CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Phage Resistance Is Not Impeded by the DNA Modifications of Phage T4

Bacteria rely on two known DNA-level defenses against their bacteriophage predators: restriction-modification and Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR)-CRISPR-associated (Cas) systems. Certain phages have evolved countermeasures that are known to block endonucleases. For example, phage T4 not only adds hydroxymethyl groups to all of its cytosines, but also glucosylates them, a strategy that defeats almost all restriction enzymes. We sought to determine whether these DNA modifications can similarly impede CRISPR-based defenses. In a bioinformatics search, we found naturally occurring CRISPR spacers that potentially target phages known to modify their DNA. Experimentally, we show that the Cas9 nuclease from the Type II CRISPR system of Streptococcus pyogenes can overcome a variety of DNA modifications in Escherichia coli. The levels of Cas9-mediated phage resistance to bacteriophage T4 and the mutant phage T4 gt, which contains hydroxymethylated but not glucosylated cytosines, were comparable to phages with unmodified cytosines, T7 and the T4-like phage RB49. Our results demonstrate that Cas9 is not impeded by N6-methyladenine, 5-methylcytosine, 5-hydroxymethylated cytosine, or glucosylated 5-hydroxymethylated cytosine

Can large language models democratize access to dual-use biotechnology?

Large language models (LLMs) such as those embedded in 'chatbots' are accelerating and democratizing research by providing comprehensible information and expertise from many different fields. However, these models may also confer easy access to dual-use technologies capable of inflicting great harm. To evaluate this risk, the 'Safeguarding the Future' course at MIT tasked non-scientist students with investigating whether LLM chatbots could be prompted to assist non-experts in causing a pandemic. In one hour, the chatbots suggested four potential pandemic pathogens, explained how they can be generated from synthetic DNA using reverse genetics, supplied the names of DNA synthesis companies unlikely to screen orders, identified detailed protocols and how to troubleshoot them, and recommended that anyone lacking the skills to perform reverse genetics engage a core facility or contract research organization. Collectively, these results suggest that LLMs will make pandemic-class agents widely accessible as soon as they are credibly identified, even to people with little or no laboratory training. Promising nonproliferation measures include pre-release evaluations of LLMs by third parties, curating training datasets to remove harmful concepts, and verifiably screening all DNA generated by synthesis providers or used by contract research organizations and robotic cloud laboratories to engineer organisms or viruses.Comment: 6 pages, 0 figure

Heritable genome editing in C. elegans via a CRISPR-Cas9 system

CRISPR-Cas systems have been used with single-guide RNAs for accurate gene disruption and conversion in multiple biological systems. Here we report the use of the endonuclease Cas9 to target genomic sequences in the C. elegans germline, utilizing single-guide RNAs that are expressed from a U6 small nuclear RNA promoter. Our results demonstrate that targeted, heritable genetic alterations can be achieved in C. elegans, providing a convenient and effective approach for generating loss-of-function mutants

BIOSAFETY. Safeguarding gene drive experiments in the laboratory.

Multiple stringent confinement strategies should be used whenever possibleThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from AAAS via http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aac793

CAS9 transcriptional activators for target specificity screening and paired nickases for cooperative genome engineering

Prokaryotic type II CRISPR-Cas systems can be adapted to enable targeted genome modifications across a range of eukaryotes.1–7. Here we engineer this system to enable RNA-guided genome regulation in human cells by tethering transcriptional activation domains either directly to a nuclease-null Cas9 protein or to an aptamer-modified single guide RNA (sgRNA). Using this functionality we developed a novel transcriptional activation–based assay to determine the landscape of off-target binding of sgRNA:Cas9 complexes and compared it with the off-target activity of transcription activator–like (TAL) effector proteins8, 9. Our results reveal that specificity profiles are sgRNA dependent, and that sgRNA:Cas9 complexes and 18-mer TAL effector proteins can potentially tolerate 1–3 and 1–2 target mismatches, respectively. By engineering a requirement for cooperativity through offset nicking for genome editing or through multiple synergistic sgRNAs for robust transcriptional activation, we suggest methods to mitigate off-target phenomena. Our results expand the versatility of the sgRNA:Cas9 tool and highlight the critical need to engineer improved specificity

Inhibition of Bacterial Conjugation by Phage M13 and Its Protein g3p: Quantitative Analysis and Model

Conjugation is the main mode of horizontal gene transfer that spreads antibiotic resistance among bacteria. Strategies for inhibiting conjugation may be useful for preserving the effectiveness of antibiotics and preventing the emergence of bacterial strains with multiple resistances. Filamentous bacteriophages were first observed to inhibit conjugation several decades ago. Here we investigate the mechanism of inhibition and find that the primary effect on conjugation is occlusion of the conjugative pilus by phage particles. This interaction is mediated primarily by phage coat protein g3p, and exogenous addition of the soluble fragment of g3p inhibited conjugation at low nanomolar concentrations. Our data are quantitatively consistent with a simple model in which association between the pili and phage particles or g3p prevents transmission of an F plasmid encoding tetracycline resistance. We also observe a decrease in the donor ability of infected cells, which is quantitatively consistent with a reduction in pili elaboration. Since many antibiotic-resistance factors confer susceptibility to phage infection through expression of conjugative pili (the receptor for filamentous phage), these results suggest that phage may be a source of soluble proteins that slow the spread of antibiotic resistance genes

Inoculating science against potential pandemics and information hazards.

The recent de novo assembly of horsepox is an instructive example of an information hazard: published methods enabling poxvirus synthesis led to media coverage spelling out the implications, efficiently disseminating true information that might be used to cause harm. Whether or not the benefits justified the risks, the horsepox saga provides ample reason to upgrade the current system for screening synthesized DNA for hazardous sequences, which does not cover the majority of firms and cannot reliably prevent the assembly of potentially pandemic pathogens. An upgraded system might leverage one-way encryption to confidentially scrutinize virtually all commercial production by a cooperative international network of servers whose integrity can be verified by third parties. Funders could support participating institutions to ease the transition or outright subsidize the market to make clean DNA cheaper, while boycotts by journals, institutions, and funders could ensure compliance and require hardware-level locks on future DNA synthesizers. However, the underlying problem is that security and safety discussions among experts typically follow potentially hazardous events rather than anticipating them. Changing norms and incentives to favor preregistration and advisory peer review of planned experiments could test alternatives to the current closeted research model in select areas of science. Because the fields of synthetic mammalian virology and especially gene drive research involve technologies that could be unilaterally deployed and may self-replicate in the wild, they are compelling candidates for initial trials of early-stage peer review

Measuring the tolerance of the genetic code to altered codon size

Translation using four-base codons occurs in both natural and synthetic systems. What constraints contributed to the universal adoption of a triplet codon, rather than quadruplet codon, genetic code? Here, we investigate the tolerance of the Escherichia coli genetic code to tRNA mutations that increase codon size. We found that tRNAs from all 20 canonical isoacceptor classes can be converted to functional quadruplet tRNAs (qtRNAs). Many of these selectively incorporate a single amino acid in response to a specified four-base codon, as confirmed with mass spectrometry. However, efficient quadruplet codon translation often requires multiple tRNA mutations. Moreover, while tRNAs were largely amenable to quadruplet conversion, only nine of the twenty aminoacyl tRNA synthetases tolerate quadruplet anticodons. These may constitute a functional and mutually orthogonal set, but one that sharply limits the chemical alphabet available to a nascent all-quadruplet code. Our results suggest that the triplet codon code was selected because it is simpler and sufficient, not because a quadruplet codon code is unachievable. These data provide a blueprint for synthetic biologists to deliberately engineer an all-quadruplet expanded genetic code.</jats:p

Harnessing gene drive

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. When scientists alter the genome of an organism, we typically reduce its ability to reproduce in the wild. This limitation has prevented researchers from rendering wild insects unable to spread disease, programing pests to ignore our crops, using genetics to precisely remove environmentally damaging invasive species, and much more. Gene drive occurs when a vertically transmitted genetic element reliably spreads through a population over generations despite providing no reproductive advantage to each host organism. Until recently, scientific efforts to take advantage of this natural phenomenon achieved only limited success. The advent of CRISPR genome editing has dramatically accelerated efforts to harness gene drive. Small groups of scientists may now be capable of unilaterally altering entire wild populations, and through them, the shared environment. Determining whether, when, and how to develop gene drive interventions responsibly will be a defining challenge of our time. Here we describe capabilities, safeguards, applications, and opportunities relevant to gene drive technologies