Varieties of Cognitive Integration

Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat

Extended circularity: a new puzzle for extended cognition

Mainstream epistemology has typically taken for granted a traditional picture of the metaphysics of mind, according to which cognitive processes (e.g. memory storage and retrieval) play out entirely within the bounds of the skull and skin. But this simple ‘intracranial’ picture is falling in- creasingly out of step with contemporary thinking in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Likewise, though, proponents of active exter- nalist approaches to the mind—e.g. the hypothesis of extended cognitition (HEC)—have proceeded by and large without asking what epistemological ramifications should arise once cognition is understood as criss-crossing the bounds of brain and world. This paper aims to motivate a puzzle that arises only once these two strands of thinking are brought in contact with one another. In particular, we want to first highlight a kind of con- dition of epistemological adequacy that should be accepted by proponents of extended cognition; once this condition is motivated, the remainder of the paper demonstrates how attempts to satisfy this condition seem to inevitably devolve into a novel kind of epistemic circularity. At the end of the day, proponents of extended cognition have a novel epistemological puzzle on their hands

Sosa on Knowledge, Judgment and Guessing

In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Sosa (Judgment and Agency, 2015) explicates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing so, he draws from illustrative examples of practical performances and applies lessons drawn to the case of cognitive performances, and in particular, to the cognitive performance of judging. Sosa’s examples in the practical sphere are rich and instructive. But there is, I will argue, an interesting disanalogy between the practical and cognitive examples he relies on. Ultimately, I think the source of the disanalogy is a problematic picture of the cognitive performance of guessing and its connection to knowledge and defeat. Once this critical line of argument is advanced, an alternative picture of guessing, qua cognitive performance, is articulated, one which avoids the problems discussed, and yet remains compatible with Sosa’s broader framework

Longevity risk and capital markets: the 2021–22 update

This Special Issue of the Journal of Demographic Economics contains 10 contributions to the academic literature all dealing with longevity risk and capital markets. Draft versions of the papers were presented at Longevity 16: The Sixteenth International Longevity Risk and Capital Markets Solutions Conference that was held in Helsingør near Copenhagen on 13-14 August 2021. It was hosted by PerCent at Copenhagen Business School and the Pensions Institute at City, University of London

Extended self-knowledge

We aim to move the externalism and self-knowledge debate forward by exploring two novel sceptical challenges to the prospects of self-knowledge of a paradigmatic sort, both of which result from ways in which our thought content, cognitive processes and cognitive successes depend crucially on our external environments. In particular, it is shown how arguments from extended cognition (e.g., Clark A, Chalmers D. Analysis 58:7–19 (1998); Clark A. Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008)) and situationism (e.g., Alfano M. The Philosophical Quarterly 62:223–249 (2012), Alfano M. Expanding the situationist challenge to reliabilism about inference. In Fairweather A (ed) Virtue epistemology naturalized, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 103–122 (2014); Doris JM. Noûs 32:504–530 (1998), Doris JM. Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2002); Harman G. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 99:315–331 (1999), Harman G. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:223–226 (2000)) pose hitherto unexplored challenges to the prospects of self-knowledge as it is traditionally conceived. It is shown, however, that, suitably understood, these apparent challenges in fact only demonstrate two ways in which our cognitive lives can be dependent on our environment. As such, rather than undermining our prospects for attaining self-knowledge, they instead illustrate how self-knowledge can be extended and expanded

Parous women perform less moderate to vigorous physical activity than their nulliparous peers: a population-based study in Denmark

Objectives The World Health Organization (WHO) highlights parous women as a key population for monitoring trends of physical activity (PA). We aimed to estimate the proportion of Danish women non-adhering to WHO PA guidelines in parous women compared with nulliparous women and to describe leisure-time PA intensity in each of these groups. Study design Cross-sectional study. Methods This population-based study builds on a sample of 27,668 women aged 16–40 years from the Danish National Health Survey 2021. These data were linked with childbirth data from the Danish National Birth Registry. The primary outcome was self-reported weekly hours of moderate to vigorous leisure-time PA (MVPA) dichotomized into: (i) adhering to WHO guidelines for MVPA or (ii) not adhering to WHO guidelines for MVPA. Binomial regression analysis was used to calculate prevalence proportions (PP) and prevalence proportion ratios (PPR). Results Of the 27,668 women, a total of 20,022 were included; 9338 (46.6%) parous women and 10,684 (53.4%) nulliparous women. The PP of women non-adhering to WHO PA guidelines was 63.8% (95% CI 62.9–64.8) for parous and 51.3% (95% CI 50.4–52.3) for nulliparous women, corresponding to a PPR of 1.24 (95% CI 1.21; 1.27). Conclusions The proportion of parous women who did not adhere to WHO PA guidelines for MVPA was 24% higher than that of nulliparous women. This highlights parous women as a subgroup of the adult population at increased risk of non-adherence to WHO PA guidelines. These findings call for future research to inform new strategies aiming to promote PA in parous women

Why ‘Swampman’ Would Not Even Get as Far as Thinking it Was Davidson:On the Spatio‐temporal Basis of Davidson's Conjuring Trick

In this article, we analyse one of the most famous recent thought experiments in philosophy, namely Donald Davidson’s Swampman. Engaging recent commentators on Davidson’s Swampman as well as analysing the spatio-temporal conditions of the thought-experiment, we will show how the ‘experiment’ inevitably fails. For it doesn’t take seriously some of its own defining characteristics: crucially, Swampman’s creation of a sudden in a place distinct from Davidson’s. Instead of denigrating philosophical thought-experiments per se, our analysis points towards considering thought-experiments in a different sense: imaginary scenarios helpfully self-deconstructing rather than constituting substantive philosophical resources