Kant’s post-1800 Disavowal of the Highest Good Argument for the Existence of God

I have two main goals in this paper. The first is to argue for the thesis that Kant gave up on his highest good argument for the existence of God around 1800. The second is to revive a dialogue about this thesis that died out in the 1960s. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I reconstruct Kant’s highest good argument. In the second, I turn to the post-1800 convolutes of Kant’s Opus postumum to discuss his repeated claim that there is only one way to argue for the existence of God, a way which resembles the highest good argument only in taking the moral law as its starting point. In the third, I explain why I do not find the counterarguments to my thesis introduced in the 1960s persuasive

A Dilemma for Mathematical Constructivism

In this paper I argue that constructivism in mathematics faces a dilemma. In particular, I maintain that constructivism is unable to explain (i) the application of mathematics to nature and (ii) the intersubjectivity of mathematics unless (iii) it is conjoined with two theses that reduce it to a form of mathematical Platonism. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section of the paper, I explain the difference between mathematical constructivism and mathematical Platonism and I outline my argument. In the second, I argue that the best explanation of how mathematics applies to nature for a constructivist is a thesis I call Copernicanism. In the third, I argue that the best explanation of how mathematics can be intersubjective for a constructivist is a thesis I call Ideality. In the fourth, I argue that once constructivism is conjoined with these two theses, it collapses into a form of mathematical Platonism. In the fifth, I confront some objections

Kant and the duty to promote one’s own happiness

In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for ‘this happens unavoidably’ (MS, AA 6:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness

Positive Duties, Maxim Realism and the Deliberative Field

My goal in this paper is to show that it is not the case that positive duties can be derived from Kant’s so-called universalizability tests. I begin by explaining in detail what I mean by this and distinguishing it from a few things that I am not doing in this paper. After that, I confront the idea of a maxim contradictory, a concept that is advanced by many com- mentators in the attempt to derive positive duties from the universalizability tests. I ex- plain what a maxim contradictory is and how the concept is used to derive positive duties. Then I argue that the notion of a maxim contradictory presupposes an objectionable form of maxim realism. I move from there to the idea of a maxim contrary and the deliberative field. These two ideas are used in tandem by commentators who do not appeal to maxim contradictories. I explain how these concepts are used to derive positive duties and then I argue that there is a systematic error in the derivations that enables one to see that they cannot work

Veganism, Animal Welfare, and Causal Impotence

Proponents of the utilitarian animal welfare argument (AWA) for veganism maintain that it is reasonable to expect that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. In this paper I argue otherwise. I maintain that (i) there are plausible scenarios in which refraining from meat-consumption will not decrease animal suffering; (ii) the utilitarian AWA rests on a false dilemma; and (iii) there are no reasonable grounds for the expectation that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I set out the utilitarian AWA in its original form. I give some background and I distinguish it from other, related arguments. In the second, I discuss the causal impotence objection, a popular objection to the utilitarian AWA. I explain how the objection works by means of a conceptual distinction between consumers and producers. In the third, I explain how proponents of the utilitarian AWA respond to this objection. In particular, I set out in some detail what I call the expected utility response. In the fourth and final section, I use the three objections noted above to explain why I do not find this response convincing

Freedom, Morality, and the Propensity to Evil

In Book I of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant offers an explanation of freedom and moral good and evil that is different from that offered in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals. My primary goal in this paper is to analyze and elucidate this new theory. My secondary goal is to contrast this new theory with the older one that it is replacing. I argue that the new theory, which centers on the idea that evil involves a sort of misprioritizing, enables Kant to get around two problems associated with the older theory

The Problem of the Kantian Line

In this paper I discuss the problem of the Kantian line. The problem arises because the locus of value in Kantian ethics is rationality, which (counterintuitively) seems to entail that there are no duties to groups of beings like children. I argue that recent attempts to solve this problem by Wood and O’Neill overlook an important aspect of it before posing my own solution

The Interconnection of Willing and Believing in Kant’s and Kantian Ethics

Author Posting of a preprint © International Philosophical Quarterly, 2014. This article is posted here for personal use, not for redistribution. The article was published in International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 54, Issue 02, June 2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq20145208In this paper I look at the connection between willing and believing for Kant’s and Kantian ethics. I argue that the two main formulations of the categorical imperative are relativized to agents according to their beliefs. I then point out three different ways in which Kant or a present-day Kantian might defend this position. I conclude with some remarks about the contrast between Kant’s legal theory and his ethical theory

The Nuclear Envelope Lamina Network Has Elasticity and a Compressibility Limit Suggestive of a Molecular Shock Absorber

Author Posting © Journal of Cell Science, 2004. This article is posted here by permission of Journal of Cell Science for personal use, not for redistribution. The article was published in the Journal of Cell Science, Volume 117, 2004, http://dx.doi.org/10.1242/jcs.01357Mechanical properties of the nuclear envelope have implications for cell and nuclear architecture as well as gene regulation. Using isolated Xenopus oocyte nuclei, we have established swelling conditions that separate the intact nuclear envelope (membranes, pore complexes and underlying lamin filament network) from nucleoplasm and the majority of chromatin. Swelling proves reversible with addition of high molecular mass dextrans. Micropipette aspiration of swollen and unswollen nuclear envelopes is also reversible and yields a network elastic modulus, unaffected by nucleoplasm, that averages 25 mN/m. Compared to plasma membranes of cells, the nuclear envelope is much stiffer and more resilient. Our results suggest that the nuclear lamina forms a compressed network shell of interconnected rods that is extensible but limited in compressibility from the native state, thus acting as a ‘molecular shock absorber’. In light of the conservation of B-type lamins in metazoan evolution, the mechanical properties determined in this investigation suggest physical mechanisms by which mutated lamins can either destabilize nuclear architecture or influence nuclear responses to mechanical signals in Emery-Dreifuss muscular dystrophy, cardiomyopathy, progeria syndromes (premature ‘aging’) and other laminopathies

Defending Kant’s conception of matter from the charge of circularity

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS) Kant develops a conception of matter that is meant to issue in an alternative to what he takes to be the then reigning empiricist account of density. However, in recent years commentator after commentator has argued that Kant’s attempt on this front is faced with insuperable difficulties. Indeed, even Kant seems to have thought that his theory of density is circular, and some of these commentators argue that this is, at least in part, what spurred Kant on to develop the theory of matter found in the Opus Postumum. Against this growing tide (and even, it seems, against Kant himself) I defend Kant’s theory of density. I shall not take a stand on whether the circularity problem played a role in the development of the Opus Postumum theory of matter – my point is simply that if the circularity problem was the sole trigger for that move, then the move was unwarranted