Can Modus Vivendi Save Liberalism from Moralism? A Critical Assessment of John Gray’s Political Realism

This chapter assesses John Gray’s modus vivendi-based justification for liberalism. I argue that his approach is preferable to the more orthodox deontological or teleological justificatory strategies, at least because of the way it can deal with the problem of diversity. But then I show how that is not good news for liberalism, for grounding liberal political authority in a modus vivendi undermines liberalism’s aspiration to occupy a privileged normative position vis-à-vis other kinds of regimes. So modus vivendi can save liberalism from moralism, but at cost many liberals will not be prepared to pay

Book review : From White Australia to Woomera : the story of Australian immigration by James Jupp

Book review of 'The European Union and Asian Countries' by Georg Wiessala (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), ISBN 0826460917.2 page(s

Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success

What is practical wisdom? What does a practically wise person know? It is widely held that a person is practically wise if and only if the person knows how to live well, and that a person knows how to live well only if the person knows what is good or important for well‐being. The question is: What is it that contributes to or constitutes well‐being known by a wise person? A theory of wisdom without a substantive answer to this question can never be seriously tested and used in practice. In this paper, I propose a fully articulated theory of wisdom by integrating the skill theory of wisdom with the success theory of well‐being, arguing that practical wisdom is a skill conducive to well‐being conceived as attitude success

Market Hegemony and Economic Theory

It is central to standard economic theory that people act on their interests. People are interested in a variety of things, so a range of values should influence market behavior. When engaged in commerce, however, people generally act for personal gain; the influence of other values usually just disappears in the marketplace. What is missing from the standard account is that people often act on proper subsets of their interests. Economics can, however, be extended to capture this insight.Yeshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guideline

Does Non-Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Situational Awareness and Attributions of Blame and Forgiveness

In this paper, we set out to test empirically an idea that many philosophers find intuitive, namely that non-moral ignorance can exculpate. Many philosophers find it intuitive that moral agents are responsible only if they know the particular facts surrounding their action. Our results show that whether moral agents are aware of the facts surrounding their action does have an effect on people’s attributions of blame, regardless of the consequences or side effects of the agent’s actions. In general, it was more likely that a situationally aware agent will be blamed for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. We also tested attributions of forgiveness in addition to attributions of blame. In general, it was less likely that a situationally aware agent will be forgiven for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. When the agent is situationally unaware, it is more likely that the agent will be forgiven than blamed. We argue that these results provide some empirical support for the hypothesis that there is something intuitive about the idea that non-moral ignorance can exculpate

Estimation of CT-derived abdominal visceral and subcutaneous adipose tissue depots from anthropometry in Europeans, South Asians and African Caribbeans

Background South Asians and African Caribbeans experience more cardiometabolic disease than Europeans. Risk factors include visceral (VAT) and subcutaneous abdominal (SAT) adipose tissue, which vary with ethnicity and are difficult to quantify using anthropometry. Objective We developed and cross-validated ethnicity and gender-specific equations using anthropometrics to predict VAT and SAT. Design 669 Europeans, 514 South Asians and 227 African Caribbeans (70±7 years) underwent anthropometric measurement and abdominal CT scanning. South Asian and African Caribbean participants were first-generation migrants living in London. Prediction equations were derived for CT-measured VAT and SAT using stepwise regression, then cross-validated by comparing actual and predicted means. Results South Asians had more and African Caribbeans less VAT than Europeans. For basic VAT prediction equations (age and waist circumference), model fit was better in men (R2 range 0.59-0.71) than women (range 0.35-0.59). Expanded equations (+ weight, height, hip and thigh circumference) improved fit for South Asian and African Caribbean women (R2 0.35 to 0.55, and 0.43 to 0.56 respectively). For basic SAT equations, R2 was 0.69-0.77, and for expanded equations it was 0.72-0.86. Cross-validation showed differences between actual and estimated VAT of <7%, and SAT of <8% in all groups, apart from VAT in South Asian women which disagreed by 16%. Conclusion We provide ethnicity- and gender-specific VAT and SAT prediction equations, derived from a large tri-ethnic sample. Model fit was reasonable for SAT and VAT in men, while basic VAT models should be used cautiously in South Asian and African Caribbean women. These equations will aid studies of mechanisms of cardiometabolic disease in later life, where imaging data are not available

Two Concepts of Basic Equality

It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another's equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each individual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in themselves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else)