Kalle Maijala

Kalle Maijala, nekrologiNon peer reviewe

Two bifurcation sets arising from the beta transformation with a hole at 00

Given $\beta\in(1,2],$ the $\beta$-transformation $T_\beta: x\mapsto \beta x\pmod 1$ on the circle $[0, 1)$ with a hole $[0, t)$ was investigated by Kalle et al.~(2019). They described the set-valued bifurcation set $$\mathcal E_\beta:=\{t\in[0, 1): K_\beta(t')\ne K_\beta(t)~\forall t'>t\},$$ where $K_\beta(t):=\{x\in[0, 1): T_\beta^n(x)\ge t~\forall n\ge 0\}$ is the survivor set. In this paper we investigate the dimension bifurcation set $$\mathcal B_\beta:=\{t\in[0, 1): \dim_H K_\beta(t')\ne \dim_H K_\beta(t)~\forall t'>t\},$$ where $\dim_H$ denotes the Hausdorff dimension. We show that if $\beta\in(1,2]$ is a multinacci number then the two bifurcation sets $\mathcal B_\beta$ and $\mathcal E_\beta$ coincide. Moreover we give a complete characterization of these two sets. As a corollary of our main result we prove that for $\beta$ a multinacci number we have $\dim_H(\mathcal E_\beta\cap[t, 1])=\dim_H K_\beta(t)$ for any $t\in[0, 1)$. This confirms a conjecture of Kalle et al.~for $\beta$ a multinacci number.Comment: 12 page

Paternalism towards children

Debates on the nature and justifiability of paternalism typically focus only on adults, sometimes presuming without argument that paternalism towards children is a non-issue or obviously justified. Debates on the moral and political status of children, in turn, rarely connect with the rich literature on paternalism. This chapter attempts to bridge this gap by exploring how issues that arise in the general debate on paternalism are relevant also for the benevolent interference with children. I survey and discuss various views and argue for my own: that paternalism towards children is in most respects like paternalism towards adults and stands in the same need of justification, though such justification is more often forthcoming both because children are typically less prudent than adults and so benefit more from interference, and because, in some respects, interference is less harmful to them

Paternalism by and towards groups

In many or most instances of paternalism, more than one person acts paternalistically, or more than one person is treated paternalistically. This chapter discusses some complications that arise in such group cases, which are largely ignored in the conceptual debate. First, a group of people who together perform an action may do so for different reasons, which makes it more challenging to determine whether the action is paternalistic. This gives us some reason not to pin the property of being paternalistic on actions, since we may alternatively pin it on reasons for actions and allow that these differ between members in the group. Second, the prevention of harmful consensual interactions is sometimes paternalism towards both or all involved, but only if all benefit from interference with themselves rather than with other members in the group, or if all want the harm or risk (more or less) for its own sake. Third, interrelations between three components of paternalism - interference, benevolence and consent - gives us reason to allow that an action can be paternalistic towards some but not others of those affected. This makes it even more difficult, and less relevant, to determine whether or not actions are paternalistic

There’s A Nice Knockdown Argument For You: Donald Davidson And Modest Intentionalism

It might come as a surprise for someone who has only a superficial knowledge of Donald Davidson’s philosophy that he has claimed literary language to be ‘a prime test of the adequacy of any view on the nature of language’.1 The claim, however, captures well the transformation that has happened in Davidson’s thinking on language since he began in the 1960’s to develop a truth-conditional semantic theory for natural languages in the lines of Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth. About twenty years afterwards, this project was replaced with a view that highlights the flexible nature of language and, in consequence, the importance of the speaker’s intentions for a theory of meaning, culminating in Davidson’s staggering claim that ‘there is no such thing as a language’

Playing The Game After The End Of Art: Comments For Hans Maes

In his philosophy of art history, Arthur C. Danto claims that in the 1960 ́s the master narrative of art had come to an end, and that we had reached the end of art. This conception has been widely considered, but also misunderstood. Hans Maes has recently discussed Danto's conception of the end of art in his article, where he clears some misconceptions about the thesis, but at the same time challenges Danto's analysis of contemporary art