236 research outputs found
Bewusstsein, minimales Selbst und Gehirn
This paper explores the possibility of a neuroscientific explanation of consciousness, and what such an explanation might look like. More specifically, I will be concerned with the claim that for any given experience there is neural representational system that constitutes the minimal supervenience base of that experience. I will call this hypothesis the minimal supervenience thesis. I argue that the minimal supervenience thesis is subject to two readings, which I call the localist and holist readings. Localist theories seek to identify the minimal supervenience base for specific experiences. They sideline questions about the nature of creature consciousness, treating the neural basis of creature consciousness as merely a causally necessary background condition for a particular conscious experience. Holists on the other hand prioritise creature consciousness and argue that we can only account for particular states of consciousness in the context of an account of creature consciousness. I argue that any scientific explanation of consciousness must account for what I will call a minimal sense of self that is intrinsic to every conscious state. Holist theories are best able to accommodate this feature. I end by arguing that the Dynamic Sensorimotor (DSM) account of consciousness can be combined with a holist account of the neural basis of consciousness. Such a combination of views corrects for the opposition to the minimal supervenience thesis found in some prominent defenders of the DSM account (e.g. Alva NoĂ« and Evan Thompson). It also provides a framework for developing a neuroscientific account of the minimal sense of self.Lâarticle cherche Ă savoir si une explication neuroscientifique de la conscience est possible et Ă quoi elle pourrait ressembler. Plus particuliĂšrement, je me pencherai sur lâaffirmation quâĂ chaque expĂ©rience donnĂ©e correspond un systĂšme de reprĂ©sentation neural qui constitue la base de survenance minimale de cette expĂ©rience. Jâappellerai cette hypothĂšse « la thĂšse de survenance (supervenience) minimale ». Je soutiens que cette thĂšse peut se lire de deux façons que je nommerai lectures localiste et holiste. Les thĂ©ories localistes cherchent Ă dĂ©finir quelle est la base de survenance minimale des expĂ©riences particuliĂšres. Elles laissent de cĂŽtĂ© les questions sur la nature de la conscience des ĂȘtres et considĂšrent la base neurale de leur conscience comme une condition causale circonstancielle nĂ©cessaire Ă lâexpĂ©rience dâune conscience particuliĂšre. Les holistes, dâautre part, donnent la prioritĂ© Ă la conscience des ĂȘtres et affirment que nous pouvons rendre compte des Ă©tats de conscience particuliers seulement dans un contexte dâexplication de la conscience des ĂȘtres. Jâaffirme que toute explication scientifique de la conscience doit rendre compte de ce que jâappellerai « une sensation minimale de soi »,
intrinsĂšque Ă tout Ă©tat conscient. Les thĂ©ories holistes sont les plus aptes Ă tenir compte de cet aspect. Enfin, jâaffirme que lâexplication sensori-motrice dynamique de la conscience peut se combiner avec une approche holiste de la base neurale de la conscience. Une telle combinaison dâapproches compense lâopposition Ă la thĂšse de survenance minimale de certains dĂ©fenseurs de lâexplication sensori motrice dynamique distinguĂ©s (ex. Alva NoĂ« et Evan Thompson). Elle offre Ă©galement un cadre de dĂ©veloppement pour une explication neuroscientifique de la sensation minimale de soi.Dieser Artikel macht von der Möglichkeit Gebrauch, das PhĂ€nomen des Bewusstseins neurowissenschaftlich zu erklĂ€ren, und geht der Frage nach, wie eine solche ErklĂ€rung wohl auszusehen hĂ€tte. Der Verfasser widmet sich konkret der These, dass jeder Erfahrung ein reprĂ€sentatives neurales System zugrunde liegt, das als Supervenienzgrundlage dieser Erfahrung dient. Diese Hypothese wird im weiteren Verlauf als minimale Supervenienz-These bezeichnet. Nach Meinung des Autors kann diese These auf zweierlei Weisen verstanden werden; dementsprechend ist von einer lokalistischen und einer holistischen Lesart die Rede. Lokalistische Theorien versuchen, die minimale Supervenienzgrundlage einer spezifischen Erfahrung zu ermitteln, wĂ€hrend sie Fragen ĂŒber die Natur des Bewusstseins von Lebewesen beiseite lassen und die Neuralbasis des Bewusstseins lediglich als kausal-notwendige Hintergrundvoraussetzung fĂŒr eine partikulĂ€re Bewusstseinserfahrung werten. Holisten hingegen rĂ€umen dem Bewusstsein von Lebewesen Vorrang ein und behaupten, dass partikulĂ€re BewusstseinszustĂ€nde nur im Rahmen von Deutungen ebendieses Bewusstseins erklĂ€rt werden können. Nach Meinung des Autors muss jegliche wissenschaftliche Deutung des Bewusstseins jenem Faktor Rechnung tragen, den er als minimale Wahrnehmung des Selbst bezeichnet und das jedem Bewusstseinszustand intrinsisch ist. Holistische Theorien sind am besten geeignet, diesen Umstand zu verĂ€ndern. Der Artikel schlieĂt mit der These, dass die sog. Dynamisch-Sensomotorische (DSM) Deutung des Bewusstseins mit der holistischen ErklĂ€rung der Neuralbasis des Bewusstseins kombiniert werden kann. Eine solchermaĂen kombinierte Sichtweise korrigiert den Widerspruch bezĂŒglich der These von der minimalen Supervenienz, die bei einigen prominenten BefĂŒrwortern der DSM These (z.B. Alva NoĂ« und Evan Thompson) zu finden ist. Sie ermöglicht ebenfalls einen Rahmen fĂŒr die Entwicklung einer neurowissenschaftlichen Deutung der These von der minimalen Wahrnehmung des Selbst
Naturalising phenomenology: using phenomenology to close the explanatory gap
Naturalists and Phenomenologists have contrasting conceptions of
philosophy and its purpose. The naturalist takes philosophy to be a discipline
that is continuous with the natural sciences, while phenomenology defines
itself by its opposition to such a view of philosophy. My thesis project argues
that this opposition is unfounded.The phenomenologist takes the world we consciously experience to be
a world of subjective facts. My thesis begins by introducing the
phenomenologist's conception of a subjective fact. I call a situation "a
subjective fact" when it essentially involves a subject of experience. I go on
to explain why phenomenologists thought the world we experience is a world
of subjective facts.Naturalists hold that all facts are objective facts, and it is generally
supposed that no fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that it is
the contrast between these two kinds of facts that led phenomenologists to
conclude that a naturalistic theory of mind will have no place in it for
subjective facts.A central claim in my PhD thesis is that a fact can be both subjective
and objective. I argue that a naturalist could accept the existence of
subjective facts if s/he could admit the existence of situations that essentially
involve relations to subjects of experience. If a naturalist is to accept the
existence of situations of this kind, a naturalist account must be given of what
it is to be a subject of experience.A creature becomes a subject of experience, I claim, when it tokens
representations with reflexive content. I offer an account of what it is for a
representation to have reflexive content in terms of a special kind of
representation I call 'an implicit self-representation'. I offer a naturalist
account of implicit self-representation by appealing to the role this notion of
representations plays in embodied and situated accounts of perception.I conclude that naturalism can admit into its ontology subjects of
experience. The phenomenologist says naturalism must exclude subjective
facts with the result that our relation to the world gets misdescribed. I argue
that naturalists can admit subjective facts, thereby opening up the possibility
of a naturalised phenomenology
Embodying addiction: a predictive processing account
In this paper we show how addiction can be thought of as the outcome of learning. We look to the increasingly influential predictive processing theory for an account of how learning can go wrong in addiction. Perhaps counter intuitively, it is a consequence of this predictive processing perspective on addiction that while the brain plays a deep and important role in leading a person into addiction, it cannot be the whole story. Weâll argue that predictive processing implies a view of addiction not as a brain disease, but rather as a breakdown in the dynamics of the wider agent-environment system. The environment becomes meaningfully organised around the agentâs drug-seeking and using behaviours. Our account of addiction offers a new perspective on what is harmful about addiction. Philosophers often characterise addiction as a mental illness because addicts irrationally shift in their judgement of how they should act based on cues that predict drug use. We argue that predictive processing leads to a different view of what can go wrong in addiction. We suggest that addiction can prove harmful to the person because as their addiction progressively takes hold, the addict comes to embody a predictive model of the environment that fails to adequately attune them to a volatile, dynamic environment. The use of an addictive substance produces illusory feedback of being well-attuned to the environment when the reality is the opposite. This can be comforting for a person inhabiting a hostile niche, but it can also prove to be harmful to the person as they become skilled at living the life of an addict, to the neglect of all other alternatives. The harm in addiction weâll argue is not to be found in the brains of addicts, but in their way of life
Embraining Culture: Leaky Minds and Spongy Brains
We offer an argument for the extended mind based on considerations from brain development. We argue that our brains develop to function in partnership with cognitive resources located in our external environments. Through our cultural upbringing we are trained to use artefacts in problem solving that become factored into the cognitive routines our brains support. Our brains literally grow to work in close partnership with resources we regularly and reliably interact with. We take this argument to be in line with complementarity or âsecond-waveâ defences of the extended mind that stress the functional differences between biological elements and external, environmental resources in putative cases of extended cognition. Complementarity defences argue that many of the kinds of cognition humans excel at can only be accomplished by brains working together with a body that directly manipulates and acts on the world [Rowlands (1999); Menary (2007); Sutton (2010)]. We argue that complementarity and functionalist defences of the extended mind arenât opposed, but that complementarity considerations can provide much needed and hitherto under exploited leverage in defending EMT. Moreover, the developmental work we will describe adds extra weight to the complementarity case for EMT
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