Scale Scale Economies in Nonprofit Provision, Technology Adoption and Entry

We study competition between nonprofit providers that supply a collective service through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies under conditions of free entry. When providers adopt a not-for-profit mission, the absence of a residual claimant can impede entry, protecting the position of an inefficient incumbent. Moreover, when providers supply goods that are at least partly public in nature, they may be unable to sustain the adoption of more efficient technologies that feature fixed costs, because buyers (private donors) face individual incentives to divert donations towards charities that adopt inferior, lower-fixed-cost technologies. These incentives may give rise to a technological race to the bottom, where nonprofit providers forgo opportunities to exploit scale economies. In these situations, government grants in support of core costs can have a nonneutral effect on entry, technology adoption, and industry performance.Not-for-profit Organizations, Entry, Core Funding

Viable Tax Constitutions

Taxation is only sustainable if the general public complies with it. This observation is uncontroversial with tax practitioners but has been ignored by the public finance tradition, which has interpreted tax constitutions as binding contracts by which the power to tax is irretrievably conferred by individuals to government, which can then levy any tax it chooses. However, in the absence of an outside party enforcing contracts between members of a group, no arrangement within groups can be considered to be a binding contract, and therefore the power of tax must be sanctioned by individuals on an ongoing basis. In this paper we offer, for the first time, a theoretical analysis of this fundamental compliance problem associated with taxation, obtaining predictions that in some cases point to a re-interptretation of the theoretical constructions of the public finance tradition while in others call them into questionTaxation ; Public Goods ; Government

The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy

This paper examines policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction, political economy model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and interjurisdictional policy spillovers, under alternative democratic choice procedures, namely, direct democracy and representative democracy. We show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policymakers rather than by referendum. The reason for this result is that delegation of the harmonization choice to elected policymakers can effectively act as a policy commitment device by a pro-centralization jurisdiction and induce a reluctant partner to cooperate. In these situations, policy centralization will result in policies converging towards the choice preferred by the reluctant partner, rather than in a dilution of policy preferences.international cooperation, trade and environmental policy negotiations

Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices.

This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting. We show that in this setting interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers.

Relational altruism and giving in social groups

Much fundraising is done by individuals within existing social groups. Exploiting a unique dataset, we demonstrate (i) a positive relationship between social group size and the number of donations; (ii) a negative relationship between group size and the size of individual donations; (iii) no clear relationship between group size and the total amount raised. Free riding with respect to the activity being funded cannot explain the relationship between group size and donation size, since the number of social group members is only a subset of total contributors. Instead, the findings are consistent with the notion that giving in social groups is motivated by “relational altruism”

Contextual variety, Internet-of-things and the choice of tailoring over platform : mass customisation strategy in supply chain management

This paper considers the implications for Supply Chain Management from the development of the Internet of Things (IoT) or Internet Connected Objects (ICO). We focus on the opportunities and challenges arising from consumption data as a result of ICO and how this can be translated into a provider’s strategy of offering different varieties of products. In our model, we consider two possible strategies: tailoring strategy and platform strategy. Tailoring strategy implies that a provider produces multiple varieties of a product that meet consumers’ needs. Platform strategy depicts the provider’s actions in offering a flexible and standardised platform which enables consumers’ needs to be met by incorporating personal ICO data onto various customisable applications independently produced by other providers that could be called on in context and on demand. We derive conditions under which each of the strategies may be profitable for the provider through maximising consumers’ value. We conclude by considering the implications for SCM research and practice including an extension of postponement taxonomies to include the customer as the completer of the product

Contextual variety, Internet-of-Things and the choice of tailoring over platform: Mass customisation strategy in supply chain management

AbstractThis paper considers the implications for Supply Chain Management (SCM) from the development of the Internet of Things (IoT) or Internet Connected Objects (ICO). We focus on opportunities and challenges stemming from consumption data that comes from ICO, and on how this data can be mapped onto strategic choices of product variety. We develop a simple analytical framework that illustrates the underlying mechanisms of a product supplier/producer׳s choice between (i) producing multiple product varieties as a way of meeting consumer demand (a “tailoring strategy”), and (ii) offering a flexible and standardised platform which enables consumers׳ needs to be met by incorporating personal ICO data into various customisable applications (a “platform strategy”). Under a platform strategy, the ICO data is independently produced by other providers and can be called on in both use and context of use. We derive conditions under which each of the strategies may be profitable for the provider through maximising consumers’ value. Our findings are that the higher the demand for contextual variety, the more profitable the platform strategy becomes, relative to the tailoring strategy. Our study concludes by considering the implications for SCM research and practice with an extension to postponement taxonomies, including those where the customer, and not the supplier, is the completer of the product, and we show that this yields higher profits than the tailoring strategy

The definition, measurement, and evaluation of tax expenditures and tax reliefs

Technical paper prepared for the National Audit Office © National Audit Office 2014Tax reliefs and tax expenditures are two closely related and overlapping concepts. The distinction between tax reliefs and tax expenditures is a subtle one and can only be clear after careful description of the two concepts. The first part of the report discusses how to define and categorise these concepts. Section 1 focuses upon the issue of how to define a tax expenditure and, therefore, how to distinguish a tax expenditure from a tax relief. This analysis is necessary since there is no consistency of definition in existing work or in practice. After a review of existing definitions a new definition of tax expenditures is proposed with the intention that it is useful for guiding categorisation. Section 2 reviews a number of alternative categorisations of tax expenditures and tax reliefs. Recommendations are made on the use of categorisations for the purposes of review and evaluation. The final section discusses characteristics that identify tax expenditures for review and proposes triggers for review

Does market size matter for charities?

We analyze implications of market size for market structure in the charity sector. While a standard model of oligopolistic for-profit competition predicts a positive relationship between market size and firm size, our analogous model of competition between prosocially motivated charities predicts no such correlation. If charities are biased towards their own provision, a positive association between market size and provider size can arise. We examine these predictions empirically for six different local charity markets. Our empirical findings suggest that charities do not solely pursue prosocial objectives, and that increased competition in the charity sector can lead to rationalization in provision