contributing to stigma associated with self-control failures, the metaphor causally contributes to self-control failures by obscuring available self-control strategies and instructing agents to superfluous self-control efforts