The Directed Closure Process in Hybrid Social-Information Networks, with an Analysis of Link Formation on Twitter

It has often been taken as a working assumption that directed links in information networks are frequently formed by "short-cutting" a two-step path between the source and the destination -- a kind of implicit "link copying" analogous to the process of triadic closure in social networks. Despite the role of this assumption in theoretical models such as preferential attachment, it has received very little direct empirical investigation. Here we develop a formalization and methodology for studying this type of directed closure process, and we provide evidence for its important role in the formation of links on Twitter. We then analyze a sequence of models designed to capture the structural phenomena related to directed closure that we observe in the Twitter data

Analysis of a continuous-time model of structural balance

It is not uncommon for certain social networks to divide into two opposing camps in response to stress. This happens, for example, in networks of political parties during winner-takes-all elections, in networks of companies competing to establish technical standards, and in networks of nations faced with mounting threats of war. A simple model for these two-sided separations is the dynamical system dX/dt = X^2 where X is a matrix of the friendliness or unfriendliness between pairs of nodes in the network. Previous simulations suggested that only two types of behavior were possible for this system: either all relationships become friendly, or two hostile factions emerge. Here we prove that for generic initial conditions, these are indeed the only possible outcomes. Our analysis yields a closed-form expression for faction membership as a function of the initial conditions, and implies that the initial amount of friendliness in large social networks (started from random initial conditions) determines whether they will end up in intractable conflict or global harmony.Comment: 12 pages, 2 figure

Modeling self-organization of communication and topology in social networks

This paper introduces a model of self-organization between communication and topology in social networks, with a feedback between different communication habits and the topology. To study this feedback, we let agents communicate to build a perception of a network and use this information to create strategic links. We observe a narrow distribution of links when the communication is low and a system with a broad distribution of links when the communication is high. We also analyze the outcome of chatting, cheating, and lying, as strategies to get better access to information in the network. Chatting, although only adopted by a few agents, gives a global gain in the system. Contrary, a global loss is inevitable in a system with too many liarsComment: 6 pages 7 figures, Java simulation available at http://cmol.nbi.dk/models/inforew/inforew.htm

Coordination and Efficiency in Decentralized Collaboration

Environments for decentralized on-line collaboration are now widespread on the Web, underpinning open-source efforts, knowledge creation sites including Wikipedia, and other experiments in joint production. When a distributed group works together in such a setting, the mechanisms they use for coordination can play an important role in the effectiveness of the group's performance. Here we consider the trade-offs inherent in coordination in these on-line settings, balancing the benefits to collaboration with the cost in effort that could be spent in other ways. We consider two diverse domains that each contain a wide range of collaborations taking place simultaneously -- Wikipedia and GitHub -- allowing us to study how coordination varies across different projects. We analyze trade-offs in coordination along two main dimensions, finding similar effects in both our domains of study: first we show that, in aggregate, high-status projects on these sites manage the coordination trade-off at a different level than typical projects; and second, we show that projects use a different balance of coordination when they are "crowded," with relatively small size but many participants. We also develop a stylized theoretical model for the cost-benefit trade-off inherent in coordination and show that it qualitatively matches the trade-offs we observe between crowdedness and coordination.Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures, ICWSM 2015, in Proc. 9th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Medi

Spectral centrality measures in complex networks

Complex networks are characterized by heterogeneous distributions of the degree of nodes, which produce a large diversification of the roles of the nodes within the network. Several centrality measures have been introduced to rank nodes based on their topological importance within a graph. Here we review and compare centrality measures based on spectral properties of graph matrices. We shall focus on PageRank, eigenvector centrality and the hub/authority scores of HITS. We derive simple relations between the measures and the (in)degree of the nodes, in some limits. We also compare the rankings obtained with different centrality measures.Comment: 11 pages, 10 figures, 5 tables. Final version published in Physical Review

Superlinear Scaling for Innovation in Cities

Superlinear scaling in cities, which appears in sociological quantities such as economic productivity and creative output relative to urban population size, has been observed but not been given a satisfactory theoretical explanation. Here we provide a network model for the superlinear relationship between population size and innovation found in cities, with a reasonable range for the exponent.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figures, 1 table, submitted to Phys. Rev. E; references corrected; figures corrected, references and brief discussion adde

Paradoxes in Fair Computer-Aided Decision Making

Computer-aided decision making--where a human decision-maker is aided by a computational classifier in making a decision--is becoming increasingly prevalent. For instance, judges in at least nine states make use of algorithmic tools meant to determine "recidivism risk scores" for criminal defendants in sentencing, parole, or bail decisions. A subject of much recent debate is whether such algorithmic tools are "fair" in the sense that they do not discriminate against certain groups (e.g., races) of people. Our main result shows that for "non-trivial" computer-aided decision making, either the classifier must be discriminatory, or a rational decision-maker using the output of the classifier is forced to be discriminatory. We further provide a complete characterization of situations where fair computer-aided decision making is possible