Large Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation

Comparisons of resource assessments suggest resource constraints are not an obstacle to the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies. Economic analysis identifies barriers to the adoption of renewable energy sources resulting from market structure, competition in an uneven playing field and various non-market place barriers. However, even if these barriers are removed, the problem of ‘technology lock-out’ remains. The key policy response is strategic deployment coupled with increased R&D support to accelerate the pace of improvement through market experience. The paper suggests significant contributions from various technologies, but does not assess their optimal or maximal market share.technology policy, renewable energy, learning externalities, market structure

Optimal congestion treatment for bilateral electricity trading

How to treat transmission constraints in electricity markets that are not based on a pool but on bilateral trading? Three approaches are currently discussed: First, the system operator resolves constraints and socialises costs; second, physical transmission contracts; third, locational charging with the option of financial hedging. Socialisation of costs for constraint resolution results in inefficient dispatch and incorrect incentives for investment in generation. Physical contracts and locational charging designs have identical properties in a very simplified model world, but differ if transaction costs, illiquid markets and uncertainty about demand are considered. Physical transmission contracts are best designed as zonal access rights, but have to be centrally administered to be efficient. Only locational charging can cope with uncertainty and volatility of electricity demand efficiently and non-discriminatory. Qualitative arguments allow ranking of designs involving physical contracts and locational charging. Comparison with a system operator socialising costs requires network specific analysis.Electricity Networks, Constraint Management, Market Design, Bilateral Trading

Allocation of Carbon Emission Certificates in the Power Sector: How generators profit from grandfathered rights

To meet its Kyoto requirements, the EU will establish an internal market for carbon dioxide allowances from 2005, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). National governments are to allocate most of these allowances for free. The analysis shows that as a result the net value of both a typical pulverised coal-fired (PC) power station and a more modern gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) will increase. We show that in future allocation rounds a greater proportion of allowances can and should be auctioned. The paper also analyses the interactions with the Large Combustion Plant Directive, which limits SO2 and NOx emissionselectricity generation, eu emission trading, allocation, updating, grandfathering

‘Definition of a Balancing Point for Electricity Transmission Contracts’

Electricity transmission contracts allocate scarce resources, allow hedging against locational price differences and provide information to guide investment. Liquidity is increased if all transmission contracts are defined relative to one balancing point, then a set of two contracts can replicate any point to point contract. We propose an algorithm and apply it to the European electricity network to identify a well connected balancing point that exhibits minimal relative cross-price responses and hence reduces market power exercised by generation companies. Market level data which is difficult to obtain or model such as price levels in different regions or that is dependent on the time scale of interaction, as demand elasticity, is not required. The only critical input quantities are assumptions on future transmission constraint patterns.Transmission contract design, Congestion management, Market Power, European electricity network

Comparison of Feed in Tariff, Quota and Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development

A comparison of policy instruments employed to support onshore wind projects suggests that in terms of capacity installed, policies adopted in Germany have been more effective than those adopted in the UK. Price comparisons have frequently neglected differences in resource base: once accounted for we find the cost of policies to be similar. A developer survey identifies planning constraints as only one reason why installed capacity is greater in Germany, and indicates that price support is also important. Information provided by developers also suggests that although the tendering process adopted in the UK is highly competitive in terms of price paid for energy delivered, competition in other areas of the market is significantly lower than in Germany.Wind Generation, Renewable Energy, Subsidy, Policy

Auctions to gas transmission access: The British experience

When access to monopoly owned networks is constrained auctioning access rights can increase the efficiency of allocations relative to negotiation and grandfathering when there is sufficient competition among network users. Historically, access rights to entry capacity on the British gas network were granted by the monopoly network owner via negotiation; rights were later based on regulated tariffs with an increasing reliance on market based constraint resolution by the system operator. In 1999 an auction mechanism for allocating rights was introduced. Comparing the different allocation methods we conclude that where there is competition at entry terminals auctions have been successful with respect to anticipating spot prices, capturing producer rents and reducing the costs of alleviating network constraints. Moreover, auctions are more transparent and better facilitate entry.gas, network, access, auction, regulation

A Comparison of Electricity Market Designs in Networks

In the real world two classes of market designs are implemented to trade electricity in transmission constrained networks. Analytical results show that in two node networks integrated market designs reduce the ability of electricity generators to exercise market power relative to separated market designs. In multi node networks countervailing effects make an analytic analysis difficult. We present a formulation of both market designs as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We find that in a realistic network, prices are lower with the integrated market design.

Border Tax Adjustments: A feasible way to address nonparticipation in Emission Trading

CO2 emission certificates internalise effects of fossil fuel consumption on global climate and sea levels. If they are only implemented in some countries, then their effectiveness is limited; Consumption, production and investment decisions do not reach the optimal allocation, production with inefficient technologies in non-participating countries can even be increased. Furthermore industry lobbying might result in limited application of CO2 emission certificates or less ambitious reduction targets. Border tax adjustment at the level of additional costs incurred for procurement of CO2 emission permits during production of processed materials using best available technology limits the distortions. We show that it can be compatible with WTO constraints. Crucial features of a practicable implementation are simplicity achieved by a focus on the CO2 emissions caused by processed materials and a separate treatment of electric energy input to take account of regionally varying fuel mixes.Border Tax, Emission Trading, WTO law, International trade

Implications of intermittency and transmission constraints for renewables deployment

We represent hourly, regional wind data and transmission constraints in an investment planning model calibrated to the UK and test sensitivities of least cost expansions to fuel and technology prices. Thus we can calculate the value of transmission expansions to the system. We represent limited public acceptance of wind and regional network constraints by maximum built rates per region and year. Thus we calculate the marginal value of improved planning and grid connection regimes. It is likely that some constraints will remain. Market designs that do not allow for regional differentiation to reflect transmission and planning constraints can increase overall costs to consumers.Investment planning model, wind power, constraint land, Network constraints.