Ground-wind restrictions procedure for Atlas/Centaur/Surveyor AC-6 and AC-7

Surface wind restrictions for Atlas Centaur launch vehicle while erected on launching pa

Uniform Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Answer to Preventing Unscrupulous Agent Activity

This Note addresses whether there should be an arbitration and mediation section added to both the Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA), and Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) to establish a uniform dispute resolution process for dealing with unscrupulous acts of athlete agents. This issue is distinctive because while all four professional sports leagues’ players associations have specific arbitration procedures in their athlete agent regulations, the two statutes governing athlete agent conduct do not adopt a uniform policy relating to arbitration procedures. This Note addresses the prior history of state and federal legislation pertaining to an athlete agent, including how the UAAA and SPARTA regulate athlete agents working with both students and professionals. This Note then analyzes the similarities and differences among the arbitration and mediation procedures used by each of the four professional sports leagues’ players associations. It next discusses the successes and failures of both the professional leagues’ arbitration methods and other legal literature propositions for most effectively dealing with sports agents. Finally, this Note proposes that the most effective processes for dealing with the alleged unscrupulous acts of sports agents will result from modifying both the UAAA and SPARTA to include a uniform sports agent act and a uniform arbitration and mediation section

Closing Impunity Gaps for the Crime of Aggression

As stated at Nuremberg, the crime of aggression is the “supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” International instruments clearly and repeatedly have outlawed initiating wars of aggression and other illegal uses of armed force. States parties recently have defined and codified the crime in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and delineated the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression. Although the ICC is an important mechanism for accountability and justice, it is not certain when it will be able to adjudicate the crime of aggression. Moreover, the ICC will not have jurisdiction to prosecute all individuals who wage aggressive war, nor will it be free of political cooptation by states parties interested in quashing attempts to seek justice for acts of aggression committed by their leaders. Consequently, advocates combating impunity for international crimes should continue to view the ICC as a court of last resort, especially for prosecuting cases of aggression. Despite the many legal and political challenges, primary responsibility for prosecuting individuals for the use of armed force in violation of the U.N. Charter—the crime of aggression—should still rest with national courts. Once aggression is criminalized at the domestic level, three types of extraterritorial jurisdiction—passive nationality jurisdiction, protective jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction—are avenues for enabling criminal prosecution of leaders who illegally use armed force. This Article examines each of these principles, their potential, and the challenges inherent in prosecuting the crime of aggression in national courts. In addition, it supports scholars’ arguments for expanding national-level jurisdiction over crimes of aggression committed domestically and internationally, finding that the crime of aggression is among the ‘core’ international crimes demanding accountability at the domestic level. It challenges arguments put forth by some scholars that national legislatures and prosecutors should not criminalize or prosecute individuals who wage aggressive war and finds that domesticating international criminal law, including outlawing the crime of aggression, is essential to achieve more effective prosecution of aggression. Unless additional exceptions are made to the current legal structures, however, the challenges of bringing perpetrators of aggressive war to justice under domestic law are considerable. Individual states, therefore, should (1) exercise jurisdiction and prosecute the crime whenever possible, and (2) consider ways to widen domestic avenues for justice in cases of aggression

Disaggregating Slavery and the Slave Trade

International law prohibits slavery and the slave trade as peremptory norms, customary international law prohibitions and crimes, humanitarian law prohibitions, and non-derogable human rights. Human rights bodies, however, focus on human trafficking, even when slavery and the slave trade—and not human trafficking—are enumerated within their mandates. International human rights law has conflated human trafficking with slavery and the slave trade. Consequently, human trafficking has subsumed the slave trade and, at times, slavery prohibitions, increasing perpetrator impunity for slavery and the slave trade abuses and denying full expressive justice to survivors. This Article disaggregates slavery from the slave trade and slavery and the slave trade from human trafficking, arguing that untangling these prohibitions is important for several reasons. First, slavery and the slave trade persist as harms today as evidenced by, inter alia, kafala system abuses in Lebanon, slave market auctions in Libya, and Islamic State (IS) crimes in Iraq and Syria perpetrated against Yazidis. Second, slavery and the slave trade enjoy peremptory status, offering the highest form of protection in international law. Human trafficking does not. Third, naming and addressing violations of the slave trade—the precursory acts to slavery—helps to identify, provide redress, and prevent slavery and slave trade perpetration. Distinguishing the slave trade from slavery, and the slave trade and slavery from human trafficking, affords additional avenues for redress, maximizing full expressive accountability for states’ obligations to prohibit slavery and the slave trade. Finally, delineating these prohibitions provides legal clarity and accuracy, both by correctly characterizing harms and by properly interpreting treaty provisions and jurisdictional mandates. In the short term, playing “fast and loose” with distinct prohibitions undermines international law’s institutional legitimacy. In the long term, state practice and opinio juris that moves away from enforcing against slavery and slave trade harms might lessen or even erode these protective customary international law prohibitions

The Tax Benefit Rule: Recovery Reevaluated

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases, Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States and Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, to resolve a conflict in the circuits as to whether recovery is necessary for the application of the tax benefit rule. The author argues that the application of the tax benefit rule should not depend on the existence of a recovery, but instead should depend on whether an event occurs that is inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the prior deduction; recovery merely is a manifestation of an inconsistent event

Prohibiting Slavery & The Slave Trade

Slavery and the slave trade stubbornly persist in our time, but they receive insufficient attention in international human rights law. Even when courts adjudicate slavery violations, they often fail to characterize slave trade conduct that nearly always precedes slavery. Courts also characterize acts that meet the definition of slavery or the slave trade only as other human rights harms, such as forced labor or human trafficking. This failure to accurately characterize violations also as slavery and the slave trade perpetuates impunity and denies victims full expressive justice. This Article argues for reviving international human rights law’s prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade. It also argues that a state responsibility complement to individual criminal accountability will assist to enforce or reform prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade in domestic laws, transform structures that perpetuate those harms, and dismantle systems that support them

The Tax Benefit Rule: Recovery Reevaluated

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases, Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States and Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, to resolve a conflict in the circuits as to whether recovery is necessary for the application of the tax benefit rule. The author argues that the application of the tax benefit rule should not depend on the existence of a recovery, but instead should depend on whether an event occurs that is inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the prior deduction; recovery merely is a manifestation of an inconsistent event

Disaggregating Slavery and the Slave Trade

International law prohibits slavery and the slave trade as peremptory norms, customary international law prohibitions and crimes, humanitarian law prohibitions, and non-derogable human rights. Human rights bodies, however, focus on human trafficking, even when slavery and the slave trade—and not human trafficking—are enumerated within their mandates. International human rights law has conflated human trafficking with slavery and the slave trade. Consequently, human trafficking has subsumed the slave trade and, at times, slavery prohibitions, increasing perpetrator impunity for slavery and the slave trade abuses and denying full expressive justice to survivors. This Article disaggregates slavery from the slave trade and slavery and the slave trade from human trafficking, arguing that untangling these prohibitions is important for several reasons. First, slavery and the slave trade persist as harms today as evidenced by, inter alia, kafala system abuses in Lebanon, slave market auctions in Libya, and Islamic State (IS) crimes in Iraq and Syria perpetrated against Yazidis. Second, slavery and the slave trade enjoy peremptory status, offering the highest form of protection in international law. Human trafficking does not. Third, naming and addressing violations of the slave trade—the precursory acts to slavery—helps to identify, provide redress, and prevent slavery and slave trade perpetration. Distinguishing the slave trade from slavery, and the slave trade and slavery from human trafficking, affords additional avenues for redress, maximizing full expressive accountability for states’ obligations to prohibit slavery and the slave trade. Finally, delineating these prohibitions provides legal clarity and accuracy, both by correctly characterizing harms and by properly interpreting treaty provisions and jurisdictional mandates. In the short term, playing “fast and loose” with distinct prohibitions undermines international law’s institutional legitimacy. In the long term, state practice and opinio juris that moves away from enforcing against slavery and slave trade harms might lessen or even erode these protective customary international law prohibitions