Signaling, Learning and Screening Prior to Trial: Informational Implications of Preliminary Injunctions

The decision to request a preliminary injunction—a court order that bans a party from certain actions until their lawfulness are ascertained in a final court ruling at trial—is an important litigation instrument in many areas of the law including antitrust, copyright, patents, trademarks, employment and labor relations as well as contracts. The process of filing for a preliminary injunction and the court's ruling on such a request generates information that can affect possible settlement decisions. We consider these implications when there is uncertainty about both the plaintiff's damages as well as the merits of case in the eyes of the court. Both plaintiff and defendant revise their beliefs about the case strength in dispute once they observe the court's ruling on preliminary injunctive relief. We study how such learning affects the likelihood of settlement. A precursor to this analysis is the study of the strategic role of preliminary injunctions as a means to signal the plaintiff's willingness to settle.preliminary injunction, learning, signaling, screening, litigation, pre-trial motion, settlement

Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives

This paper analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. We show that the ISP’s decision on the introduction of discrimination across content depends on a potential trade-off between network access fee and the revenue from the trade of the first-priority. Concerning the ISP’s investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion affects the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Because the relative merit of the first priority, and thus its value, becomes relatively small for higher capacity levels, the ISP’s incentive to invest on capacity under a discriminatory network can be smaller than that under a neutral regime where such rent extraction effects do not exist. Contrary to ISPs’ claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite.net neutrality, investment (innovation) incentives, queuing theory, hold-up problem, two-sided markets, vertical integration

Signaling, Learning and Screening Prior to Trial: A Theory of Preliminary Injunctions

The decision to request a preliminary injunction- a court order that bans a party from certain behavior until its lawfulness is ascertained in a final court ruling at trial-is an important litigation instrument in many areas of the law including antitrust, copyright, patents, trademarks, employment and labor relations as well as contracts. The process of filing for a preliminary injunction and the court's ruling on such a request generates information that can affect possible settlement decisions. We consider these implications when there is uncertainty about both the plaintiff's damages as well as the merits of case in the eyes of the court. Both plaintiff and defendant revise their beliefs about the case strength in dispute once they observe the court's ruling on preliminary injunctive relief. We study how such learning affects the likelihood of settlement. A precursor to this analysis is the study of the strategic role of preliminary injunctions as a means to signal the plaintiff's willingness to settle

The Economics of the Right to Be Forgotten

Scholars and practitioners debate whether to expand the scope of the right to be forgotten—the right to have certain links removed from search results—to encompass global search results. The debate centers on the assumption that the expansion will increase the incidence of link removal, which reinforces privacy while hampering free speech. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the expansion of the right to be forgotten can reduce the incidence of link removal. We also show that the expansion does not necessarily enhance the welfare of individuals who request removal and that it can either improve or reduce societal welfare. Our analysis has implications for understanding the impact of the global expansion of the right to be forgotten on privacy and free speech

Forecasting project progress and early warning of project overruns with probabilistic methods

Forecasting is a critical component of project management. Project managers must be able to make reliable predictions about the final duration and cost of projects starting from project inception. Such predictions need to be revised and compared with the project’s objectives to obtain early warnings against potential problems. Therefore, the effectiveness of project controls relies on the capability of project managers to make reliable forecasts in a timely manner. This dissertation focuses on forecasting project schedule progress with probabilistic methods. Currently available methods, for example, the critical path method (CPM) and earned value management (EVM) are deterministic and fail to account for the inherent uncertainty in forecasting and project performance. The objective of this dissertation is to improve the predictive capabilities of project managers by developing probabilistic forecasting methods that integrate all relevant information and uncertainties into consistent forecasts in a mathematically sound procedure usable in practice. In this dissertation, two probabilistic methods, the Kalman filter forecasting method (KFFM) and the Bayesian adaptive forecasting method (BAFM), were developed. The KFFM and the BAFM have the following advantages over the conventional methods: (1) They are probabilistic methods that provide prediction bounds on predictions; (2) They are integrative methods that make better use of the prior performance information available from standard construction management practices and theories; and (3) They provide a systematic way of incorporating measurement errors into forecasting. The accuracy and early warning capacity of the KFFM and the BAFM were also evaluated and compared against the CPM and a state-of-the-art EVM schedule forecasting method. Major conclusions from this research are: (1) The state-of-the-art EVM schedule forecasting method can be used to obtain reliable warnings only after the project performance has stabilized; (2) The CPM is not capable of providing early warnings due to its retrospective nature; (3) The KFFM and the BAFM can and should be used to forecast progress and to obtain reliable early warnings of all projects; and (4) The early warning capacity of forecasting methods should be evaluated and compared in terms of the timeliness and reliability of warning in the context of formal early warning systems

Net neutrality, Network capacity and Innovation at the Edges

We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high-bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services (QoS) in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry decision is constrained by the Internet service provider (ISP)'s network capacity. If capacity is relatively large, prioritized services reduce the QoS investment as they become substitutes, but improve trafic management. With limited capacity, by contrast, prioritized delivery services are complementary to the CP's investments and can facilitate entry of congestionsensitive content; however, this creates more congestion for other existing content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks

A Second-degree Price Discrimination by a Two-sided Monopoly Platform

In this article we study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. We find novel distortions that arise due to the two-sidedness of the mar- ket. They make the standard result \no distortion at top and downward distortion at bottom" not holding. They generate a new type of non-responsiveness, different from the one found by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984). We also show that the platform may mitigate or remove non-responsiveness at one side by properly designing price discrimi- nation on the other side. These findings help to address our central question, i.e., when price discrimination on one side substitutes for or complements price discrimination on the other side. As an application, we study the optimal mechanism design for an advertising platform mediating advertisers and consumers