Building a common european energy policy around a market based approach.

Pays de l'Union européenne; Politique énergétique;

« Going with Coase against Coase : The Dynamic Approach to the Internalization of External Effects »

The article develops R. H. Coase’s insight that the level of transaction costs in the market determines the amount of externalities, thus providing arguments against government intervention. Contrary to Coase, however, we argue that the level of transaction costs cannot be considered as given, and that there is therefore a case for selective and innovative government intervention to reduce such transaction costs. Externalities are approached as intrinsically new and dynamic impacts, whose transaction costs diminish over time, a process that can be accelerated by appropriate government action. In contrast, internalization by means of public intervention through Pigouvian taxation is shown to be epistemologically untenable: if externalities had sufficient information content to allow governments to determine optimal tax levels, these same externalities would already have been fully internalized by the market. The final part of the article proposes two internalization strategies based on a dynamic re-interpretation of the Coasean approach. The first aims at developing feedback mechanisms between generators of externalities and those affected by them through media other than the market. The second seeks to reduce transaction costs in order to extend the domain in which markets can operate effectively by proposing codification strategies for the informational complexities characterizing externalities.External effects, incomplete information, environmental economics, transaction costs, codification, dynamic internalization

Do Carbon Permits Constitute a Respectable Asset Class? Efficiency, Liquidity and Volatility in comparison with Other Financial Markets.

Emission markets; Carbon;

Le triangle des prix carbone-gaz-électricité sur le marché au comptant.

gaz; électricité; CO2; Industrie énergétique; prix;

Investir dans le secteur de l'énergie : une question de gouvernance.

Politiques publiques; Energie;

Les perspectives énergétiques de la Chine.

Energie; Chine; Politiques publiques;

Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets

Deep decarbonization of energy systems poses considerable challenges to electricity markets and there is a growing consensus that an energy-only design based on short-term marginal cost pricing cannot deliver adequate levels of investment and long-term coordination across actors and sectors. Based on the instructive example of the evolution of European electricity market designs, we discuss several shortcomings of energy-only markets and illustrate how ad-hoc policies that intend to address them have limitations of their own, notably a lack of systemwide coordination. Second, we describe how the sheer scale and nature of deep decarbonization targets requiring massive investment in capital-intensive low-carbon technologies exacerbate these issues. Ambitious emission reduction targets thus require an evolution of market design towards hybrid regimes. Hybrid markets separate long-term investment decisions from short-term operations through a balanced and differentiated use of competitive and regulatory design elements to coordinate and de-risk investment. Finally, a historical analysis of the evolution of different electricity market designs shows how hybrid markets constitute contemporary forms of long-run marginal cost pricing that are appropriate for meeting deep decarbonization targets with reduced uncertainty and hence lower private and social costs

Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets

Deep decarbonization of energy systems poses considerable challenges to electricity markets and there is a growing consensus that an energy-only design based on short-term marginal cost pricing cannot deliver adequate levels of investment and long-term coordination across actors and sectors. Based on the instructive example of the evolution of European electricity market designs, we discuss several shortcomings of energy-only markets and illustrate how ad-hoc policies that intend to address them have limitations of their own, notably a lack of systemwide coordination. Second, we describe how the sheer scale and nature of deep decarbonization targets requiring massive investment in capital-intensive low-carbon technologies exacerbate these issues. Ambitious emission reduction targets thus require an evolution of market design towards hybrid regimes. Hybrid markets separate long-term investment decisions from short-term operations through a balanced and differentiated use of competitive and regulatory design elements to coordinate and de-risk investment. Finally, a historical analysis of the evolution of different electricity market designs shows how hybrid markets constitute contemporary forms of long-run marginal cost pricing that are appropriate for meeting deep decarbonization targets with reduced uncertainty and hence lower private and social costs

Beteiligung als Strategie und Strukturelement einer Energiewende in Ostdeutschland

Zuerst erschienen im Lang-Verlag: Keppler, Dorothee; Zöllner, Jan; Rau, Irina; Rupp, Johannes: Beteiligung als Strategie und Strukturelement einer Energiewende in Ostdeutschland. - In: Keppler, Dorothee; Nölting, Benjamin; Schröder, Carolin (Hg.): Neue Energie im Osten - Gestaltung des Umbruchs : Perspektiven für eine zukunftsfähige sozial-ökologische Energiewende. - Frankfurt am Main [u.a.] : Lang, 2011. - ISBN: 978-3-631-61009-1. - S. 187–206