Four problems with global carbon markets: a critical review

This article offers a critique of global carbon markets and trading, with a special focus on the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. It explores problems with the use of tradable permits to address climate change revolving around four areas: homogeneity, justice, gaming, and information. Homogeneity problems arise from the non-linear nature of climate change and sensitivity of emissions, which complicate attempts to calculate carbon offsets. Justice problems involve issues of dependency and the concentration of wealth among the rich, meaning carbon trading often counteracts attempts to reduce poverty. Gaming problems include pressures to promote high-volume, least-cost projects and the consequences of emissions leakage. Information problems encompass transaction costs related to carbon trading and market participation and the comparatively weak institutional capacity of project evaluators

External sources of clean technology: evidence from the clean development mechanism

New technology is fundamental to sustainable development. However, inventors from industrialized countries often refuse technology transfer because they worry about reverse-engineering. When can clean technology transfer succeed? We develop a formal model of the political economy of North–South technology transfer. According to the model, technology transfer is possible if (1) the technology in focus has limited global commercial potential or (2) the host developing country does not have the capacity to absorb new technologies for commercial use. If both conditions fail, inventors from industrialized countries worry about the adverse competitiveness effects of reverse-engineering, so technology transfer fails. Data analysis of technology transfer in 4,894 projects implemented under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism during the 2004–2010 period provides evidence in support of the model

Small donors in world politics: The role of trust funds in the foreign aid policies of Central and Eastern European donors

The Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states have emerged as new donors of international development assistance since the turn of the millennium. The literature has tended to focus on the bilateral components of these policies, and neglected CEE multilateral aid. This paper contributes to filling this gap by examining how and why CEE donors contribute to trust funds operated by multilateral donors. The aim of the paper is twofold: First, it provides a descriptive account of how CEE countries use trust funds in the allocation of their foreign aid. Second, it explains this allocation using data from qualitative interviews with CEE officials. CEE countries make much less use of trust funds than might be expected. This is due not only to the loss of visibility and control over their resources, but also to how CEE companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) rarely achieve funding successes at multilateral organisations