17 research outputs found
Reciprocity in the shadow of threat.
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two
agents differently evaluate a contested stake. Differently from common contest
models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome
of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive
investments in conflict management labeled as talks . The focus is on the
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake: whenever the asymmetry in the evaluation
of the stake is large there is no room for cooperation and a conflict trap emerges;
whenever the degree of asymmetry falls within a critical interval, cooperation seems
to emerge only in the presence of a unilateral concession; as the evaluations of the
stake converge, only reciprocal concessions can sustain cooperation. Finally the
concept of entropy is applied to measure conflict and conflict management
The theory of contests: a survey
Contests, Conflict, Institutions, C70, D20, D74, N00, P16, O11,