Hollywood Loving

In this Essay, I highlight how nongovernmental entities establish political, moral, and sexual standards through visual media, which powerfully underscores and expresses human behavior. Through the Motion Picture Production Code (the “Hays Code”) and the Code of Practices for Television Broadcasters (the “TV Code”), Americans viewed entertainment as a pre-mediated, engineered world that existed outside of claims of censorship and propaganda. This Essay critically examines the role of film and television as persuasive and integral legal actors and it considers how these sectors operate to maintain, and sometimes challenge, racial order

Nonlinear stability of viscous roll waves

Extending results of Oh--Zumbrun and Johnson--Zumbrun for parabolic conservation laws, we show that spectral stability implies nonlinear stability for spatially periodic viscous roll wave solutions of the one-dimensional St. Venant equations for shallow water flow down an inclined ramp. The main new issues to be overcome are incomplete parabolicity and the nonconservative form of the equations, which leads to undifferentiated quadratic source terms that cannot be handled using the estimates of the conservative case. The first is resolved by treating the equations in the more favorable Lagrangian coordinates, for which one can obtain large-amplitude nonlinear damping estimates similar to those carried out by Mascia--Zumbrun in the related shock wave case, assuming only symmetrizability of the hyperbolic part. The second is resolved by the observation that, similarly as in the relaxation and detonation cases, sources occurring in nonconservative components experience greater than expected decay, comparable to that experienced by a differentiated source.Comment: Revision includes new appendix containing full proof of nonlinear damping estimate. Minor mathematical typos fixed throughout, and more complete connection to Whitham averaged system added. 42 page

The Pocahontas Exception: American Indians and Exceptionalism in Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924

Most scholarship on Loving v. Virginia (1967) briefly mentions the “Pocahontas Exception,” a subsection of Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924 which counted persons of limited American Indian ancestry as white. However, few of these works raise the issue outside of a footnote. This article addresses the treatment of Native American ancestry as a curious exception to the threat of racial impurity. Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute sought to eradicate stealth intrusions of tainted blood into the white race, which proponents believed to be threatened “by the quagmire of mongrelization.” Exempted from this racial policing regime were those influential whites, the “First Families of Virginia,” who proudly claimed Native American ancestry from Pocahontas. Why would Native American ancestry, as opposed to others, pass as acceptable nonwhite blood and good law? This exception translates into contemporary social practice, as increasing numbers of Americans freely and lately claim Native ancestry. This openness escapes the triumvirate of resistance, shame, and secrecy that regularly accompanies findings of partial African ancestry. This paper contends that antimiscegenation laws such as the Racial Integrity Act relegate Indians to existence only in a distant past, creating a temporal disjuncture to free Indians from a contemporary discourse of racial politics. I argue that such exemptions assess Indians as abstractions rather than practicalities, which facilitates the miscegenistic exceptionalism as demonstrated in Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute

The Color of Testamentary Freedom

Wills that prioritize the interests of nontraditional families over collateral heirs test courts’ dedication to observing the posthumous wishes of testators. Collateral heirs who object to will provisions that redraw the contours of “family” are likely to profit from the incompatibility of testamentary freedom and social deviance. Thus, the interests of married, white adults may claim priority over nonwhite, unmarried others. Wills that acknowledge the existence of moral or social transgressions—namely, interracial sex and reproduction—incite will contests by collateral heirs who leverage their status as white and legitimate in order to defeat testamentary intent. This Article turns to antebellum and postwar will contests between disinherited white heirs and mixed-race devisees to question the role of courts in defining “family” and the expectancy of collaterals to uphold this limitation. While other studies have separately examined the myth of testamentary freedom and argued for the legitimacy of diverse families, scholars have paid less attention to the color of inheritance. Drawing on Cheryl Harris’s groundbreaking work on property and racial expectation interests, this Article illustrates the centrality of whiteness in the validation of testamentary transfers. At the same time, it questions the legal resistance to nontraditional families, which substantially weakens the aspirational theory of donative freedom—the cornerstone of Trusts & Estates. Through the intersection of wills law and family law, this Article initiates a critical inquiry of the influence of race in testamentary transfers

Slaves in the Family: Testamentary Freedom and Interracial Deviance

This Article addresses the deviance of interracial sexuality acknowledged in testamentary documents. The language of wills calls into question the authority of probate and family law by forcing issues of deviance into the public realm. Will dramas, settled in or out of court, publicly unearth insecurities about family. Many objections to the stated intent of the testator generate from social prejudices toward certain kinds of interpersonal relationships: nonmarital, homosexual, and/or interracial. When pitted against an issue of a moral or social transgression, testamentary intent often fails. In order for these attacks on testamentary validity to succeed, they must be situated within an existing juridical framework that supports and adheres to the hegemony of denial that refuses to legitimate the wishes of the testator. Disinherited white relatives of white testators regularly challenged wills disposing a majority of an estate to paramours and children of African descent. In the nineteenth century, testators who eschewed traditional devises to spouses, relatives, and institutions in favor of mistresses, slaves, or both often incited will contests of testamentary incapacity, undue influence, or fraud. This Article is a case study of In Re Remley, an antebellum will contest between disinherited white collateral heirs and the intended black and mulatto devisees. It retains timeless value in its demonstration of the incompatibility of testamentary freedom and social deviance. I conclude that subjective conceptions of kinship, in particular those unpopular relationships that defy social norms, prevent the idea of testamentary freedom from reaching diverse articulations of family

The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry from Racial Purity Law

The Pocahontas Exception confronts the legal existence and cultural fascination with the eponymous Indian Grandmother. Laws existed in many states that prohibited marriage between Whites and non- Whites to prevent the quagmire of mongrelization. Yet, this racial protectionism, as ingrained in law, blatantly exempted Indian blood from the threat to White racial purity. In Virginia, the Racial Integrity Act of 1924 made exceptions for Whites of mixed descent who proudly claimed Native American ancestry from Pocahontas. This Paper questions the juridical exceptions made for Native American ancestry in antimiscegenation statutes, and analyzes the concomitant exemptions in contemporary social practice. With increasing numbers of Americans freely and lately claiming Native ancestry, this openness escapes the triumvirate of resistance, shame, and secrecy that regularly accompanies findings of partial African ancestry. The author contends that antimiscegenation laws such as the Racial Integrity Act relegate Indians to existence only in a distant past, creating a temporal disjuncture to free Indians from a contemporary discourse of racial politics. He argues that such exemptions assess Indians as abstractions rather than practicalities, which facilitates the miscegenistic exceptionalism as demonstrated in Virginia\u27s antimiscegenation statute

Rethinking Children as Property

Despite the collective view in law and social practice that it is intrinsically taboo to consider human beings as chattel, the law persists in treating children as property. Applying principles of property, this Article examines paternity disputes to explain and critique the law’s view of children as property of their parents. As evidenced in these conflicts, I demonstrate that legal paternity exposes a rhetoric of ownership, possession, and exchange. The law presumes that a child born to a married woman is fathered by her husband, even when irrefutable proof exists that another man fathered the child. Attempts by the non-marital biological father to assert parental rights regularly fail, as states allow only one father to “claim” the child. This approach treats the nonmarital father as a trespasser and categorically favors the fundamental due process rights of the marital father. Analyzing these family law cases along a property framework offers a rethinking of the law’s imbalanced treatment of unmarried fathers. The law’s current approach to paternity disputes reflects a classic model of property rights and ownership rooted in static, rigid, and exclusive claims. This framework ignores the interests of children in their biological fathers while overestimating the reproductive normativity of marriage. This Article joins in recent discussions of “stewardship” models of property that engage the complexities of nontitled claims to property. It draws upon constitutional law, property theory, and political philosophy to assert the possibility that the interests of children are better served by protecting and nurturing those relationships (i.e., those with the biological father) that are normally defeated by traditional appeals to substantive due process. By highlighting the claims of nonmarital, biological fathers divested of standing to assert paternal rights, I suggest a turn to a fiduciary ethic that entertains the unique legal status of what I call the “complex family.” This engagement of a textured—as opposed to flat and conclusory—model of the hybrid marital/nonmarital family recognizes the unwed father’s property rights in the child as nontitled, while the marital unit acts as a fiduciary caregiver with legal rights to the child. By embracing the counterintuitive notion of children as property, I argue for a redirection of the existing framework of property theory to a productive model for the family that champions the best interests of the child in tandem with the constitutional interests of marital and nonmarital parents

The Multiracial Epiphany

The year 1967 becomes the temporal landmark for the beginning of an interracial nation. That year, the United States Supreme Court ruled state antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional in Loving v Virginia. In addition to outlawing interracial marriage, these restrictive laws had created a presumption of illegitimacy for historical claims of racial intermixture. Not all states had antimiscegenation laws, but the sting of restriction extended to other states to forge a collective forgetting of mixed race. Defenders of racial purity could depend on these laws to render interracial relationships illegitimate. Looking back to Loving as the official birth of Multiracial America reinforces the prevailing memory of racial separatism while further underscoring the illegitimacy of miscegenations past. By establishing racial freedom in marriage, Loving also sets a misleading context for the history of mixed race in America. Even though Loving instigates the open acceptance of interracialism, it unintentionally creates a collective memory that mixed race people and relationships did not exist before 1967. To imagine and realize a pre-1967 miscegenated America directly challenges the legal legitimacy of the racial reality that antimiscegenation law attempted to enforce. I approach this subject by examining contemporary claims of mixed race that are rooted in the past. This conflict usually entails opposing narratives: one venerating the involvement of a prominent historical figure as party to an interracial relationship; the other steadfastly holds that such claims are unfounded as specious. Placing miscegenation upon narratives and figures that are faintly characterized and understood as racially white turns private claims of mixed identity into public contemplations of interracial intimacy. To imagine historic figures as Founding Fathers of another sort destabilizes an implicit understanding of ingrained racial limitations