Йеменский опыт дерадикализации исламизма

The ongoing armed conflict in Yemen between the forces of ousted President M. Hadi, supported by the coalition units of the Gulf monarchies led by Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group Ansar Allah, has a destabilizing effect on the entire Arabian Peninsula as a whole. In this regard, the creation of a deradicalization program and its implementation will help to solve several main tasks. First, to change the worldview of members of Islamist groups and movements from radical to moderate. Secondly, it will significantly reduce the level of instability in the Middle East region, where the majority of armed conflicts is conducted under religious slogans. The main focus of this study is on measures to counter radical Islamism, which were taken by the Yemeni authorities before and after the events of the Arab Spring. At the initial stage, the Yemeni administration’s use of the de-radicalization program showed impressive results. However, the ongoing fighting, as well as the reluctance of the Yemeni elite to Fund the deradicalization programme, led to its closure. The subsequent events of the Arab Spring brought additional instability to the domestic political situation in Yemen. Attempts to revive the program of deradicalization by the new Yemeni administration have failed. In general, the work done by the Yemeni authorities to deradicalize Islamism has demonstrated the ability to use non-violent methods of struggle, but their use is associated with serious financial investments, which the Yemeni state is not yet able to make due to the difficult financial situation caused by the prolonged armed conflict.Работа посвящена проблеме дерадикализации исламизма в Йемене до и после событий «арабской весны». На начальном этапе программа дерадикализации, проводимая йеменской администрацией, показала впечатляющие результаты. Однако нестабильность внутренней ситуации, а также нежелание йеменской элиты финансировать программу привели к ее закрытию. Этому обстоятельству способствовало и то, что в политике администрации по борьбе с радикальными группировками приоритетным было совершенствование силового аппарата. Попытки новой йеменской власти возродить программу дерадикализации после событий «арабской весны» обернулись провалом. В целом проделанная йеменскими властями работа по дерадикализации исламизма продемонстрировала умение применять несиловые методы борьбы, однако их использование связано с серьезными финансовыми вложениями, на которые йеменское государство пойти пока не может из-за тяжелой финансовой ситуации, вызванной затянувшимся вооруженным конфликтом

«Арабская весна» как фактор возникновения салафитских партий на Ближнем Востоке и в Северной Африке

The article is devoted to the analysis of Salafi Islamism. Conservative Salafi Islamism during the events of the Arab spring received a new development. In particular, the fall of authoritarian regimes and the beginning of the democratic process in the Middle East and North Africa led to the creation of Salafi political parties. The Salafi sts believed, that in a favorable political environment, they would be able to defend their legal status and gain some privileges through participating in parliamentary elections. However, the creation of parties has deepened internal divisions within the Salafi movements. In particular, there were supporters among the Salafi sts, who defended the combination of student and political activities against those who considered participation in the political struggle as a temporary tactical action. The result of the disagreement was the emergence of a reformist movement, that began to see participation in politics as a tool for strengthening the position of the Salafi st movement.Статья посвящена проблеме политизации салафизма. Консервативный салафитский исламизм в период событий «арабской весны» получил новое развитие. В частности, падение авторитарных режимов и начавшийся демократический процесс в странах Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки привели к тому, что салафитские движения стали создавать политические партии. Салафиты считали, что в условиях благоприятной политической конъюнктуры им удастся отстоять свой правовой статус и получить некоторые привилегии через участие в парламентских выборах. Однако создание партий привело к углублению разногласий внутри самих салафитских движений. В частности, салафиты разделились на тех, кто отстаивал совмещение проповеднической и политической деятельности, и тех, кто рассматривал участие в политической борьбе в качестве временной тактической акции. Итогом разногласий стало появление реформистского направления, рассматривающего участие в политике как инструмент для укрепления позиций салафитского движения

Катарско-турецкий альянс в борьбе за лидерство в Сомали

The article examines the struggle of the Qatari- Turkish alliance for regional leadership in the Federal Republic of Somalia. The analysis revealed that the foreign policy activity of Turkey and Qatar in Somalia began during the events of the Arab Spring. Ankara and Doha used diplomatic, military and fi nancial instruments to strengthen their infl uence in the country. Moreover, Qatari money played an important role in promoting pro-qatari candidates to power during the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. However, the eff orts of the Turkish- Qatari alliance to strengthen its position in Somalia have clashed with the interests of the Saudi- Emirati bloc seeking regional dominance. On the other hand, the inability to close the main cooperation with the central government in Somalia forced the UAE to support such autonomous regions as Somaliland, thereby intensifying the destabilization processes in the country.В статье рассматривается борьба катарско- турецкого альянса за региональное лидерство в Федеративной Республике Сомали. В ходе проведенного анализа выясняется, что внешнеполитическая активность Турции и Катара в Сомали началась в период событий «арабской весны». Для усиления своего влияния в стране Анкара и Доха использовали дипломатический, военный и финансовый инструменты. Более того, катарские деньги сыграли важную роль в продвижении к власти прокатарских кандидатов в период президентских выборов 2012 и 2017 гг. Однако усилия турецко- катарского альянса по укреплению своих позиций в Сомали столкнулись с интересами саудовско- эмиратского блока, стремящегося к региональному доминированию. Но неспособность замкнуть на себе основное сотрудничество с центральным правительством Сомали, вынудило ОАЭ поддерживать такие автономные районы, как Сомалиленд, тем самым усиливая дестабилизационные процессы в самом Сомали

Qatar and Turkey in the Struggle for Influence in the Republic of Sudan

Катарско-турецкий альянс в период событий «арабской весны» бросил беспрецедентный вызов усиливающейся мощи Саудовской Аравии в арабском регионе. Это проявилось во вмешательстве Анкары и Дохи во внутриполитические дела большинства государств рассматриваемого региона. Однако эта активность вызвала ответные действия со стороны Эр-Рияда, стремившегося нивелировать новую угрозу в лице Катара и Турции.During the Arab Spring, Qatari-Turkish alliance threw an unprecedented challenge to the growing power of Saudi Arabia in the Arab region. This was manifested in the intervention of Ankara and Doha in the internal political affairs of most States of the Arab region. However, such activity caused retaliatory actions on the part of Riyadh, which sought to neutralize the new threat in the face of Qatar and Turkey

Predictors of In-Hospital Mortality Among Patients with COVID-19 Related Stroke

Introduction. COVID-19-related stroke is associated with a significantly higher mortality than COVID-19 or stroke alone. Mechanisms underlying the increased mortality of patients with stroke and COVID-19 should be thoroughly studied. Objective: to analyze predictors of hospital mortality associated with COVID-19-related stroke. Materials and methods. We retrospectively analyzed 1,386 cases of COVID-19-related stroke reported by an infectious diseases inpatient clinic in 2020. We studied clinical, laboratory, and instrumental parameters in patients with different outcomes. Logistic regression was used to identify independent predictors of mortality. Results. 539 (38.9%) patients died during their hospital stay, with 437 (38.0%) deaths from ischemic stroke and 102 (42.7%) deaths from hemorrhagic stroke (p = 0.0001). Independent predictors of mortality associated with COVID-19-related stroke included age, neurological deficit severity measured by NIHSS, COVID-19 severity, and laboratory parameters including white blood cell count, creatinine, glucose, and D-dimer blood levels. Discussion. The results of logistic regression analysis were able to explain only 41% of the variability in hospital deaths among patients with stroke associated with COVID-19. Conclusion. Hospital mortality in patients with COVID-19-related stroke is associated with severity of inflammatory response, impaired coagulation, age, neurological deficit severity, and somatic comorbidities

Дерадикализация исламизма: опыт Саудовской Аравии

The article is devoted to the analysis of non-violent elements in the anti-terrorist approach of Saudi Arabiaat the present stage. The article consists of three thematic parts. First of all, the authors considered several main factors, leading to the radicalization of the partisans of political Islam. Second, they pointed out some preventive measures that could prevent the dissemination of radical ideas among the Muslim population. The final stage was the consideration of the direct deradicalization program used by Saudi Arabiaagainst those accused of religious terrorism and extremism. The analysis, which had been made, showed that the program of deradicalization used in Saudi Arabiahad demonstrated quite impressive results. Apparently, Saudi Arabia is seriously trying to play a leading role in the middle East, strengthening its position not only through military operations against Islamist radicalism, but also paying great attention to the reasons for the growth of radical convictions among the Islamist groups in the region.Статья посвящена анализу несиловых элементов в подходе Саудовской Аравии к решению проблемы терроризма на современном этапе. Работа состоит из трех частей. В первой рассмотрены основные причины подъема радикальных настроений среди представителей исламистских движений. Во второй проанализированы превентивные меры, которые могут предотвратить возникновение радикальных идей среди мусульманского населения. В третьей представлена непосредственно программа дерадикализации, применяемая Саудовской Аравией в отношении тех, кто был обвинен в религиозном терроризме и экстремизме. В ходе анализа выявлено, что действие программы привело к довольно впечатляющему результату. По-видимому, Саудовская Аравия всерьез стремится играть ведущую роль на Ближнем Востоке, не только укрепляя свои позиции посредством силовых операций против исламистского радикализма, но и уделяя большое внимание профилактике радикальных настроений среди исламистских групп региона

The Struggle between the Qatari-Turkish and Saudi-Emirati Bloc for the Infl uence in Afghanistan

The article is devoted to the analysis of the confrontation between the Qatari-Turkish and Saudi-Emirate blocs for the influence in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It was found out that with the change of power in August 2021 in Afghanistan, a number of regional players tried to assert their influence in the country. Qatar was particularly active in strengthening its positions, having managed to close the negotiation process between the United States and the Taliban before they came to power. It is also important that Saudi Arabia and the UAE claimed the role of a diplomatic mediator, but the approval of Qatar's candidacy led to the strengthening of the positions of the Qatari-Turkish alliance. Turkey provided impressive humanitarian assistance to the country, and also jointly with Qatar defended the right to restore an important infrastructure facility – the Kabul airport, which was also claimed by the UAE. Pakistan, which is the military wing of the Taliban, continues to have an important influence on the internal political situation in Afghanistan. The formation of a new Afghan government in the fall of 2021 determined the balance of power in the country in favor of Qatar and Pakistan, which support the political and power bloc, respectively. Saudi Arabia has failed to find the necessary levers of influence on the new Afghan government, but does not lose hope of using Pakistan as its proxy for pressure on the Taliban, in order to prevent the strengthening of the Iranian positions in Afghanistan. Thus, Afghanistan continues to be an arena of struggle for regional influence