Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin

The distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ value concepts, and its importance to ethical theory, has been an active topic in recent meta-ethics. This paper defends three claims regarding the parallel issue about thick and thin epistemic concepts. (1) Analogy with ethics offers no straightforward way to establish a good, clear distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. (2) Assuming there is such a distinction, there are no semantic grounds for assigning thick epistemic concepts priority over the thin. (3) Nor does the structure of substantive epistemological theory establish that thick epistemic concepts enjoy systematic theoretical priority over the thin. In sum, a good case has yet to be made for any radical theoretical turn to thicker epistemology

Pluralism about Knowledge

In this paper I consider the prospects for pluralism about knowledge, that is, the view that there is a plurality of knowledge relations. After a brief overview of some views that entail a sort of pluralism about knowledge, I focus on a particular kind of knowledge pluralism I call standards pluralism. Put roughly, standards pluralism is the view that one never knows anything simpliciter. Rather, one knows by this-or-that epistemic standard. Because there is a plurality of epistemic standards, there is a plurality of knowledge relations. In §1 I argue that one can construct an impressive case for standards pluralism. In §2 I clarify the relationship between standards pluralism, epistemic contextualism and epistemic relativism. In §3 I argue that standards pluralism faces a serious objection. The gist of the objection is that standards pluralism is incompatible with plausible claims about the normative role of knowledge. In §4 I finish by sketching the form that a standards pluralist response to this objection might take

Must . . . stay . . . strong!

This is the fourth installment in our trilogy of papers on epistemic modality.It is a recurring matra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must

A 20-year multicentre outcome analysis of salvage mechanical circulatory support for refractory cardiogenic shock after cardiac surgery

Abstract Background Refractory post-cardiotomy cardiogenic shock (PCCS) is a relatively rare phenomenon that can lead to rapid multi-organ dysfunction syndrome and is almost invariably fatal without advanced mechanical circulatory support (AMCS), namely extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) or ventricular assist devices (VAD). In this multicentre observational study we retrospectively analyzed the outcomes of salvage venoarterial ECMO (VA ECMO) and VAD for refractory PCCS in the 3 adult cardiothoracic surgery centres in Scotland over a 20-year period. Methods The data was obtained through the Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen cardiac surgery databases. Our inclusion criteria included any adult patient from April 1995 to April 2015 who had received salvage VA ECMO or VAD for PCCS refractory to intra-aortic balloon pump (IABP) and maximal inotropic support following adult cardiac surgery. Results A total of 27 patients met the inclusion criteria. Age range was 34–83 years (median 51 years). There was a large male predominance (n = 23, 85 %). Overall 23 patients (85 %) received VA ECMO of which 14 (61 %) had central ECMO and 9 (39 %) had peripheral ECMO. Four patients (15 %) were treated with short-term VAD (BiVAD = 1, RVAD = 1 and LVAD = 2). The most common procedure-related complication was major haemorrhage (n = 10). Renal failure requiring renal replacement therapy (n = 7), fatal stroke (n = 5), septic shock (n = 2), and a pseudo-aneurysm at the femoral artery cannulation site (n = 1) were also observed. Overall survival to hospital discharge was 40.7 %. All survivors were NYHA class I-II at 12 months’ follow-up. Conclusion AMCS for refractory PCCS carries a survival benefit and achieves acceptable functional recovery despite a significant complication rate

Epistemic pluralism, epistemic relativism and ‘hinge’ epistemology

According to Paul Boghossian (2006, 73) a core tenet of epistemic relativism is what he calls epistemic pluralism, according to which (i) ‘there are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems’, but (ii) ‘no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others’. Embracing the former claim is more or less uncontroversial–viz., a descriptive fact about epistemic diversity. The latter claim by contrast is very controversial. Interestingly, the Wittgenstenian ‘hinge’ epistemologist, in virtue of maintaining that rational evaluation is essentially local, will (arguably, at least) be committed to the more controversial leg of the epistemic pluralist thesis, simply in virtue of countenancing the descriptive leg. This paper does three central things. First, it is shown that this ‘relativistic’ reading of Wittgenstein’s epistemology is plausible only if the locality of rational evaluation (in conjunction with a reasonable appreciation of epistemic diversity) commits the Wittgenstenian to a further epistemic incommensurability thesis. Next, Duncan Pritchard’s (e.g., 2009; 2015) novel attempt to save the hinge epistemologist from a commitment to epistemic incommensurability is canvassed and critiqued. Finally, it is suggested how, regardless of whether Pritchard’s strategy is successful, there might be another very different way—drawing from recent work by John MacFarlane (2014)—for the hinge epistemologist to embrace epistemic pluralism while steering clear of epistemic relativism, understood in a very specific way

Skepticism. : A contemporary reader.

New Yorkv, 314 p.; 23 cm