Reducing False Guilty Pleas and Wrongful Convistions Through Exoneree Compensation

A great concern with plea-bargains is that they may induce innocent individuals to plead guilty to crimes they have not committed. In this article, we identify schemes that reduce the number of innocent-pleas without affecting guilty individuals\u27 plea-bargain incentives. Large compensations for exonerees reduce expected costs associated with wrongful determinations of guilt in trial and thereby reduce the number of innocent-pleas. Any distortions in guilty individuals\u27 incentives to take plea bargains caused by these compensations can be off-set by a small increase in the discounts offered for pleading guilty. Although there are many statutory reform proposals for increasing exoneration compensations, no one has yet noted this desirable separating effect of exoneree compensations. We argue that such reforms are likely to achieve this result without causing deterrence losses

Reducing False Guilty Pleas and Wrongful Convistions Through Exoneree Compensation

A great concern with plea-bargains is that they may induce innocent individuals to plead guilty to crimes they have not committed. In this article, we identify schemes that reduce the number of innocent-pleas without affecting guilty individuals\u27 plea-bargain incentives. Large compensations for exonerees reduce expected costs associated with wrongful determinations of guilt in trial and thereby reduce the number of innocent-pleas. Any distortions in guilty individuals\u27 incentives to take plea bargains caused by these compensations can be off-set by a small increase in the discounts offered for pleading guilty. Although there are many statutory reform proposals for increasing exoneration compensations, no one has yet noted this desirable separating effect of exoneree compensations. We argue that such reforms are likely to achieve this result without causing deterrence losses

Identifying Criminals’ Risk Preferences

There is a 250 year old presumption in the criminology and law enforcement literature that people are deterred more by increases in the certainty rather than increases in the severity of legal sanctions. We call this presumption the Certainty Aversion Presumption (CAP). Simple criminal decision making models suggest that criminals must be risk-seeking if they behave consistently with CAP. This implication leads to disturbing interpretations, such as criminals being categorically different than law abiding people, who often display risk-averse behavior while making financial decisions. Moreover, policy discussions that incorrectly rely on criminals’ risk attitudes implied by CAP are ill-informed, and may therefore have unintended negative consequences. In this article, we first demonstrate, contrary to most of the existing literature, that CAP consistent behavior does not imply risk-seeking behavior. A host of considerations that are unrelated to risk-attitudes can generate behavior that is consistent with CAP, including stigmatization; discounting; judgment proofness; the forfeitability of illegal gains; and the possibility of being punished for unsuccessful criminal attempts. Next, we discuss empirical methods that can be employed to gain a better understanding of criminals’ risk-attitudes and responsiveness to various punishment schemes. These methods focus on the various non-risk-related-considerations that may be responsible for CAP consistent behavior. Finally, we discuss the importance of gaining a better understanding of criminals’ attitudes for purposes of designing optimal law enforcement methods, punishment schemes for repeat offenders, plea bargaining procedures and standards of proof

Forfeiture of Illegal Gains, Attempts and Implied Risk Preferences

In the law enforcement literature there is a presumption—supported by some experimental and econometric evidence—that criminals are more responsive to increases in the certainty than the severity of punishment. Under a general set of assumptions, this implies that criminals are risk seeking. We show that this implication is no longer valid when forfeiture of illegal gains and the possibility of unsuccessful attempts are considered. Therefore, when drawing inferences concerning offenders’ attitudes toward risk based on their responses to various punishment schemes, special attention must be paid to whether and to what extent offenders’ illegal gains can be forfeited and whether increases in the probability of punishment affect the probability of attempts being successful. We discuss policy implications related to our observations

Identifying Criminals’ Risk Preferences

There is a 250-year-old presumption in the criminology and law enforcement literature that people are deterred more by increases in the certainty rather than increases in the severity of legal sanctions. We call this presumption the Certainty Aversion Presumption (CAP). Simple criminal decision-making models suggest that criminals must be risk seeking if they behave consistently with CAP. This implication leads to disturbing interpretations, such as criminals being categorically different from law-abiding people, who often display risk-averse behavior while making financial decisions. Moreover, policy discussions that incorrectly rely on criminals’ risk attitudes implied by CAP are ill informed, and may therefore have unintended negative consequences. In this Article, we first demonstrate, contrary to most of the existing literature, that CAP-consistent behavior does not imply risk-seeking behavior. A host of considerations that are unrelated to risk attitudes can generate behavior that is consistent with CAP, including stigmatization, discounting, judgment proofness, the forfeitability of illegal gains, and the possibility of being punished for unsuccessful criminal attempts. Next, we discuss empirical methods that can be employed to gain a better understanding of criminals’ risk attitudes and responsiveness to various punishment schemes. These methods focus on the various non-risk-related-considerations that may be responsible for CAP-consistent behavior. Finally, we discuss the importance of gaining a better understanding of criminals’ attitudes for purposes of designing optimal law enforcement methods, punishment schemes for repeat offenders, plea bargaining procedures, and standards of proof

Discounting and Criminals\u27 Implied Risk Preferences

It is commonly assumed that potential offenders are more responsive to increases in the certainty than increases in the severity of punishment. An important implication of this assumption within the Beckerian law enforcement model is that criminals are risk-seeking. This note adds to existing literature by showing that offenders who discount future monetary benefits can be more responsive to the certainty rather than the severity of punishment, even when they are risk averse, and even when their disutility from imprisonment rises proportionally (or more than proportionally) with the length of the sentence

Discounting and Criminals\u27 Implied Risk Preferences

It is commonly assumed that potential offenders are more responsive to increases in the certainty than increases in the severity of punishment. An important implication of this assumption within the Beckerian law enforcement model is that criminals are risk-seeking. This note adds to existing literature by showing that offenders who discount future monetary benefits can be more responsive to the certainty rather than the severity of punishment, even when they are risk averse, and even when their disutility from imprisonment rises proportionally (or more than proportionally) with the length of the sentence

Forfeiture of Illegal Gains, Attempts and Implied Risk Preferences

In the law enforcement literature there is a presumption—supported by some experimental and econometric evidence—that criminals are more responsive to increases in the certainty than the severity of punishment. Under a general set of assumptions, this implies that criminals are risk seeking. We show that this implication is no longer valid when forfeiture of illegal gains and the possibility of unsuccessful attempts are considered. Therefore, when drawing inferences concerning offenders’ attitudes toward risk based on their responses to various punishment schemes, special attention must be paid to whether and to what extent offenders’ illegal gains can be forfeited and whether increases in the probability of punishment affect the probability of attempts being successful. We discuss policy implications related to our observations

The limits to libertarian paternalism: two new critiques, and seven best practice imperatives

publication-status: AcceptedCopyright © 2012 PionGill N, Gill M, 2012. The definitive, peer-reviewed and edited version of this article is published in Environment and Planning C, 2012, Vol. 30, Issue 5, pp. 924 - 940Behavioural economists argue that humans are predictably irrational in various ways, as a result of which there appears to be a role for public policy to improve their decision-making. We offer a sympathetic critique of this so-called ‘libertarian paternalist’ approach. As well as reviewing existing critiques, we present two new arguments. First, we question the use of libertarian paternalism in situations where the social good is invoked to justify policies that are not beneficial to the individuals directly affected. Second, we highlight the potentially adverse consequences of poorly targeted libertarian paternalist techniques. The penultimate section then brings together the existing critiques and the new arguments to offer seven best practice imperatives for the reflective application of these powerful, but easily misused, tools of government. We conclude with some brief reflections on what freedom might mean in the context of libertarian paternalist governance