Entanglement Dynamics after a Quench in Ising Field Theory: A Branch Point Twist Field Approach

We extend the branch point twist field approach for the calculation of entanglement entropies to time-dependent problems in 1+1-dimensional massive quantum field theories. We focus on the simplest example: a mass quench in the Ising field theory from initial mass m0 to final mass m. The main analytical results are obtained from a perturbative expansion of the twist field one-point function in the post-quench quasi-particle basis. The expected linear growth of the Rényi entropies at large times mt ≫ 1 emerges from a perturbative calculation at second order. We also show that the Rényi and von Neumann entropies, in infinite volume, contain subleading oscillatory contributions of frequency 2m and amplitude proportional to (mt)−3/2. The oscillatory terms are correctly predicted by an alternative perturbation series, in the pre-quench quasi-particle basis, which we also discuss. A comparison to lattice numerical calculations carried out on an Ising chain in the scaling limit shows very good agreement with the quantum field theory predictions. We also find evidence of clustering of twist field correlators which implies that the entanglement entropies are proportional to the number of subsystem boundary points

Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods

While the benefits of common and public goods are shared, they tend to be scarce when contributions are provided voluntarily. Failure to cooperate in the provision or preservation of these goods is fundamental to sustainability challenges, ranging from local fisheries to global climate change. In the real world, such cooperative dilemmas occur in multiple interactions with complex strategic interests and frequently without full information. We argue that voluntary cooperation enabled across overlapping coalitions (akin to polycentricity) not only facilitates a higher generation of non-excludable public goods, but it may also allow evolution toward a more cooperative, stable, and inclusive approach to governance. Contrary to any previous study, we show that these merits of multi-coalition governance are far more general than the singular examples occurring in the literature, and they are robust under diverse conditions of excludability, congestion of the non-excludable public good, and arbitrary shapes of the return-to-contribution function. We first confirm the intuition that a single coalition without enforcement and with players pursuing their self-interest without knowledge of returns to contribution is prone to cooperative failure. Next, we demonstrate that the same pessimistic model but with a multi-coalition structure of governance experiences relatively higher cooperation by enabling recognition of marginal gains of cooperation in the game at stake. In the absence of enforcement, public-goods regimes that evolve through a proliferation of voluntary cooperative forums can maintain and increase cooperation more successfully than singular, inclusive regimes.Supported by US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (D17AC00005), National Science Foundation grant GEO-1211972, and Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) through grants PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014, PTDC/EEI-SII/5081/2014, and UID/BIA/04050/2013. P.M.H. was supported by the Walbridge Fund at the Princeton Environmental Institute