Telegram from William Kahn, Executive Vice President of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, to Geraldine Ferraro

Congratulatory telegram from William Kahn, executive vice president of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, on behalf of his organization. References Ferraro\u27s membership in the federation as a board member. Contains standard response letter from Ferraro.https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/vice_presidential_campaign_correspondence_1984_new_york/1019/thumbnail.jp

Load limiting energy absorbing lightweight debris catcher

In the representative embodiment of the invention disclosed, a load limiting, energy absorbing net is arranged to overlay a normally-covered vent opening in the rear bulkhead of the space orbiter vehicle. Spatially-disposed flexible retainer straps are extended from the net and respectively secured to bulkhead brackets spaced around the vent opening. The intermediate portions of the straps are doubled over and stitched together in a pattern enabling the doubled-over portions to progressively separate at a predicable load designed to be well below the tensile capability of the straps as the stitches are successively torn apart by the forces imposed on the retainer members whenever the cover plate is explosively separated from the bulkhead and propelled into the net. By arranging these stitches to be successively torn away at a load below the strap strength in response to forces acting on the retainers that are less than the combined strength of the retainers, this tearing action serves as a predictable compact energy absorber for safely halting the cover plate as the retainers are extended as the net is deployed. The invention further includes a block of an energy-absorbing material positioned in the net for receiving loose debris produced by the explosive release of the cover plate

Payments Settlement under Limited Enforcement: Private versus Public Systems

What are the benefits provided by a payment system? What are the tradeoffs in public versus private payment systems and in restricted versus open payments arrangements? Modern payment systems encompass a variety of institutional designs with varying degrees of counterparty protection. We develop a framework which allows for an examination and comparison of payment systems, and specification of conditions leading to their adoption. We relate these conditions to the design of present large-value payment systems (Fedwire, CHIPS, Target, etc.)Payment systems, limited enforcement, settlement risk

Demandable debt as a means of payment: banknotes versus checks

We examine the question of whether transactable forms of privately issued, demandable debt are better used as "banknotes" or "checks." The distinction between the two is that a check must be redeemed by the issuing bank with each use, whereas a banknote can circulate. We find that the answer to the question depends critically on the cost of early redemption. If this cost is small, banknotes will not circulate, so the question is moot. If this cost is large, incentive problems will prevent the issue of banknotes. For intermediate values of the early redemption cost, the option of early redemption limits the bank's risk-taking behavior, so that banknotes will be preferred over checks.Checks ; Money ; Payment systems

Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives

In this paper we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves, but increases moral hazard problems. The "put option" value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Net settlement becomes more attractive relative to gross settlement if bank assets have to be liquidated at less than book value. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers G21, G28. This paper was presented at the Financial Institutions Center's conference on Performance of Financial Institutions, May 8-10, 1997.

Real-time gross settlement and the costs of immediacy

Using a neoclassical monetary model, we investigate the welfare cost of a payment system that operates as a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system. We illustrate how the cost of such systems does not ultimately derive from factors such as "payments gridlock" but instead from the credit constraints imposed by RTGS. We also investigate the welfare consequences of various approaches to the allocation of daylight credit by central banks. The two most popular approaches, collateralization and charging an administered intraday interest rate, are shown to be effective along some dimensions but flawed in others.Money ; Payment systems

The economics of payment finality

Payment finality is critical to decentralized exchange. By specifying how the transfer of one type of claim extinguishes another, the rules governing finality minimize opportunities for default along credit chains and allocate other risks. ; The authors provide a basic analysis of finality and its role in facilitating exchange. They first present a simple, historically based model of transferable debt and finality. The discussion demonstrates the desirability of transferable debt and why rules governing payment finality are needed to sort out who will bear the losses in the event of default. Over time, the introduction of such rules helped establish the concept of negotiability, which greatly increased the efficiency of trade. ; A second model shows how a more modern payment system works. The large volume and scope of payments in modern systems have resulted in disparate sets of finality rules. For example, the finality of check payments is generally tentative, and the risks are often concentrated on a single party. Credit and debit card payments are generally more final, and the liability for potential losses tends to be shared among participants. Choosing the degree of finality for a given situation involves a trade-off between the benefits of finality and the costs of an erroneous or fraudulent transfer. The introduction of new technologies for payments may improve these trade-offs, but finality will remain the essential service provided.Payment systems ; Credit cards ; Checks

A Theory of Transactions Privacy

In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation with result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made before the transaction occurs. In such cases, initial assignments of rights (for example, privacy laws) can have consequences for efficiency.

Money is privacy

An extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record-keeping device. Money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly, and some might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information, and thus the cost of credit-based transactions, continues to fall. ; In this paper we investigate another use for money: the provision of privacy. That is, a money purchase does not identify the purchaser while a credit purchase does. In a simple trading economy with moral hazard, we compare the efficiency of money is compared with that of credit, and we find that money may be useful even when information is free.

Settlement risk under gross and net settlement

Previous comparative analyses of gross and net settlement have focused on the credit risk of the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements and on the incentives for participants to alter the risk of the portfolio under net settlement. By modeling the trading economy that generates the demand for payment services, we are able to show some largely unexplored advantages of net settlement. We find that net settlement can prevent certain gridlock situations, which may arise in gross settlement in the absence of delivery versus payment requirements. In addition, we show that net settlement can economize on collateral requirements and avoid trading delays.Payment systems ; Risk