Measure concentration for Euclidean distance in the case of dependent random variables

Let q^n be a continuous density function in n-dimensional Euclidean space. We think of q^n as the density function of some random sequence X^n with values in \BbbR^n. For I\subset[1,n], let X_I denote the collection of coordinates X_i, i\in I, and let \bar X_I denote the collection of coordinates X_i, i\notin I. We denote by Q_I(x_I|\bar x_I) the joint conditional density function of X_I, given \bar X_I. We prove measure concentration for q^n in the case when, for an appropriate class of sets I, (i) the conditional densities Q_I(x_I|\bar x_I), as functions of x_I, uniformly satisfy a logarithmic Sobolev inequality and (ii) these conditional densities also satisfy a contractivity condition related to Dobrushin and Shlosman's strong mixing condition.Comment: Published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org) in the Annals of Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aop/) at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/00911790400000070

Illusionism's discontent

Frankish positions his view, illusionism about qualia (a.k.a. eliminativist physicalism), in opposition to what he calls radical realism (dualism and neutral monism) and conservative realism (a.k.a. non-eliminativist physicalism). Against radical realism, he upholds physicalism. But he goes along with key premises of the Gap Arguments for radical realism, namely, 1) that epistemic/explanatory gaps exist between the physical and the phenomenal, and 2) that every truth should be perspicuously explicable from the fundamental truth about the world; and he concludes that because physicalism is true, there could be no phenomenal truths, and no qualia. I think he is wrong to accept 2); and even if he was right to accept it, the more plausible response would be not to deny the existence of qualia but to deny physicalism. In either case, denying the existence of qualia is the wrong answer. I present a physicalist realist alterative that refutes premise 2 of the Gap Argument; I also make a general case against the scientism that accompanies Frankish’s metaphysics

The Inverse Agreement Constraint in Uralic languages

The paper aims to answer the question why object–verb agreement is blocked in Hungarian, Tundra Nenets, Selkup, and Nganasan if the object is a first or second person pronoun. Based on Dalrymple & Nikolaeva (2011), it is argued that object–verb agreement serves (or served historically) to mark the secondary topic status of the object. The gaps in object-verb agreement can be derived from the Inverse Agreement Constraint, a formal, semantically unmotivated constraint observed by Comrie (1980) in Chukchee, Koryak and Kamchadal, forbidding object-verb agreement if the object is more ʻanimate’ than the subject: The paper claims that the Inverse Agreement Constraint is a constraint on information structure. What it requires is that a secondary topic be less topical than the primary topic. An object more topical than the primary topic can only figure as a focus. A version of the constraint can also explain why Hungarian first and second person objects have no accusative suffix, and why accusative marking is optional in the case of objects having a first or second person possessor