Auction Models SupportingEnd-to- End Connection Trading, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2012, nr 2

The paper concerns bandwidth allocation problem on the telecommunication market where there are many sellers and buyers. Sellers offer the bandwidth of telecommunication links. Buyers are interested in the purchase of the bandwidth of several links that makes up an end-to-end connection between two nodes of telecommunication network. We analyze three auction models supporting such a bandwidth exchange: NSP (network second price), BCBT (model for balancing communication bandwidth trading) and BCBT-CG which is a modification of BCBT that applies column generation technique. All of these models concern divisible network resources, treat bandwidth of telecommunication links as an elementary commodity offered for sale, and allow for purchasing bandwidth along multiple paths joining two telecommunication nodes. All of them also aim at maximizing the social welfare. Considered auction models have been compared in the respect of economic and computational efficiency. Experimental studies have been performed on several test instances based on the SNDlib library data sets

Multicommodity Auction Model for Indivisible Network Resource Allocation, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2008, nr 4

In this paper we present the multicommodity auction model BCBT-I that allocates indivisible network resources among bidders. The approach can be considered as a generalization of the basic multicommodity model for balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT). The BCBT model assumes that offers concerning inter-node links and point-to-point bandwidth demands can be realized partially. However, in the real-world trade there might be a need to include capacity modularity in the market balancing process. Thus we state the model for balancing communication bandwidth trade that takes into account the indivisibility of traded bandwidth modules. This requires to solve a mixed integer problem and increases computational complexity. Furthermore, the pricing issue appears nontrivial, as the dual prices cannot be longer used to set fair, competitive market prices. For clearing the market, we examine the multicommodity pricing mechanizm based on differentiation of buy and sell market prices

Model for Balancing Aggregated Communication Bandwidth Resources, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2009, nr 3

In this paper we present a multicommodity bandwidth exchange model for balancing aggregated communication bandwidth resources (BACBR) that allows us to aggregate similar offers. In this model offers submitted to sell (or buy) the same, similar, or equivalent network resources (or demands for end-to-end connections) are aggregated into single commodities. BACBR model is based on the balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model. It requires much less variables and constraints then original BCBT, however the outcomes need to be disaggregated. The general model for disaggregation is also given in the paper

Bandwidth Trading: A Comparison of the Combinatorial and Multicommodity Approach, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2010, nr 2

Since the telecommunication market becomes more complex and dynamic, a strong need for a new, efficient and flexible bandwidth trading mechanisms appears. We believe that good mechanisms, that allow effective and fair allocation of bandwidth between market participants will help to develop the real competitive bandwidth market. In this paper we compare two different double-sided bandwidth auction mechanisms, that seem to be well suited approaches for trading indivisible units of bandwidth: combinatorial auction c-SeBiDA and multicommodity mechanism BACBR-I. The c-SeBiDA mechanism considers two types of commodities: inter-node links and paths consisting of particular links. Market partici- pants may bid a single link, or a bundle of links, constituting a specific path. The BACBR-I mechanism is a multicommodity exchange model, that allows bidders to place buy offers not only for individual or bundled links, but rather for end-to-end connections. Therefore, it is the decision model that allocates the most efficient links to connections. We run a large set of experiments to test the allocation and computational efficiency obtained under both approaches

A Flexible Auction Model for Virtual Private Networks

Part 2: PricingInternational audienceWe consider the resource allocation problem related to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). VPN provides connections between geographically dispersed endpoints over a shared network. To realize VPN service, sufficient amount of bandwidth of network resources must be reserved for any traffic demand specified by a customer. We assume that there are many customers that want to purchase VPN services, and many network providers that offer their network resources for sale. We present a multicommodity auction model that enables the efficient management of the network resources in the market environment. On the other hand it is very convenient for the customers as it allows them to specify the bandwidth requirements concerning VPN in a very flexible way, including pipe and hose VPN representations. The proposed model has also many other valuable properties, such as individual rationality and budget balance. The auction model has a form of LP for which the computational efficiency can be improved by applying the column generation technique

Paper Model for Balancing Aggregated Communication Bandwidth Resources

Abstract—In this paper we present a multicommodity bandwidth exchange model for balancing aggregated communication bandwidth resources (BACBR) that allows us to aggregate similar offers. In this model offers submitted to sell (or buy) the same, similar, or equivalent network resources (or demands for end-to-end connections) are aggregated into single commodities. BACBR model is based on the balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model. It requires much less variables and constraints then original BCBT, however the outcomes need to be disaggregated. The general model for disaggregation is also given in the paper

Paper Multicommodity Auction Model for Indivisible Network Resource Allocation

Abstract—In this paper we present the multicommodity auction model BCBT-I that allocates indivisible network resources among bidders. The approach can be considered as a generalization of the basic multicommodity model for balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT). The BCBT model assumes that offers concerning inter-node links and point-topoint bandwidth demands can be realized partially. However, in the real-world trade there might be a need to include capacity modularity in the market balancing process. Thus we state the model for balancing communication bandwidth trade that takes into account the indivisibility of traded bandwidth modules. This requires to solve a mixed integer problem and increases computational complexity. Furthermore, the pricing issue appears nontrivial, as the dual prices cannot be longer used to set fair, competitive market prices. For clearing the market, we examine the multicommodity pricing mechanism based on differentiation of buy and sell market prices