A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction

Economic sanction has been widely used and increasingly a popular tool in maintaining peace and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction, as opposed to the use of military power, to punish target countries have been supported by the Charter of United Nations (UN). Tsebelis (1990) modelled economic sanctions using game theory and found that any attempt to increase the severity of the sanctions was counterintuitive, namely the policy reduced the likelihood of sender country(s) in enforcing economic sanction, however, it did not change the probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. This paper focuses on the refinement of the sanction game proposed by Tsebelis (1990) to analyse international relations. Recent findings from various studies on the effectiveness of economic sanction have been used to reconstruct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis’(1990) findings, any attempt to increase the severity of economic sanction may reduce the probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. A similar result was obtained in the case for which the sender country(s) applies any policy in preventing violation of international agreement/law by providing aids, assistances, and incentives to the target country.Economic Sanction; the Sanction/Inspection Games; Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

REFINEMENT OF THE TSEBELIS’ (1990) ECONOMIC SANCTION GAME

Economic sanction has been widely used and increasingly a popular tool in maintaining peace and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction, as opposed to the use of military power, to punish target countries have been supported by the Charter of United Nations (UN). Tsebelis (1990) modelled economic sanctions using game theory namely the Sanction Game. This paper focuses on the refinement of the sanction game proposed by Tsebelis (1990) to analyse international relations. Recent findings from various studies on the effectiveness of economic sanction have been used to reconstruct the game

Education and Ethnic Intermarriage: Evidence from Higher Education Expansion in Indonesia

In this paper, we analyse the effect of educational attainments on interethnic marriages in Indonesia, a multi-ethnic emerging country. The empirical analysis is based on data from the Java Island obtained from the 2014 wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey, combined with administrative data about the location and year of establishment of Higher Education Institutions (HEI). To estimate causal effects, we exploit variation in exposure to HEI by birth year and district of residence in an IV/TSLS framework. Specifically, we employ as instrument for education the number of HEI located in a radius of 10 kilometres from the centroid of the district of residence at age 18. The analysis is carried out at the individual level, with separate estimations for males and females. The results indicate that years of schooling, college attendance and completion positively affect the likelihood of exogamy, i.e. having a partner from a different ethnicity. (...

Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Utang Luar Negeri di Indonesia Periode 1985-2015

Dalam proses pembangunan sebuah negara dibutuhkan dana yang cukup besar. Indonesia merupakan negara berkembang yang sedang mengalami proses pembangunan, sehingga membutuhkan suntikan dana di berbagai sektor. Sumber dana dapat diperoleh baik dari dalam ataupun luar negeri, salah satunya yaitu berupa utang. Maka dari itu, penting untuk melihat faktor apa saja yang bisa mempengaruhi pemberian utang luar negeri, sehingga pemerintah dapat melakukan Langkah yang tepat. Untuk itu, penulis ingin menghitung pengaruh PDB, PMA, JUB dan KURS terhadap utang luar negeri di Indonesia. penulis menggunakan data time series selama periode 1985-2015 yang bersumber dari BPS, BI, dan BKPM. Alat estimasi yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) menggunakan Eviews 7.0. Hasil estimasi VECM menunjukan bahwa dalam jangka panjang variable PDB, JUB, dan KURS berpengaruh negatif dan signifikan terhadap utang luar negeri di Indonesia, sedangkan variabel PMA tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap utang luar negeri. Hasil estimasi VECM dalam penelitian ini juga menghasilkan analisis penting yaitu IRF (Impluse Response Function) dan VDC (Variance Decomposition)

A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction

Economic sanction has been widely used and increasingly a popular tool in maintaining peace and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction, as opposed to the use of military power, to punish target countries have been supported by the Charter of United Nations (UN). Tsebelis (1990) modelled economic sanctions using game theory and found that any attempt to increase the severity of the sanctions was counterintuitive, namely the policy reduced the likelihood of sender country(s) in enforcing economic sanction, however, it did not change the probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. This paper focuses on the refinement of the sanction game proposed by Tsebelis (1990) to analyse international relations. Recent findings from various studies on the effectiveness of economic sanction have been used to reconstruct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis’(1990) findings, any attempt to increase the severity of economic sanction may reduce the probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. A similar result was obtained in the case for which the sender country(s) applies any policy in preventing violation of international agreement/law by providing aids, assistances, and incentives to the target country

A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction

Economic sanction has been widely used and increasingly a popular tool in maintaining peace and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction, as opposed to the use of military power, to punish target countries have been supported by the Charter of United Nations (UN). Tsebelis (1990) modelled economic sanctions using game theory and found that any attempt to increase the severity of the sanctions was counterintuitive, namely the policy reduced the likelihood of sender country(s) in enforcing economic sanction, however, it did not change the probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. This paper focuses on the refinement of the sanction game proposed by Tsebelis (1990) to analyse international relations. Recent findings from various studies on the effectiveness of economic sanction have been used to reconstruct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis’(1990) findings, any attempt to increase the severity of economic sanction may reduce the probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. A similar result was obtained in the case for which the sender country(s) applies any policy in preventing violation of international agreement/law by providing aids, assistances, and incentives to the target country

The Impact of Compulsory Schooling Expansion on Educational Outcomes: The Case of Indonesia

Compulsory schooling reforms have been frequently used for expanding access to higher levels of education. However, these laws may not translate immediately into human capital gains. In this paper, we assess the impact of compulsory schooling expansion in Indonesia on a set of educational outcomes. The identification strategy exploits the discontinuity in the exposure to the reform according to individual's month and year of birth adopting a sharp regression discontinuity design. Our main results indicate that the reform successfully increased expected years of education and the probability of completing junior secondary education in the middle and long term. The reform also shaped the propensity to enroll and complete senior secondary schooling. However, the policy did not affect university attendance. Upon closer examination of heterogeneous effects, we found that the reform's impact was more substantial on individuals living in urban compared to those living in rural areas across both Java and Non-Java Islands. Moreover, when we investigate the heterogenous effects of parental education along with the gender of the child, male children with a low parental education experienced a greater effect from the reform. In contrast, female children of highly educated parents were more affected by the reform

Earthquake exposure and schooling: impacts and mechanisms

Natural disasters are a significant threat to human development. In this paper, we analyze the effects of being exposed to a strong earthquake during school age on schooling outcomes. We merge geolocated data about the intensity of the shock at the district level with individual information from the Indonesia Family Life Survey. The identification strategy exploits variation in exposure to the natural shock by birth cohort and district of residence, considering as the treated group individuals who were residing in affected districts while they were in school age. Earthquake exposure reduces years of schooling by somewhat less than one year and negatively affects the probability of completing compulsory education but does not alter the chances of enrolling into post-compulsory education. Falsification analysis and several robustness checks corroborate the causal interpretation of our findings. The analysis of the potential mechanisms indicates that induced migration and casualties occurring at the family level as a consequence of the earthquake do not seem to play a relevant role. However, damages in educational infrastructures do represent a relevant channel through which natural disasters harm human capital formation. Part of the overall impact of the earthquake represents a delay in schooling progression, but a substantial share of its effect consists in a permanent loss of human capital among affected individuals