7,863 research outputs found

    Topological triviality of smoothly knotted surfaces in 4-manifolds

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    Some generalizations and variations of the Fintushel-Stern rim surgery are known to produce smoothly knotted surfaces. We show that if the fundamental groups of their complements are cyclic, then these surfaces are topologically unknotted. Using a twist-spinning construction from high-dimensional knot theory, we construct examples of knotted surfaces whose complements have cyclic fundamental groups.Comment: Final version; appeared in AMS Transactions. 15 pages, 2 figure

    Double point surgery and configurations of surfaces

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    We introduce a new operation, double point surgery, on immersed surfaces in a 4-manifold, and use it to construct knotted configurations of surfaces in many 4-manifolds. Taking branched covers, we produce smoothly exotic actions of Z/m x Z/n on simply connected 4-manifolds with complicated fixed-point sets.Comment: Final version; to appear in Journal of Topology. Removed assertion about the restriction of the Z/m x Z/n action to the Z/m and Z/n subgroup

    Multilevel Network Games

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    We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improve their communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network. The nn nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goal of a node vv is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from vv to all other nodes plus a fixed price α>0\alpha > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gateways the communication distance is 00, and gateways also improve other nodes' distances by behaving as shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we show that for α≤n−1\alpha \leq n-1, the price of anarchy is Θ(n/α)\Theta(n/\sqrt{\alpha}) and in this range equilibria always exist. In range α∈(n−1,n(n−1))\alpha \in (n-1,n(n-1)) the price of anarchy is Θ(α)\Theta(\sqrt{\alpha}), and for α≥n(n−1)\alpha \geq n(n-1) it is constant. For the MAX-game, we show that the price of anarchy is either Θ(1+n/α)\Theta(1 + n/\sqrt{\alpha}), for α≥1\alpha\geq 1, or else 11. Given a graph with girth of at least 4α4\alpha, equilibria always exist. Concerning the dynamics, both the SUM-game and the MAX-game are not potential games. For the SUM-game, we even show that it is not weakly acyclic.Comment: An extended abstract of this paper has been accepted for publication in the proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE
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