Arrow's Theorem with a fixed feasible alternative

Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a prespecified list of alternatives and if there are at least three additional alternatives not on this list, replacing nondictatorship by anonymity results in an impossibility theorem.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47085/1/355_2004_Article_BF00450993.pd

Application of interfacial properties of polymeric surfactans in physiological processes for biomedical and nutraceutic purposes

Tesis Univ. Granada. Departamento de Física AplicadaEste trabajo ha sido financiado por: Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, bajo los proyectos MAT2007-66662-C02-01, MAT2010-20370 y JCI-2009-03823; Junta de Adnalucía, proyectos P07-FQM-03099 y P09-FQM-4698; Universidad de Granada, proyecto CEIBiotic 20F12/16; así como al proyecto EU-FP7-PERG07-GA-2010-268315-ColloD

On the parameterized complexity of party nominations

by Neeldhara Misr

A politico-economic model of public expenditure and income taxation

This paper contributes to the literature on majority voting over fiscal policies. We depart from the standard model in two dimensions. First, besides redistributing income, the government uses the net tax revenue to finance the provision of goods and services that become in-kind transfers to the citizens. By deciding on the composition of this expenditure (education, health, law-and-order, etc.), the government chooses the allocation of the benefits to the different income segments. This choice is a fundamental ingredient of fiscal policy. Second, we tackle the problem of choosing the income tax function and the composition of public expenditure by assuming that the political process selects one of these issues as the salient one. Political controversy and vote focus on this issue exclusively. The other dimension is determined in a way so as to minimize objections (obtain consensus) among the voters. We analyze the case where the salient policy is the composition of public expenditure. We show that for each voted expenditure policy, there is a unique income tax function that attains consensus. The political process we model yields that the progressiveness of the income tax schedule depends on income inequality interacted with the elasticity of substitution of the goods provided in the market and those publicly provided. This relationship is confirmed in our empirical test.Mayoral and Esteban research has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Grant, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015—0563) and Grant ECO 2015—66883–P, Generalitat de Catalunya Project 2017SGR1359Δ, and the National Science Foundation Grant SES-1629370. Useful comments by Jordi Caballé, Eliana la Ferrara and Kalle Moene are gratefully acknowledged. Andrew Gianou has provided us with excellent research assistance