161 research outputs found
Relevance differently affects the truth, acceptability, and probability evaluations of âandâ, âbutâ, âthereforeâ, and âifâthenâ
In this study we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and âandâ/âbutâ/âthereforeâ sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege-Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participantsâ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participantsâ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across the two experiments a strong dissociation was found. The reason-relation reading of all four sentences strongly affected their probability and acceptability evaluations, but hardly affected their respective truth evaluations. Implications of this result for recent work on indicative conditionals are discussed
'Automatic' evaluation? Strategic effects on affective priming
Two studies examined strategic effects on affective priming. Extending prior research by Klauer and Teige-Mocigemba [Klauer, K. C., & Teige-Mocigemba, S. (2007). Controllability and resource dependence in automatic evaluations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 648â655], the influence of different control strategies on a priming measure of prejudice was assessed. In both studies, a short stimulus onset asynchrony between prime and target (275 ms) was implemented along with considerable time pressure. In Study 1, participants could strategically eliminate priming effects with attitudinal prime categories (Arabs and liked celebrities) represented by several exemplars per category while priming effects for control categories remained intact. In Study 2, two strategies (payoff and faking) were induced to motivate participants to respond particularly fast and accurately to incongruent targets. Both strategies were successful in counteracting the usual priming effects, while leaving priming effects for non-targeted primes intact. We consider the role of so-called implementation intentions in accounting for the present findings
Conditionals, Individual Variation, and the Scorekeeping Task
In this manuscript we study individual variation in the
interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual
profiles of the participants based on their behavioral responses
and reflective attitudes. To investigate the participantsâ
reflective attitudes we introduce a new experimental paradigm
called the Scorekeeping Task, and a Bayesian mixture model
tailored to analyze the data. The goal is thereby to identify the
participants who follow the Suppositional Theory of conditionals
and Inferentialism and to investigate their performance
on the uncertain and-to-if inference task
Probabilistic conditional reasoning : disentangling form and content with the dual-source model
The present research examines descriptive models of probabilistic conditional reasoning, that is of reasoning from uncertain conditionals with contents about which reasoners have rich background knowledge. According to our dual-source model, two types of information shape such reasoning: knowledge-based information elicited by the contents of the material and content-independent information derived from the form of inferences. Two experiments implemented manipulations that selectively influenced the model parameters for the knowledge-based information, the relative weight given to form-based versus knowledge-based information, and the parameters for the form-based information, validating the psychological interpretation of these parameters. We apply the model to classical suppression effects dissecting them into effects on background knowledge and effects on form-based processes (Exp. 3) and we use it to reanalyse previous studies manipulating reasoning instructions. In a model-comparison exercise, based on data of seven studies, the dual-source model outperformed three Bayesian competitor models. Overall, our results support the view that people make use of background knowledge in line with current Bayesian models, but they also suggest that the form of the conditional argument, irrespective of its content, plays a substantive, yet smaller, role
New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model
There has been a major shift in research on human reasoning toward Bayesian and probabilistic approaches, which has been called a new paradigm. The new paradigm sees most everyday and scientific reasoning as taking place in a context of uncertainty, and inference is from uncertain beliefs and not from arbitrary assumptions. In this manuscript we present an empirical test of normative standards in the new paradigm using a novel probabilized conditional reasoning task. Our results indicated that for everyday conditional with at least a weak causal connection between antecedent and consequent only the conditional probability of the consequent given antecedent contributes unique variance to predicting the probability of conditional, but not the probability of the conjunction, nor the probability of the material conditional. Regarding normative accounts of reasoning, we found significant evidence that participants' responses were confidence preserving (i.e., p-valid in the sense of Adams, 1998) for MP inferences, but not for MT inferences. Additionally, only for MP inferences and to a lesser degree for DA inferences did the rate of responses inside the coherence intervals defined by mental probability logic (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005, 2010) exceed chance levels. In contrast to the normative accounts, the dual-source model (Klauer et al., 2010) is a descriptive model. It posits that participants integrate their background knowledge (i.e., the type of information primary to the normative approaches) and their subjective probability that a conclusion is seen as warranted based on its logical form. Model fits showed that the dual-source model, which employed participants' responses to a deductive task with abstract contents to estimate the form-based component, provided as good an account of the data as a model that solely used data from the probabilized conditional reasoning task
Social Presence Effects on the Stroop Task: Boundary Conditions and an Alternative Account
Two studies investigated boundary conditions of an effect of social presence on the Stroop task and its interpretation in terms of an attentional view (P. Huguet, M. P. Galvaing, J. M. Monteil, & F. Dumas, 1999). In this view, social presence leads to attentional focusing, enhancing participantsâ ability to screen out the distracting features of Stroop stimuli. As predicted, Stroop interference was found to be reduced by social presence, but an alternative account in which social presence exerts an effect on task selection received more support
The Affect Misattribution Procedure.
The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) has been forwarded as one of the most promising alternatives to the Implicit Association Test and the evaluative-priming task for measuring attitudes such as prejudice indirectly. We investigated whether the AMP is indeed able to detect an evaluative out-group bias. In contrast to recent conclusions about the robustness of AMP effects, six out of seven pilot studies indicated that participants did not show any prejudice effects in the AMP. Yet, these pilot studies were not fully conclusive with regard to our research question because they investigated different domains of prejudice, used small sample sizes, and employed a modified AMP version. In a preregistered, high-powered AMP study, we therefore examined whether the standard AMP does reveal prejudice against Turks, the biggest minority in Germany, and found a significant, albeit very small prejudice effect. We discuss possible reasons for the AMP's weak sensitivity to evaluations in socially sensitive domains
Spatial processes in category assignment
Investigates the hypothesis that spatial processes are involved in judgments on membership in a category. It is argued that membership versus nonmembership of an object or a concept, in a category, is spatially simulated in mental space by a minimal continuum with 2 levels, left for membership and right for nonmembership. In analogy to other embodied dimensions (e.g., time line or number line), the orientation of membership levels on the mental dimension is assumed to follow the acquired reading/writing schema, with procedural primacy implying dominance, hence leftward positioning of dominant elements. This rationale is tested in 7 experiments. A recognition memory paradigm (modified 2AFC paradigm, Experiment 1) revealed that participants were faster indicating the location of an old word on the screen when displayed left within a pair of words, indicating a spatial representation of category membership (âmemberâ = left, ânonmemberâ = right). For category discrimination (Experiment 2) we found faster and more accurate performance when a target word is presented left as compared with right. This pattern is replicated in Experiments 4a and 4b, with different response alternatives. Discriminating categories in a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm (Experiment 3), participants were faster making correct responses with their left hand than with their right hand in target category trials. In contrast, no differences were found for distractor trials. Experiments 5a and 5b address the spatial bias in spontaneous sorting situations. Overall, this pattern of results across the 7 experiments provides evidence in support of a spatial simulation of category assignmen
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