Taking Globalization Seriously: Towards General Jurisprudence (Book Review of \u3ci\u3eGlobalization and Legal Theory\u3c/i\u3e by William Twining)

Part II provides an account of the jurisprudence of Globalization and Legal Theory. Due to the novelty of many of the issues discussed in the book, as well as their importance to the understanding of Twining\u27s recommendations, I have provided a longer than usual account of several chapters. Part II touches upon one of the central jurisprudential dichotomies introduced by Twining—the distinction between general and particular jurisprudence. Twining compares different accounts of the distinction using pairs of canonical jurists. In particular, he compares H.L.A Hart\u27s Postscript with Dworkin\u27s Law\u27s Empire. In this part, I juxtapose Twining\u27s record of this exchange with seemingly conflicting accounts provided by other commentators and suggest resolving the apparent conflict. Part IV brings to the fore the concept of general jurisprudence in the age of globalization. Placed in that context, I will suggest that a new general jurisprudence should respond to the challenges posed by globalization. I first identify the driving forces behind globalization, mainly new economic markets, the Internet, and the trend towards democracy. Then, I suggest that some of the current American schools of thought may respond to these very phenomena. Economic analysis of law, feminism, and critical race studies may all have something interesting to say on globalization. My last step is to propose that a transnational version of these theories should form the main body of a new global jurisprudence

Taking Globalization Seriously: Towards General Jurisprudence (Book Review of \u3ci\u3eGlobalization and Legal Theory\u3c/i\u3e by William Twining)

Part II provides an account of the jurisprudence of Globalization and Legal Theory. Due to the novelty of many of the issues discussed in the book, as well as their importance to the understanding of Twining\u27s recommendations, I have provided a longer than usual account of several chapters. Part II touches upon one of the central jurisprudential dichotomies introduced by Twining—the distinction between general and particular jurisprudence. Twining compares different accounts of the distinction using pairs of canonical jurists. In particular, he compares H.L.A Hart\u27s Postscript with Dworkin\u27s Law\u27s Empire. In this part, I juxtapose Twining\u27s record of this exchange with seemingly conflicting accounts provided by other commentators and suggest resolving the apparent conflict. Part IV brings to the fore the concept of general jurisprudence in the age of globalization. Placed in that context, I will suggest that a new general jurisprudence should respond to the challenges posed by globalization. I first identify the driving forces behind globalization, mainly new economic markets, the Internet, and the trend towards democracy. Then, I suggest that some of the current American schools of thought may respond to these very phenomena. Economic analysis of law, feminism, and critical race studies may all have something interesting to say on globalization. My last step is to propose that a transnational version of these theories should form the main body of a new global jurisprudence

\u3ci\u3eArtis v. District of Columbia\u3c/i\u3e—What Did the Court Actually Say?

On January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court issued Artis v. District of Columbia. A true clash of the titans, this 5-4 decision featured colorful comments on both sides, claims of absurdities, uncited use of Alice in Wonderland vocabulary ( curiouser, anyone?), and an especially harsh accusation by the dissent that we’ve wandered so far from the idea of a federal government of limited and enumerated powers that we’ve begun to lose sight of what it looked like in the first place. One might assume that the issue in question was a complex constitutional provision, or a dense, technical federal code section. Far from it. The sole issue in Artis was the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), an obscure tolling provision dealing with the time period allowed for plaintiffs who filed their claims in federal court and were dismissed to refile their claims in state court. The majority—authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—provided a generous interpretation, allowing plaintiffs some more time to refile. The dissent—authored by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—thought that, in most cases, plaintiffs should receive no more than thirty days to refile. This Comment does not follow the many constitutional and jurisprudential intricacies of this fascinating battle. Instead, it intends to point to what seems to be a glaring misunderstanding of the majority opinion by the dissent. This Comment also raises the possibility that the majority itself did not understand the full implications of its own opinion, as evidenced by its response to the dissent. If this is indeed the state of affairs, an inevitable question arises: What did the Court actually say in Artis v. District of Columbia

Same-Sex Marriage and Jewish Law: Time for a New Paradigm?

In recent years the Supreme Court, as well as important segments of society, has come to accept and even celebrate same-sex relations that, in the past, and for some still today, have generated contempt, hostility, and violence. This change in law and culture poses a unique challenge for those who are moved by the plight of gay people yet concomitantly feel bound by their religious convictions and therefore prevented from providing religious legitimacy to people who yearn to be part of their community. Professor Kalir meets this challenge by proposing that the Torah (and Jewish law), read in context, accepts homosexuality and treats gay people as equal members of the community. It does not plainly stigmatize and condemn them to the fringes of society, as people have previously thought on the basis of two verses in Leviticus. In a sophisticated, contextualized, and comprehensively-informed interpretation of the Levitical text, Kalir shows that a much more benign interpretation of the notorious verses in Leviticus is as plausible as (or more plausible than) the standard construction. In this new interpretation, the prohibition in Leviticus stigmatizes only one sort of homosexuality — that which occurs between members of the same extended family, i.e., incestuous homosexuality

\u3ci\u3eArtis v. District of Columbia\u3c/i\u3e—What Did the Court Actually Say?

On January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court issued Artis v. District of Columbia. A true clash of the titans, this 5-4 decision featured colorful comments on both sides, claims of absurdities, uncited use of Alice in Wonderland vocabulary ( curiouser, anyone?), and an especially harsh accusation by the dissent that we’ve wandered so far from the idea of a federal government of limited and enumerated powers that we’ve begun to lose sight of what it looked like in the first place. One might assume that the issue in question was a complex constitutional provision, or a dense, technical federal code section. Far from it. The sole issue in Artis was the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), an obscure tolling provision dealing with the time period allowed for plaintiffs who filed their claims in federal court and were dismissed to refile their claims in state court. The majority—authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—provided a generous interpretation, allowing plaintiffs some more time to refile. The dissent—authored by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—thought that, in most cases, plaintiffs should receive no more than thirty days to refile. This Comment does not follow the many constitutional and jurisprudential intricacies of this fascinating battle. Instead, it intends to point to what seems to be a glaring misunderstanding of the majority opinion by the dissent. This Comment also raises the possibility that the majority itself did not understand the full implications of its own opinion, as evidenced by its response to the dissent. If this is indeed the state of affairs, an inevitable question arises: What did the Court actually say in Artis v. District of Columbia

Rethinking Religious Objections (Old-Testament Based) to Same-Sex Marriage

In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court closed the door on one issue only to open the floodgates to another. While recognizing a constitutional right for same-sex marriage, the Court also legitimized religious objections to such unions, practically inviting complex legal challenges to its doors. In doing so, the Court also called for an open and searching debate on the issue. This Article seeks to trigger such debate. For millennia, objections to same-sex marriage were cast in religious and moral terms. The Jewish Bible ( Old Testament ), conventional wisdom argues, provided three demonstrable proofs of the Bible\u27s abhorrence of same-sex intimacy: Genesis\u27 Story of Creation, the tale of the City of Sodom (after which the dreadful term sodomy was coined), and the Levitical prohibition on same-sex intimacy. All three have reached near-axiomatic level over the years. This Article, however, offers a fresh look into these axioms, questioning their very validity. The conventional interpretation, it argues, fails to read the text in its proper context. It also fails to acknowledge the basic premise—the three organizing principles—on which the entire Jewish Bible is founded. Accordingly, a new, narrower and more congruent interpretation is offered, which properly recognizes the dignity, equality, and empathy of the original text. Religious objections to same-sex marriage are not merely academic. They have inflicted tremendous injury on members of the LGBTQ community. It is time to put those behind. The open and searching debate the Court has called for should instruct us all to move towards a more just, fair, and open society

Artis v. District of Columbia—What Did the Court Actually Say?

This Comment does not follow the many constitutional and jurisprudential intricacies of the fascinating battle of Artis v. District of Columbia. Instead, it intends to point to what seems to be a glaring misunderstanding of the majority opinion by the dissent. This Comment also raises the possibility that the majority itself did not understand the full implications of its own opinion, as evidenced by its response to the dissent. If this is indeed the state of affairs, an inevitable question arises: What did the Court actually say in Artis v. District of Columbia

The Qualified Immunity Paradox and the Sixth Circuit’s \u3ci\u3eModerwell\u3c/i\u3e Opinion: A Harbinger of Better Things to Come?

This note discusses the requirement of clearly-established law, which a plaintiff needs to show in order to overcome a qualified immunity defense. This requirement--in essence, asking a plaintiff to show that someone else in their shoes has already prevailed in similar circumstances--may lead to an infinite regression paradox. The Note discusses this paradox and the ways in which the Supreme Court, and now the Sixth Circuit, have begun to resolve it

Columbia Business Law Review Spring Symposium 2000 Issue (Introduction)

This is the Introduction to Spring Symposium Issue. On March 28, 2000, the Columbia Business Law Review hosted its Spring Symposium entitled The Changing Workplace in the New Millennium. The symposium, which brought together legal scholars and thinkers from around the country, sought to address many current labor and employment law issues, as well as some which are likely to arise in the years to com

Brief for the National Association of Social Workers and the Ohio Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curie in Support of Petitioners, No. 13-933, United States Supreme Court (Mar. 6, 2014)

NASW\u27s first argument is simple. To protect children from abuse - a major congressional and state legislative goal - this Court should apply qualified immunity to protect social workers from personal liability where a reasonable decision has been made to remove a child without a warrant. NASW\u27s second argument is equally cogent. DeShaney was decided 25 years ago. Since then, this Court\u27s continued silence on the issue, Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 708 (Sutton, J., dissenting), has failed to provide guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting child welfare within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011). In light of the circuit split on this issue - compare Hatch v. Dep\u27t for Children, 274 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2001) with Kovacic, 724 F.3d (6th Cir. 2013) - guidance from this Court is more necessary today than ever