Is Explaining Intuition Compatible with Trusting it?

First, a summary of anti-naturalist criticism of explanationism,\ud taking Th. Nagel"s work (1997) as typical. A common\ud assumption in the debate is the following one: if there\ud is a causal explanation of our intuitions, it will appeal to the\ud design of our mind, and ultimately to the causal-historical\ud forces shaping it. In other words, the thinkers find their\ud intuitions immediately compelling because they, the intuitions,\ud reflect the built-up of thinker"s minds. The intuitioncontents,\ud on the other hand, tend to be true, since the\ud built-up of the mind reflects the most general structures of\ud reality that has been causally shaping it. Most explanationists\ud offer the design account as the best available\ud explanation-sketch. The anti-explanationists, from Kant\ud (Critique of Pure reason, B 176) through Wittgensteinians\ud (e.g., J: Lear) to Th. Nagel (1997), G. Bealer (1987) and J.\ud Pust (2001), perform a modus tollens on this designfocused\ud account. Since it is self-undermining and has unacceptable\ud normative conesquences it should be rejected,\ud they claim. Here is Nagel"s recent formulation of the use of\ud evolutionary hypothesis about the origin of our minddesign

Algebra of Theoretical Term Reductions in the Sciences

An elementary algebra identifies conceptual and corresponding applicational limitations in John Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim’s (K-O) 1956 model of theoretical reduction in the sciences. The K-O model was once widely accepted, at least in spirit, but seems afterward to have been discredited, or in any event superceeded. Today, the K-O reduction model is seldom mentioned, except to clarify when a reduction in the Kemeny-Oppenheim sense is not intended. The present essay takes a fresh look at the basic mathematics of K-O comparative vocabulary theoretical term reductions, from historical and philosophical standpoints, as a contribution to the history of the philosophy of science. The K-O theoretical reduction model qualifies a theory replacement as a successful reduction when preconditions of explanatory adequacy and comparable systematicization are met, and there occur fewer numbers of theoretical terms identified as replicable syntax types in the most economical statement of a theory’s putative propositional truths, as compared with the theoretical term count for the theory it replaces. The challenge to the historical model developed here, to help explain its scope and limitations, involves the potential for equivocal theoretical meanings of multiple theoretical term tokens of the same syntactical type

On the weak Lefschetz Property of graded modules over K[x,y]K[x,y]

It is known that graded cyclic modules over $S=K[x,y]$ have the Weak Lefschetz Property (WLP). This is not true for non-cyclic modules over $S$. The purpose of this note is to study which conditions on $S$-modules ensure the WLP. We give an algorithm to test the WLP for graded modules with fixed Hilbert function. In particular, we prove that indecomposable graded modules over $S$ with the Hilbert function $(h_0,h_1)$ have the WLP

On the Reduction of Genetics to Molecular Biology

The applicability of Nagel\u27s concept of theory reduction, and related concepts of reduction, to the reduction of genetics to molecular biology is examined using the lactose operon in Escherichia coli as an example. Geneticists have produced the complete nucleotide sequence of two of the genes which compose this operon. If any example of reduction in genetics should fit Nagel\u27s analysis, the lactose operon should. Nevertheless, Nagel\u27s formal conditions of theory reduction are inapplicable in this case. Instead, it is argued that genetics has been partially reduced to molecular biology in the sense of token-token reduction

Disordered Cellular automata traffic flow models

In this paper, we extend the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) model by introducing disordered acceleration and deceleration terms. The disorder leads to segregated states where the flow is constant at intermediate densities for high values of breaking probability p. Within the model we present a density wave behavior appears below a critical value of p. Such result was found in car following models with an optimal velocity. The behavior of the gap distribution shows that the traffic exhibits a self organized criticality for high values of p and random deceleration.In this paper, we extend the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) model by introducing disordered acceleration and deceleration terms. The disorder leads to segregated states where the flow is constant at intermediate densities for high values of breaking probability p. Within the model we present a density wave behavior appears below a critical value of p. Such result was found in car following models with an optimal velocity. The behavior of the gap distribution shows that the traffic exhibits a self organized criticality for high values of p and random deceleration

Deceleration in The Micro Traffic Model and Its Application to Simulation for Evacuation from Disaster Area

Referring to the Nagel–Schreckenberg’s (NaSch) model, we have studied the impact of agent and diligent driver into the micro traffic model in the case of evacuation. This study is attention to the deceleration that added in the micro traffic model. The effect of deceleration to simulation for evacuation from disaster area is considered. The traffic flow property is studied by analyzing the time-space diagram. The simulation results show that deceleration caused the evacuation time increases when we compare it by without deceleration