Optimal Emission Tax with Endogenous Location Choice of Duopolistic Firms

This paper explores optimal environmental tax policy under which duopoly firms strategically choose the location of their plants in a simple three-stage game. We examine how the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the choice of location of duopoly firms affects the welfare of the home country. We characterize the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the fixed cost, depending on the degree of environmental damage from production. Finally, we show the existence of asymmetric equilibrium in which either firm chooses relocation of its plant even if the duopoly firms are identical ex ante.Environmental policy, Relocation, Welfare

Partial Harmonization of Corporate Taxes in an Asymmetric Repeated Game Setting

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three heterogenous countries with respect to their capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., any group of countries), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the capital endowment of the median country relative to those of the large and small countries. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country to the average capital endowment of the large and small countries, the less likely is the tax harmonization including the median country to prevail and the more likely is the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country to prevail.tax coordination, asymmetric countries, repeated game, tax competition

On the Sustainability of Partial Tax Harmonization among Asymmetric Countries

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries asymmetric in repect to their capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., any group of asymmetric countries), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the capital endowment of the median country relative to those of the large and small countries. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country to the average capital endowment of the large and small countries, the less likely is the tax harmonization including the median country to prevail and the more likely is the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country to prevail

Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting

This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable.partial tax coordination, repeated game, tax competition

Optimal emission tax with endogenous location choice of duopolistic firms

This paper explores optimal environmental tax policy under which duopoly firms strategically choose the location of their plants in a simple three-stage game. We examine how the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the choice of location of duopoly firms affects the welfare of the home country. We characterize the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the fixed cost, depending on the degree of environmental damage from production. Finally, we show the existence of asymmetric equilibrium in which either firm chooses relocation of its plant even if the duopoly firms are identical ex ante.

Omental leiomyosarcoma with unusual giant cells in a Beagle dog — Short communication

A 10-year-old castrated male Beagle dog was presented with a 2-month history of intermittent vomiting and abdominal pain. The dog was referred to the Veterinary Teaching Hospital at Iwate University for further evaluation, and a splenic tumour was suspected on the basis of ultrasonography and computed tomography. Surgery identified a large, solid, light-pink mass on the greater omentum with blood-coloured ascites in the abdominal cavity, and resection was performed. Microscopically, the mass comprised spindle-shaped tumour cells and scattered osteoclast-like giant cells. Most spindle-shaped cells were positive for vimentin, desmin, and smooth muscle actin (α-SMA), whereas osteoclast-like giant cells were positive only for vimentin. On the basis of histopathological and immunohistochemical findings, a diagnosis of leiomyosarcoma was made. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first report of leiomyosarcoma associated with osteoclast-like giant cells developing from the greater omentum in a dog

エノキの組織培養と不定根の誘導

エノキ (Celtis sinensis Pers. var, japonica Nakai) の成木の新枝よりナフタレン酢酸 (NAA) 1. 0mg/ℓ, 6-ベンジルアミノプリン (BAP) 0. 1mg/ℓを含むイオン強度を半分にした改変 Murashige-Skoog (MS) 培地を用い緑色カルスを誘導した。このカルスの生育は早く, プランテックスを用いて25℃で2, 500luxの照光下培養した場合, 9週間で絶乾重量が9倍になった。このカルスを0. 5mg/ℓのNAAと1. 0mg/ℓのBAPを含む改変MS培地を用いて暗黒下培養したところ, 67％の率で根が誘導された。A green compact callus was induced from sterilized shoots of Japanese hackberry (Celtis sinensis Pers. var. japonica Nakai) on a Murashige-Skoog medium supplemented with 1.0mg/ ℓ 1-naphthaleneacetic acid (NAA) and 0.1 mg/ ℓ 6-benzylaminopurine (BAP). The callus grew fast on this medium in PLANTEX to attain 9 fold amount of dry weight at 9 weeks incubation at 25℃ with a continuous illumination of 2, 500 lux. Roots were regenerated from the callus after incubation for 4 weeks under dark at hormonal combination of 0.5mg/ ℓ NAA and 1.0 mg/ ℓ BAP at a relatively high frequency of 67%