Owl and Lizard: Patterns of Head Pose and Eye Pose in Driver Gaze Classification

Accurate, robust, inexpensive gaze tracking in the car can help keep a driver safe by facilitating the more effective study of how to improve (1) vehicle interfaces and (2) the design of future Advanced Driver Assistance Systems. In this paper, we estimate head pose and eye pose from monocular video using methods developed extensively in prior work and ask two new interesting questions. First, how much better can we classify driver gaze using head and eye pose versus just using head pose? Second, are there individual-specific gaze strategies that strongly correlate with how much gaze classification improves with the addition of eye pose information? We answer these questions by evaluating data drawn from an on-road study of 40 drivers. The main insight of the paper is conveyed through the analogy of an "owl" and "lizard" which describes the degree to which the eyes and the head move when shifting gaze. When the head moves a lot ("owl"), not much classification improvement is attained by estimating eye pose on top of head pose. On the other hand, when the head stays still and only the eyes move ("lizard"), classification accuracy increases significantly from adding in eye pose. We characterize how that accuracy varies between people, gaze strategies, and gaze regions.Comment: Accepted for Publication in IET Computer Vision. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1507.0476

Assessing framing of uncertainties in water management practice

Dealing with uncertainties in water management is an important issue and is one which will only increase in light of global changes, particularly climate change. So far, uncertainties in water management have mostly been assessed from a scientific point of view, and in quantitative terms. In this paper, we focus on the perspectives from water management practice, adopting a qualitative approach. We consider it important to know how uncertainties are framed in water management practice in order to develop practice relevant strategies for dealing with uncertainties. Framing refers to how people make sense of the world. With the aim of identifying what are important parameters for the framing of uncertainties in water management practice, in this paper we analyze uncertainty situations described by decision-makers in water management. The analysis builds on a series of ¿Uncertainty Dialogues¿ carried out within the NeWater project with water managers in the Rhine, Elbe and Guadiana basins in 2006. During these dialogues, representatives of these river basins were asked what uncertainties they encountered in their professional work life and how they confronted them. Analysing these dialogues we identified several important parameters of how uncertainties get framed. Our assumption is that making framing of uncertainty explicit for water managers will allow for better dealing with the respective uncertainty situations. Keywords Framing - Uncertainty - Water management practic

Electrophysiological activation by masked primes: Independence of prime-related and target-related activities

Visual stimuli that are made invisible by metacontrast masking (primes) have a marked influence on behavioral and psychophysiological measures such as reaction time (RT) and the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). 4 experiments are reported that shed light on the effects that masked primes have on the LRP. Participants had a go-nogo task in which the prime was associated with 1 of 2 responses even if the target required participants to refrain from responding. To analyze the electrophysiological responses, we computed the LRP and applied an averaging method separating the activation due to the prime and the target. The results demonstrated that (a) masked primes activate responses even in a nogo situation, (b) this prime-related activation is independent of masking, (c) and is also independent of whether prime and target require the same responses (congruent condition) or different responses (incongruent condition)

Bayesian inference for the information gain model

One of the most popular paradigms to use for studying human reasoning involves the Wason card selection task. In this task, the participant is presented with four cards and a conditional rule (e.g., “If there is an A on one side of the card, there is always a 2 on the other side”). Participants are asked which cards should be turned to verify whether or not the rule holds. In this simple task, participants consistently provide answers that are incorrect according to formal logic. To account for these errors, several models have been proposed, one of the most prominent being the information gain model (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). This model is based on the assumption that people independently select cards based on the expected information gain of turning a particular card. In this article, we present two estimation methods to fit the information gain model: a maximum likelihood procedure (programmed in R) and a Bayesian procedure (programmed in WinBUGS). We compare the two procedures and illustrate the flexibility of the Bayesian hierarchical procedure by applying it to data from a meta-analysis of the Wason task (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). We also show that the goodness of fit of the information gain model can be assessed by inspecting the posterior predictives of the model. These Bayesian procedures make it easy to apply the information gain model to empirical data. Supplemental materials may be downloaded along with this article from www.springerlink.com

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias.

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief

Stakeholder Workshops Informing System Modeling—Analyzing the Urban Food–Water–Energy Nexus in Amman, Jordan

Large cities worldwide are increasingly suffering from a nexus of food, water, and energy supply challenges. This complex nexus can be analyzed with modern physico-economic system models. Only when practical knowledge from those affected, experts, and decision makers is incorporated alongside various other data sources, however, are the analyses suitable for policy advice. Here, we present a concept for “Sustainability Nexus Workshops” suitable for extracting and preparing relevant practical knowledge for nexus modeling and apply it to the case of Amman, Jordan. The experiences of the workshop participants show that, although water scarcity is the predominant resource problem in Jordan, there is a close connection between food, water, and energy as well as between resource supply and urbanization. To prevent the foreseeable significant degradation of water supply security, actions are needed across all nexus dimensions. The stakeholders demonstrate an awareness of this and suggest a variety of technical measures, policy solutions, and individual behavioral changes—often in combination. Improving the supply of food, water, and energy requires political and institutional reforms. In developing these, it must be borne in mind that the prevalent informal structures and illegal activities are both strategies for coping with nexus challenges and causes of them

Can cognitive psychological research on reasoning enhance the discussion around moral judgments?

In this article we will demonstrate how cognitive psychological research on reasoning and decision making could enhance discussions and theories of moral judgments. In the first part, we will present recent dual-process models of moral judgments and describe selected studies which support these approaches. However, we will also present data that contradict the model predictions, suggesting that approaches to moral judgment might be more complex. In the second part, we will show how cognitive psychological research on reasoning might be helpful in understanding moral judgments. Specifically, we will highlight approaches addressing the interaction between intuition and reflection. Our data suggest that a sequential model of engaging in deliberation might have to be revised. Therefore, we will present an approach based on Signal Detection Theory and on intuitive conflict detection. We predict that individuals arrive at the moral decisions by comparing potential action outcomes (e.g., harm caused and utilitarian gain) simultaneously. The response criterion can be influenced by intuitive processes, such as heuristic moral value processing, or considerations of harm caused