The Effects of Rewards on Tax Compliance Decisions

We analyze how the redistribution of tax revenues influences tax compliance behavior by applying different reward mechanisms. In our experiment, subjects have to make two decisions. In the first stage, subjects decide on the contribution to a public good. In the second stage, subjects declare their income from the first stage for taxation. Our main results are threefold: First, from an aggregated perspective, rewards have a negative overall effect on tax compliance. Second, we observe that rewards affect the decision of taxpayers asymmetrically. In particular, rewards have either no effect (for those who are rewarded) or a negative effect (for those who are not rewarded) on tax compliance. Thus, if a high compliance rate of taxpayers is preferred, rewards should not be used by the tax authority. Third, we find an inverse u-shaped relationship between public good contribution and tax compliance. In particular, up to a certain level, tax compliance increases with subjects' own contributions to the public good. Above this level, however, tax compliance decreases with the public good contribution

Intertemporal equilibrium with a resource bequest motive

In this paper we question the role of a joy-of-giving bequest motive of a privately-owned renewable resource for sustainability. We model an overlapping generations economy in which individuals are endowed with a renewable resource. This resource can be exploited at no cost by the young households and provided to production or bequeathed to the next generation. We highlight two main results. First, the mere existence of a bequest motive does not guarantee a sustainable outcome. Second, when the resource is preserved in equilibrium, its level does not necessarily coincide with the efficient one. Whether the resource stock is too high or too low the capital stock should be lower than the golden rule level