Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control

Stump and Timpe have recently proposed Thomistic based solutions to the traditional problem in Christian theology of how to relate grace and free will. By taking a closer look at the notion of control, I subject Timpe’s account – itself an extension of Stump’s account – to extended critique. I argue that the centrepiece of Timpe’s solution, his reliance on Dowe’s notion of quasi-causation, is misguided and irrelevant to the problem. As a result, Timpe’s account fails to avoid Semi-Pelagianism. I canvass two alternatives, each of which adheres to the broad theological assumptions made by Stump and Timpe, including the positing of only one “unique” grace. I conclude that each of these proposals fails, although I argue that one comes as close as it is possible to get to a solution given the assumptions made

Powers opposed and intrinsic finks

Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic finks and when not

Robustness and up-to-us-ness

Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various alternatives that remain in the cases presented, while Frankfurtians have objected that such alternatives are typically not capable of grounding responsibility. In this essay I address the recent suggestion by Seth Shabo that only alternatives associated with the ‘up to us’ locution ground moral responsibility. I distinguish a number of kinds of ability, suggest which kinds of abilities ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution, and outline how these distinctions apply to the indeterministic buffer cases

Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices

Sennett (1999) and Pawl & Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this essay I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl & Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show why Matheson is mistaken to claim that the value of free choice depends on an agent retaining the ability to change their mind; in so doing I demonstrate that some choices which result in fixed outcomes - a feature of the choices leading to impeccability - can indeed be valuable even if they cannot be undone

Possibilites for divine freedom

I examine three accounts of divine freedom. I argue that two recent accounts which attempt to explain God’s freedom without appealing to alternative possibilities fail. I then show how a view of divine freedom based on Robert Adams’s idea that God’s grace means he has no obligation to create the best world is able to explain how God can be free while also being perfectly good and perfectly rational

Abilities to do otherwise

In this paper I argue that there are different ways that an agent may be able to do otherwise and that therefore, when free will is understood as requiring that an agent be able to do otherwise, we face the following question: which way of being able to do otherwise is most relevant to free will? I answer this question by first discussing the nature of intrinsic dispositions and abilities, arguing that for each action type there is a spectrum of intrinsic abilities. I suggest that recognising this allows us to articulate two ways in which an intrinsic ability is general (such that there are two kinds of non-general ability). And I argue that the abilities most relevant to free will need to be non-general in both of the ways identified. Along the way I show why these points threaten to undermine Vihvelin’s dispositionalist account of free will

Does Everyone Think the Ability to do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility?

Christopher Franklin argues that, despite appearances, everyone thinks that the ability to do otherwise is required for free will and moral responsibility. Moreover, he says that the way to decide which ability to do otherwise is required will involve settling the nature of moral responsibility. In this paper I highlight one point on which those usually called leeway theorists - i.e. those who accept the need for alternatives - agree, in contradistinction to those who deny that the ability to do otherwise is needed for free will. And I explain why it falsifies both of Franklin’s claims

The regulation of takeovers in New Zealand and returns to shareholders : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Master of Business Studies at Massey University

Between 1 January 1996 and 30 June 2001 takeovers in New Zealand were governed by a set of regulations that formed part of New Zealand Stock Exchange ("NZSE") listing rules. The NZSE rules were relatively light in their approach to governing takeovers and received much criticism throughout their tenure. Prior to 1 January 1996 takeovers had been regulated by the Companies Amendment Act 1963. We examine the returns to targets and bidders between 1 January 1990 and 30 June 2000 to determine how effective the rules were in promoting shareholder wealth. The change in regulations between 1995 and 1996 also presents an opportunity to examine the impact on returns from moving from a lightly regulated regime to one which is more regulated with a greater amount of required disclosure. We find that returns to both targets and bidders were lower under the NZSE regime than under the Companies Amendment Act 1963. This result is attributed to several specific aspects of the Companies Amendment Act 1963 such as the ability of the target to recover defense costs from bidder and a set period for which the offer must remain open

Water Striders (Hemiptera: Gerridae) of Arkansas

The taxonomy, distribution, and ecology of the water striders of Arkansas are discussed based on personal collections, museum specimens, and literature records. A total of 15 species representing six genera is presently known from the state. One additional species is included as probably occurring in Arkansas

Forgiveness in Psychology and Law: The Meeting of Moral Development and Restorative Justice

This article discusses the psychological meaning of forgiveness and its relation to the criminal justice system. Includes a discussion of the four phases of the development progression of forgiveness